PM
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

The Innovation ISSUE

SPECIAL REPORT
LGR: LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW

NOVEMBER 2020
ICMA.ORG/PM

NOVEMBER 2020 VOL. 102 NO. 11

CONTENTS

PM
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

FEATURES

f11photo/stock.adobe.com

DEPARTMENTS

Thomas Dutour/stock.adobe.com

ICMA
International City/County Management Association

Cover image: peshkova/stock.adobe.com

The Murky World of *Endorsements*

What's OK and **What's Not?** | BY MARTHA PEREGO, ICMA-CM

Stewardship of the public's money is an enormous obligation. Local governments, along with states, spend over $2 trillion annually procuring goods and services on the public's behalf. When the process is done with transparency, fairness, and on a level playing field, the outcome should be acquiring the best product or service at a competitive price provided by the most competent of sources. When done the right way, it sends the message that residents can trust their officials to be good stewards of their money. It fortifies the critical principle that holding public office is a public trust.

The guideline on endorsements under Tenet 12 of the ICMA Code of Ethics draws a line of demarcation designed to keep local government managers and the organizations they represent neutral when it comes to commerce.

Tenet 12. Public office is a public trust. A member shall not leverage his or her position for personal gain or benefit.

Endorsements. Members should not endorse commercial products or services by agreeing to use their photograph, endorsement, or quotation in paid or other commercial advertisements, marketing materials, social media, or other documents, whether the member is compensated or not for the member's support. Members may, however, provide verbal professional references as part of the due diligence phase of competitive process or in response to a direct inquiry.

Members may agree to endorse the following, provided they do not receive any compensation: (1) books or other publications; (2) professional development or educational services provided by nonprofit membership organizations or recognized educational institutions; (3) products and/or services in which the local government has a direct economic interest.

Members' observations, opinions, and analyses of commercial products used or tested by their local governments are appropriate and useful to the profession when included as part of professional articles and reports.

As clear a line drawn here, applying this can be a challenge given the many interactions between vendors and local government staff. The rapidly evolving nature of social media marketing and reliance on partnerships to provide services can make it even more challenging. Here are some of the murky scenarios where members sought advice.

MARTHA PEREGO, ICMA-CM, is director of member services and ethics director, ICMA, Washington, D.C. (mperego@icma.org).

ICMA

International City/County Management Association

icma.org

November 2020

Public Management *(PM)* (USPS: 449-300) is published monthly by ICMA (the International City/County Management Association) at 777 North Capitol Street. N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002-4201. Periodicals postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices. The opinions expressed in the magazine are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ICMA.

REPRINTS: To order article reprints or request reprint permission, contact pm@icma.org.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: U.S. subscription rate, $46 per year; other countries subscription rate, $155 per year.
Printed in the United States.
Contact: 202/289-4262; subscriptions@icma.org.

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Public Management, ICMA, 777 N. Capitol Street, N.E., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20002-4201.

ARTICLE PROPOSALS: Visit icma.org/pm to see "Editorial Guidelines" for contributors.

For more information on local government leadership and management topics, visit icma.org.

Public Management (PM)

icma.org/pm

ICMA
777 North Capitol Street, N.E.
Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20002-4201

EDITORIAL OFFICE:
pm@icma.org

ADVERTISING SALES:
Kyle Elgin, MCI USA
410.316.9866
kyle.elgin@mci-group.com
Learn more at https://go.networkmediapartners.com/icma-mediakit

ICMA MEMBER SERVICES:
800.745.8780 | 202.962.3680
membership@icma.org

ICMA
Creating and Supporting Thriving Communities
ICMA's vision is to be the leading association of local government professionals dedicated to creating and supporting thriving communities throughout the world. It does this by working with its more than 12,000 members to identify and speed the adoption of leading local government practices and improve the lives of residents. ICMA offers membership, professional development programs, research, publications, data and information, technical assistance, and training to thousands of city, town, and county chief administrative officers, their staffs, and other organizations throughout the world.

Public Management (PM) aims to inspire innovation, inform decision making, connect leading-edge thinking to everyday challenges, and serve ICMA members and local governments in creating and sustaining thriving communities throughout the world.

Our town recently contracted with FirstNet, the public safety network. AT&T won a multi-year contract from the federal government to host and build out the system. Now FirstNet is asking us to provide a "testimonial" video. I hesitate to say no because of FirstNet's mission. But given their connection with AT&T, is this okay?

FirstNet is an independent authority within the U.S. Department of Commerce authorized by Congress. By offering a testimonial, you would be recommending that local governments join FirstNet. The fact that it is powered by private entities in a public-private is secondary. Your testimonial may appear to be endorsing their partner AT&T, but that is not the case. One last thought: if you have discomfort, then you should follow your instincts and decline!

