In Young v. United Parcel Service the Supreme Court held 6-3 that a plaintiff alleging that the denial of an accommodation constitutes disparate treatment under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s second clause (employers must treat women “affected by pregnancy . . . the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work”) must first, per McDonnell Douglas, show that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others “similar in their ability or inability to work.”  The employer may then seek to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons for denying her accommodation.  But those reason normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those whom the employer accommodates.  If the employer offers a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reason, the plaintiff may show that the employer’s proffered reasons are in fact pretextual.