I serve on the board of my state's intergovernmental risk pool. They are doing a promotional video that includes interviews with member cities to highlight the success of the pool. The pool was created as a joint self-insurance fund for municipalities and they represent most local governments in the state. Is there any issue with my participation in the video?

No. Because this is a self-insurance fund created solely to provide coverage for local governments, this meets the exception in the endorsement guideline under "direct economic benefit." The ICMA Committee on Professional Conduct opined that there is a direct economic benefit to the communities that participate. That economic benefit could be realized via the lower insurance rates and/or dividends returned to local governments based on their risk experience.

I am a member of a gym that provides one-on-one fitness training, and they have solicited me to provide a customer review on Google. My alert is high with these solicitations, especially when they could directly influence my ability to serve the community. The facility is located approximately 25 miles from my place of employment and is a small owner-operated facility. Is it okay to post an online review?

The general idea behind the endorsement guideline is to avoid those situations where you would be using or leveraging in fact or appearance your official position, title, or the reputation of your organization for the benefit of the "for profit" world. If that gym was located in your city, then the advice would be to say no. Even though your use of the facility would have nothing to do with your day job, proximity would have the potential to create a connection. However, the scenario you describe is different. The connection to your work is non-existent. Offering a customer review as a private individual is not an ethics issue.

The last murky issue is one that is frequently presented by vendors and firms to local government staff: will you serve as a panelist for our webinar? Webinars are murky situations because they are a common marketing tool used to promote a business. Before agreeing to participate, confirm that the content will be educational and not promotional in nature. Also confirm that the final webinar will not be posted on the firm's website as a marketing tool, nor will the participants' image or words be used in other marketing materials.

Local governments have an interest in sharing their experience with private sector partners so that others may learn from that experience. The manner in which that information is shared must be balanced, objective, and not leverage the reputation of the local government or its staff to the benefit of the private sector partner. PM

PM PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

ICMA Executive Director	Marc Ott
Director, Equity & Social Justice	**Lynne Scott** lscott@icma.org
Managing Editor	**Kerry Hansen** khansen@icma.org
Newsletter Editor	**Kathleen Karas** kkaras@icma.org
Graphics Manager	**Delia Jones** djones@icma.org
Design & Production	picantecreative.com

FPO-FSC Logo

Focus on the *Silver Linings*

BY CLAIRE JUBB

How the unprecedented challenges of the pandemic made us **stronger**

I took a vacation recently—a very safe, COVID-friendly vacation in beautiful north Florida. I intentionally unplugged, knowing that I needed the time to reflect on the past few months.

Taking the time away gave me the opportunity to recognize what my organization, and I am sure, your organizations, have been doing for the past few months, and how I am so incredibly honored to be in public service at this point in history.

On March 6, 2020, I started my new position as assistant county administrator for Charlotte County, Florida. At that time, COVID-19 was still something to read about in the news, I didn't know what PPE stood for, and I had no idea how many ICU beds we had in our local hospitals. I didn't know how to use Microsoft Teams, had never heard of Zoom, and was

Kateryna/stock.adobe.com

CLAIRE JUBB, AICP, CFM, is assistant county administrator of Charlotte County, Florida (claire.jubb@charlottecountyfl.gov).

still (albeit naively) planning which conferences I was going to attend this year, including my first Florida City and County Managers Association conference.

I have seen more change in the provision of local government services and the way local government works in the past six months than I have seen in my entire career to date (18 years in this organization). This is not just change to make it through the pandemic; this is real, fundamental change in the way we operate.

However, I don't want to dwell on the pandemic. I want to focus on the silver linings our challenges have brought and share some that have made Charlotte County a stronger and more resilient organization.

> **Take a step back, reflect, and recognize how much amazing work is being done by so many in our profession in these historic times.**

The most significant change is teleworking. As an organization, we had a teleworking policy in place with one person working remotely. Most of our staff had regular desktop PCs and everything that comes with them.

Between our IT department and our HR department, we were able to deploy over 300 remote workers, sending pretty much everyone who didn't work in the field and didn't have to be in the office to work from home. This was done by sourcing any available laptop in the county, plus allowing staff to take home their desktops and monitors where laptops weren't available. It was a huge effort and one that made us realize the long-term benefits of teleworking. As a result, we have made a significant investment in both hardware and software and reworked our teleworking policy to fully integrate a teleworking option into our organization. This will also allow us to revisit our master space plan and adjust for this new way of working.

The human services department was tasked with the need to provide financial support to many in our community almost as soon as the first executive order was issued. To do this they reached out to some amazing community groups and activated our Community Organizations Active in a Disaster (COAD) group. This collaborative partnership allowed the quick deployment of a website designed to be an easy universal entry point for all of the financial assistance that was available either through the county or various community nonprofits (www.COADFL.org). This approach has changed the way our applicants access our services, significantly increased the awareness of the available programs, and decreased the complexity of the application. This cooperation has extended beyond our initial push into the disbursement of our CARES act funding and has changed the way we approach human services in our community.

Other similar success stories have been seen throughout our organization. Drive-up libraries have issued over 180,000 items to over 27,000 patrons when libraries were closed. Facebook Live aqua aerobics and other sports and fitness content has been viewed by many residents who loved the interaction.

Our tourism staff created a program to sell T-shirts supporting our human services programs to our snowbirds and visitors who were not able to be with us, raising thousands of dollars and ensuring those snowbirds are still part of the community they spend their vacations and winters in.

The community development department transitioned from a primarily in-person service to a 100-percent online service. Technology had just been deployed to facilitate this, but it had not yet been launched to the public. Staff was tasked with both learning a new system and teaching the public how to use it. The lasting result has been an increase to a staggering 85 percent of all permit applications now coming in completely digitally even after the department has fully opened.

PurpleHousePhotos/stock.adobe.com

Our public service workers have become true agents for change. They have taken unprecedented challenges in their stride and put our citizens and their needs front and center. They have developed and implemented creative and innovative ways to provide the services that are needed along with the quality of life services that help to make life a little better. They have eliminated policies and procedures that have been in place for years and taken a leap into the unknown showing true community spirit and a level of resourcefulness that will make our organizations significantly stronger to face the next challenges.

Take a step back, reflect, and recognize how much amazing work is being done by so many in our profession in these historic times. It certainly helped me put things into perspective, and if you would like to know more about any of our programs, please don't hesitate to contact me. PM

Overcoming Unconscious *Veteran Bias*

In honor of Veterans Day, we recognize the **leadership value** that veterans bring to local government.

BY DARRIN TANGEMAN

Over the last five years, I have dedicated a significant portion of my personal and professional life advocating for and establishing programs to bring military veterans into the local government profession. My passion was initially catalyzed by my own struggles to break into local government following my retirement from the military. However, I quickly gravitated toward advocacy for other veterans after observing the many sociocultural obstacles and unconscious bias that veterans often face from other career local government professionals.

I sometimes hear from my peers that they are hesitant to hire a veteran because they may not be a good fit. This belief is often perpetuated by false stereotypes from popular culture that often portray veterans as too regimented or autocratic in nature. This bias often leads to eliminating talented, well-trained, disciplined, and experienced leaders that have a passion for public service before they even have the opportunity to interview.

Some colleagues have even confided that they are concerned by a veteran candidate's leadership training and experience, and see them as a potential threat to their own future success. This of course is shortsighted and contrary to the diversity and inclusion mantra of *pull up a chair—there's room for everyone at the table.*

In warfare, the phrase *winning hearts and minds* is a concept in which one side of a conflict seeks to prevail by making emotional or intellectual appeals to sway supporters of the other side. With less than three percent of our nation's current workforce having served in the military, it takes significant time and effort for hiring authorities and HR professionals to relate and humanize a veteran's experience and skills to the local government profession. While winning the hearts and minds of individuals is a good start, it is not enough. It takes sociocultural change and broader organizational reinforcement to achieve long-lasting change.

We can start with training our employees and HR professionals, but even the most well-designed training is not enough to resolve veteran bias by itself, so we must reinforce these ideas within our broader organizations. When local government professionals are told their perceptions of veterans are wrong, they sometimes feel attacked and often shut down. A key to success is to avoid blaming individuals and accept that bias is normal, but organizationally unacceptable.

iStock.com/SDI Productions

So, what can we do to help military veterans succeed in a second career in local government? As local government leaders, we must lead from the front, proactively mentor and coach veterans in need, train our leadership and team to understand the skills and value veterans bring to local government, remove arbitrary local government experience barriers in our recruitment process, and ensure that our organizational values reinforce a culture of diversity, equity, and inclusion.

I am proud that ICMA has placed significant resources toward raising awareness and developing support structures to recognize the leadership value and directly relevant experience that veterans bring to local government. The Veterans Local Government Management Fellowship is one such program that has succeeded in placing veterans in local governments across the nation, including more than 10 chief administrative officers in the last four years, so that individuals like Maria Morales can continue to serve communities just as they served our country. ICMA also formed a task force in 2018 to develop the "Veterans Guide to Finding a Job in Local Government" and the "Human Resources Recruitment Handbook for Hiring Veterans for Local Government Positions."

Lastly, ICMA will officially form a Veterans Advisory Board in 2020 to support the transition of veterans to local government, develop and improve programs and services aimed at improving veteran preparation for local government careers, and conduct outreach to build better relationships among the veteran community, military installations, and local governments. PM

Speak up, ICMA!

Email us your thoughts on the issues of equity, inclusion, race, and social justice to **speakup@icma.org.**

DARRIN TANGEMAN, ICMA-CM, is city manager of Woodland Park, Colorado. He is the co-founder and local program coordinator of the Veterans Local Government Management Fellowship, and chair of ICMA's inaugural Veterans Advisory Board. (dtangeman@icma.org)

Visit ICMA's Career Center for more coaching resources

Plus....

- Digital archives
- Career Compass monthly advice column
- CoachConnect for one-to-one coach matching
- Live speed coaching events, talent development resources, and more.

UPCOMING FREE WEBINARS

Thursday, November 12

Sponsored by ICMA-RC, ICMA Premier Level Strategic Partner

Talent Management in the 21st Century: Growing, Attracting, and Retaining Your Best

Register at **icma.org/coachingwebinars**

Can't make it to the live webinar? *Register and get an automatic email notice when the recording is available.*

*Visit **icma.org/coaching** or email **coaching@icma.org** to join our email list!*

All webinars are 90 minutes, and will be held at the same time of day: *10:30am Pacific, 12:30pm Central, 11:30am Mountain, and 1:30pm Eastern*

Learn more at **icma.org/coaching**

ENCOURAGING INNOVATION

Through International Science and Research Partnerships with Local Government

Bringing together local government and global research organizations is a win-win.

BY DALE G. MEDEARIS, PHD AND E. WILLIAM COLGLAZIER, PHD

bestber/stockadobe.com

Located in Alexandria, Virginia, Alexandria Renew Enterprises is one of the most advanced water resource recovery public utilities in the United States.



Through an international partnership with Dr. Berhhard Wett to help with AlexRenew's process design, it was recommended that AlexRenew install hydrocyclones to enhance granule retention and system performance.

More than ever before, the COVID-19 global pandemic has revealed the necessity of global science and research cooperation. In April, Pew Research published a study indicating that 86 percent of Americans support international cooperation to fight infectious disease.[1] The study confirmed the public's perceptions of the importance of international cooperation on a range of national-level science- and research-related matters, such as cybersecurity or nuclear proliferation.

A cooperative agreement with VCS Denmark inspired AlexRenew to launch a mainstream deammonification program.

But in the United States, global science and research cooperation—especially that which is governmentally funded (federal, state, or local)—suffers from the perception that it is marginal when addressing the economic, social, and environmental concerns of ordinary U.S. citizens and communities. Generally speaking, government-led science and research cooperation in the United States has overlooked global engagements that can help to accomplish such things as removing lead from drinking water in Flint, Michigan; enhancing vocational training in Toledo, Ohio; or promoting climate-resilient communities in Northern Virginia.

Part of the problem is that the prevailing paradigm of government-supported international science and research cooperation in the United States has under-emphasized applied, problem-focused, goal-oriented transfers of policy and technical innovations that address ecological, health, and economic challenges at the local level. This perception is best reflected in Congressman Randy Neugebauer’s comment in Congressional budget hearings for international science and technology cooperation before the House Committee on Research and Science Education in 2008, “why we are exporting American tax dollars” in the name of “our international participation in science diplomacy?”[2]

The sad reality is that by multiple quantitative benchmarks, the United States and its cities lag far behind many other countries in arenas such as public health, urban infrastructure, education, and climate resiliency planning. There is also the stigmatization of international work at the local level and perceptions that it consists only of lavish junkets abroad or event-based cultural exchanges lacking outcomes benefitting U.S. citizens. Moreover, the transfer of policy and technical innovations is not as simple as “add water and stir.” Transferring smart cities technologies from Berlin to Fairfax County depends on strategically orchestrated cooperation among the right constellation of academic, scientific, research, and governmental institutions and staff to ensure that the innovations suitably adapt to the unique conditions of the United States.

But change is underway, and a new form of international science and research engagement is emerging. This new model is characterized by a focus on unilateral transfers of policy and technical innovations from overseas to U.S. communities. This model builds on the prioritization of countries with which to engage based on economic interconnectedness (foreign investment and trade) and the assessed quality of the benefits about the policy and technical innovations to be transferred. Today’s cross-national science and research for U.S. cities also relies heavily on partnerships among the region’s local governments and regional science, research, educational, commercial, and civil society organizations to assist with the transfer and adoption process.

In Northern Virginia, this international engagement of outcome-oriented cross-national applied science and research cooperation has been playing out over many years. In Alexandria, Virginia, the local wastewater utility, Alexandria Renew, has worked for the past five years with counterpart utilities from Copenhagen, Denmark, and Innsbruck, Austria, to adopt a highly energy-efficient nitrogen extraction technology. The application of European anaerobic ammonium oxidation processes has helped the utility save the city money, realize 25 percent energy efficiency improvements in its operations, and mitigate emissions of a pernicious pollutant to the Chesapeake Bay by up to 50 percent. There is also the 20-year effort to

The AlexRenew Centrate Pre-Treatment Facility

If the past nature of international science and research collaboration was negatively stereotyped for being too far removed from the local level, then perhaps the post-COVID-19 world of global science and technology research will open up new forms of strategic engagement.

kras99/stock.adobe.com

restore Northern Virginia's Four Mile Run watershed, which has drawn heavily from Europe through applied research partnerships and the adoption of stormwater fee assessment methods, green infrastructure planning, low-impact development, and "green" roof techniques. The six-year-old *Solarize NOVA* program—which has created over 3MW of new solar PV and $8.8 million for the Northern Virginia region—evolved through partnerships between the Northern Virginia Regional Commission and counterparts in Stuttgart, Germany, together with George Mason University and the Local Energy Alliance Program (a regional NGO). At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Northern Virginia Regional Commission looked across the Atlantic to German cities such as Stuttgart and Kiel to learn and apply innovative public health policy lessons.

The pandemic revealed that more can be done through international science and research cooperation to help U.S. communities, especially through U.S.-based umbrella science, technology, and research organizations. For example, the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials is ideally positioned to research and recommend best-practice local-level public health pandemic response metrics. The American Society of Civil Engineers could explore ways in which its infrastructure report card might be framed on the basis of comparative benchmarking against global best practices counterparts. Then, it could take the next necessary step of assessing how any U.S. infrastructure deficiencies might be improved by transferring and applying those best practices. The American Geophysical Union's global membership of 65,000 could be tapped to help find and then apply in U.S. communities sustainable development innovations from abroad, especially through its unique locally focused Thriving Earth Exchange program. Umbrella organizations representing U.S cities and counties might also consider developing a formal international strategy that prioritizes cross-national science and research partnerships to help transfer and apply policy and technical innovations from overseas to towns and counties in the United States.

If there was a silver-lining to the COVID-19 pandemic, it is the realization of the inadequacy of go-it-alone approaches when fighting infectious diseases. If the past nature of international science and research collaboration was negatively stereotyped for being too far removed from the work at the local level, then perhaps the post-COVID-19 world of global science and technology research will open up new forms of strategic engagement shared in this article. Global science and research partnerships that bring together local governments and regional research, academic, and science organizations around the common goal of finding and applying technical and policy innovations from abroad that help U.S. cities is a win-win proposition. PM

ENDNOTES AND RESOURCES

[1] https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/04/13/americans-see-spread-of-disease-as-top-international-threat-along-with-terrorism-nuclear-weapons-cyberattacks/

[2] https://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2013/new-frontier-for-government-supported-international-science-and-technology

DR. DALE G. MEDEARIS, PHD, is director of regional sustainability programs at the Northern Virginia Regional Commission (dmedearis@novaregion.org).

DR. WILLIAM E. COLGLAZIER, PHD, is editor-in-chief of Science & Diplomacy and senior scholar in the Center for Science Diplomacy at the American Association for Advancement of Science (bcolglaz@aol.com).

STRATEGY MANAGEMENT

Innovation Beyond Planning

BY KEL WANG

An evolving discipline that could be your organization's key to success

Local governments' uptake in strategy has been growing. You rarely see a municipality that doesn't have a strategic plan or any sort of strategy. It is important work as it leads to better community engagement, employee engagement, and prioritization.[1] But nothing is perfect. Are you aware of its limitations? Does it build the foundation you need to serve the community and to manage your organization? To better answer those questions, let's take a step back and understand the approach that activates this work.

The Evolution of the Approach

The work to develop a strategic plan or any sort of strategy is guided by a discipline called *strategic planning.* The approach was introduced to the public sector in the early 1980s as an innovation from the best-run private sector companies. It includes a series of phases or activities: scanning the environment, setting the vision and goals, and formulating the strategy. Strategic planning allows managers to think systematically about the future of the organization and the environment in which it operates by blending futuristic thinking, objective analysis, and subjective evaluation of values, goals, and priorities to chart future direction and courses of action.[2] But the value of good strategic planning is more than just inspiring strategic thinking. Many feel the need to use strategy to drive decisions and actions and to manage changes more effectively.[3]

To further enhance the organization's ability to advance the goals and implement the strategy, many organizations have been looking into a few more phases or activities: identifying and monitoring performance measures, aligning budgets to the strategy, internal change management throughout the organization, and engaging the community and soliciting their buy-in before the strategy is approved. This renewed version of strategic planning is known as *strategic management.* The idea is to follow through the strategic planning approach on multiple fronts, not just on the development of the strategy. It brings the community and a stronger organizational perspective into the equation.

A New Decade, A New Opportunity, A New Approach

Fast forward to where we are today, the pandemic we are currently experiencing has put our organizations' strategic capabilities to the test:

A community's needs and expectations for services have shifted. Due to physical distancing, people prefer remote and contactless access. It is likely that the shift

will continue as we reopen our economy. You may have already seen the need for new services, such as the business support service, that helps local businesses access government support programs.[4] So our understanding and traditional way of serving may not be most relevant. It is important to understand the changing needs so we can better serve.

The world is connected and fuzzy. Our local communities and organizations are not immune to external shocks. We have seen places that have managed to watch emerging issues globally and have responded timely in their own ways.[5] Those places not only created more lead time for themselves, but supported other communities in great need. It is important to have a better sense of the surrounding, so we can be more informed and less likely to be caught by surprise.

We have to address the above two points by bringing the organization together. Our organization is like a human body. It is crucial that the left hand knows what the right hand is doing. Leadership, prioritization, and accountability all play important roles in bringing the organization together. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Canadian Chief Public Health Officer Theresa Tam were role models of those qualities.

While the pandemic has affected us in many different ways, it can also be an opportunity to improve the way we develop strategies. In the last article, we introduced strategy management as a new approach and gave a few examples to demonstrate how it has assisted public organizations fighting the pandemic.[6] Here, we would like to dive in and articulate three benefits of strategy management compared to strategic management:

1. Community-centric

Community is front and center in strategy management. Strategy management focuses on developing organizational capabilities in "looking forward" to understand the changes in our community, in "looking into" our community to understand the diverse needs, and in "looking backward" to understand the implications to the community.

Under strategic management, community engagement tends to happen at the beginning of the development process. The engagement is based on a one-size-fits-all approach without recognizing multiple lines of services our organizations provide, and also without recognizing the diverse needs of the community in each line of service. In addition, the impact of our actions on the community are often overlooked.

2. A Two-way Approach

Strategy management values the input of frontline staff. While the project team leads the process to ensure the work is done properly, subject matter expertise is sought throughout the entire process because it is the best source of information when it comes to our community. Our front line staff are essential to the development and implementation of the strategy.

Under strategic management, the strategy is often developed between the project team and project sponsors (executives or council). Subject matter experts are brought in as needed. Because of the tight development process, after the strategy is approved, the project team or a separate team promotes the strategy within the organization and incorporates the strategy in employees' performance planning and rewarding processes. Most of the communication is one-way.

3. Ongoing Development

Strategy work is not considered a piece of work that happens at a point in time under strategy management. The world is connected, the change is constant, and our community's expectations are evolving; thus, the need to develop organizational capabilities to address those issues is ongoing. By that we mean each service area needs to change the way we do our work by developing a holistic view. The work should not be seen as just fulfilling a corporate ask that comes from the top. Developing organizational capabilities to answer those questions (see Chart 1) should also be the focus of our service areas—not solely the focus of the project team.

Under strategic management, the strategy work is a snapshot in time. By nature, each strategy has a life span valid for a limited period of time, but even so, the strategy can quickly become obsolete when the project sponsor is leaving the organization or the direction from council has changed significantly. Secondly, the development process is fairly lengthy. Depending on the size of your organization, the development and approval process can take anywhere from three to 24 months. It is possible that the information collected during the community engagement and environment scanning phases could become outdated by the time the strategy is approved.

| Chart 1 |

STRATEGIC PLANNING

Looking forward

- What will likely change in your community?
- What will the implications be to your organization?
- What will the opportunities and threats be?
- How can you address them accordingly?

Looking into

- Who will likely have different needs when you implement?
- What are their characteristics?
- What do they need? How do they access the services differently?
- How can you address the diverse needs?

Looking around

- Is your leadership ready to walk the walk, not just have the talk?
- How can you mobilize resources to support the actions?
- When it comes to accountability, are we just trying to find someone to blame or taking a problem-solving view to get the work done?

Looking backward

- What information is relevant and timely to monitor the outcome of our actions?
- What are the implications of the data? What does it mean to the community and your organization?
- What actions or decisions are required?

Conclusion

We have gone through two iterations of strategy development approaches, moving from strategic planning to strategic management (see Table 1). Much of what Professor Poister predicted in 2010 has been realized[7] and yet, new issues continue to arise: evolving community expectations, a call for an evidence-based approach, and a need to be more responsive and agile in strategy development. Just like Rome wasn't built in a day, our work in strategy isn't completed through a one-time effort. Moving from strategic management to strategy management is the next level of maturity (see Table 1). While the change from planning to management represents the need for a more proactive approach, the change from strategic to strategy represents the need for a more rigorous approach that is holistic, evidence-based, and timely.

Since the beginning of the pandemic, we have demonstrated our ability to innovate and adapt to changing conditions in a very quick turnaround. But how can we sustain the momentum and innovate organically over time? We don't have a perfect answer to this yet, but strategy management could be the answer for your organization.

ENDNOTES AND RESOURCES

1 "Strategic Planning Revisted," Kel Wang and Michael Sambir, *PM* magazine, August 2019.

2 Poister, Theodore H. 2010. "The Future of Strategic Planning in the Public Sector: Linking Strategic Management and Performance." *Public Administration Review*: December 2010 Special Issue, ppS246–S255.

3 Vinzant, Douglas H., and Janet C. Vinzant. 1996. "Strategy and Organizational Capacity: Finding a Fit." *Public Productivity and Management Review* 20(2): 139–57.

4 The city of Toronto has been providing this service since April.

5 See examples in "Look Beyond the Crisis," *PM* magazine, June 2020, from the city of Surrey and Alberta Health Services in Canada.

6 "Look Beyond the Crisis," Kel Wang and Michael Sambir, *PM* magazine, June 2020.

7 See endnote 2. Three predictions: (1) Shifting from strategic planning to strategic management; (2) moving from performance measurement to performance management; and (3) linking strategy and performance management more effectively.

KEL WANG is corporate performance lead, city of Edmonton, Canada (kel.wang@edmonton.ca).

| Table 1 |

	Strategic Planning	Strategic Management	Strategy Management
Phases/Activities	• Environmental scanning • Goal setting • Strategy formulation	• Community engagement • Strategic planning: - Environmental scanning - Goal setting - Strategy formulation • Implementation	
Lens	• Organization centric • A top-down approach • Static, reflects a snapshot in time		• Community-centric • A two-way approach to leverage frontline expertise • Evolving, undergoes ongoing development

Indiloo/stock.adobe.com

GETTING MORE FROM SOCIAL MEDIA for Pandemic and Disaster Management

BY CLAYTON WUKICH, PHD

In times of crisis, the use of social media is key for risk communication and community engagement

At the beginning of 2020, when contemplating their careers, most city and county managers could reasonably expect to encounter a disaster at some point—a flood, wildfire, tornado, or industrial accident. In one fell swoop, the coronavirus pandemic has made all of them emergency managers for the foreseeable future. As they continue to grapple with COVID-19, social media can help with their risk communication and community engagement efforts.

Drawing on scholarship and practitioner guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), this article outlines engagement strategies that pertain to the pandemic and other possible disasters. This knowledge is pertinent not only because of the pandemic, for communities must also prepare for other disasters looming in the short term. Extreme weather and other hazards—natural and man-made—will not wait for the pandemic to end, and such events have already exposed operational inadequacies. In short, the pandemic has made our communities more vulnerable and establishes the conditions for compounding events. Therefore, preparing residents for what is to come and enhancing our abilities to effectively communicate that risk represent critical tasks.

While in no way comprehensive, this article discusses different ways for local governments to engage residents (1) as partners to reduce their exposure to risk, (2) as customers to serve and satisfy, and (3) as citizens with whom to discuss future policy decisions. Local governments pursue these relationships during normal times, and they certainly apply during disasters.[1] My own research informs this effort; I have interviewed many emergency managers and analyzed tens of thousands of social media messages from federal, state, and local agencies. Local government managers and communications teams are certainly familiar with many of these concepts, but my hope is to offer a helpful idea or two to assist as they deal with the pandemic and whatever comes next.

Partners to Reduce Community Risk

Local governments can empower residents as partners by giving them the information they need to reduce their exposure to risk. Ideally, this will affect—or reinforce—related behavioral changes such as social distancing or disaster preparedness practices. Messages should be straightforward and consistent, and they should articulate the specific actions residents need to take to make them and their families safer.

A number of sources provide content for local governments to reuse. For example, the CDC offers sample COVID-19 guidance on social distancing, protecting older adults, stopping the spread, dealing with personal stress, and making cloth face coverings and other protective actions. This content provides clear and specific language that tells people exactly what to do, and in so doing aligns with evidence-based best practices identified within disaster research.[2] Furthermore, the CDC recognizes that different applications—Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram—have different audiences and different uses. Facebook reaches the broadest audience and allows for longer messages. Twitter messages are shorter, more news-related, and often direct readers to the CDC website.

For Instagram, messages speak to a younger audience. With the influx of younger adults contracting the disease, the CDC emphasizes "if you have certain underlying medical conditions, you are at an increased risk of severe illness from #COVID19, no matter your age." Guidance for local governments to borrow for content includes:

- Stay home if possible.
- Avoid close contact with people who are sick.
- Wear a face covering when in public.
- Stay at least 6 feet away from others and avoid large crowds.
- Take everyday preventive actions: wash hands often and avoid touching face, nose, and eyes.
- Have over-the-counter medicines, medical supplies (like tissues), and extra necessary prescriptions.
- Have extra household items and groceries on hand.
- Make a plan for what to do if you or loved ones get sick.
- Routinely clean and disinfect surfaces and objects that are touched often.
- Consult with your healthcare provider if you have symptoms of COVID-19.

In response to community outbreaks or other rapid onset events (e.g., extreme weather, earthquakes, and mass shootings), local government officials should re-familiarize themselves concerning how to write effective warning messages. Leveraging decades of research from the fields of sociology and communication as well as their own expert interviews, Jeannette Sutton, a University of Kentucky professor, and Erica Kuligowski, a social scientist at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, recommend including a description of the impending hazard and its likely consequences, the location of those affected, and explicit guidance on what people should do and when they should do it.[3] Specifically, they advise when crafting warning messages to do the following:

- Use ALL CAPS for keywords to increase urgency.
- Specify the threat and its impact.
- Clearly identify the location of impact.
- Use imperative language to instruct protective actions.
- Include a #hashtag.
- Include visual imagery as part of the message.

Here is an example message about a hypothetical radiological incident:

"NUCLEAR EXPLOSION in Southern California. High levels of radiation in Los Angeles are blowing toward Orange County & will cause severe illness and death. Do NOT drive. TAKE SHELTER NOW in a sturdy building, shut windows/doors; stay and wait further instruction. #CAExplosion."

This message includes all critical components that are essential whereas incomplete messages leave people searching for additional guidance and reduce the likelihood that they will take protective actions in a timely fashion.

Disaster preparedness messages are important as well. People are not prepared for disasters; research confirms this again and again. Prior to urgent events, local governments should promote preparedness to their residents. With public sector resources diminished, community resilience (the ability of a community to weather and recover from an extreme event) increasingly depends on individual preparedness. Well-designed messages are imperative to keep the community vigilant and informed about what they can do to keep their families safe. FEMA offers some examples, and I include a link at the end of this article.[4]

In my research, I identify best practices from state agencies, such as making family emergency plans that articulate what to do, where to go, and how to communicate with loved ones during a disaster.

Another essential message has to do with assembling emergency supply kits to include water, nonperishable food, flashlights, first aid kits, radios, and batteries. Based on a community's susceptibility to specific hazards, local governments can also educate residents about the nature of those hazards and related risks, and they can outline specific protective action guidance. For example, a state agency posted a straightforward message about flooding, "18 inches of swiftly moving water can carry away a large vehicle. Turn Around Don't Drown." After interviewing state public information officers and analyzing their preparedness messages, I have made recommendations regarding how agencies should approach preparedness campaigns:

- Be persistent. Be consistent. And repeat the message.
- Replace vague encouragement with specific steps that people can take to prepare for disasters. Do not assume people will take the time to seek out other sources to find the answers.
- Discuss the consequences of being unprepared for disasters. Use specific examples. Communicate the risk of inaction.
- Don't reinvent the wheel. Reuse content from other trusted sources such as FEMA.
- Do not forget about businesses and other organizations. Adapting household guidance messages (e.g., Making a Plan and Supply Kits) to organizations offers an approach.[5]

Information flow need not be one way. Personnel should prioritize comments and replies to their content and enable direct messaging so that residents feel free to communicate more privately.



Indiloo/stock.adobe.com

In all, the idea is that by empowering residents and businesses to prepare, local governments can help to build stronger, more resilient communities. In dire situations, people who can take care of themselves for longer periods of time help their communities by freeing up resources for the most vulnerable among us.

Customers to Serve

During normal, everyday operations, local governments spend considerable effort developing their social media presence. Much of this content has to do with letting residents know where, when, and how to access public services. Therefore, communicating service disruptions and event cancellations represent a pertinent component of pandemic and other disaster messaging.

In response to COVID-19, cities and counties have had to (1) modify waste collection schedules, (2) suspend transit service, (3) cancel recreational activities and other events, (4) close city offices, and (5) cancel public meetings or transition them to online channels such as Zoom. Residents need to know these new policies and should be given information on when services might be offered again. This type of engagement can complement risk communication efforts by letting the community know they are not operating in normal times—as if they needed to be reminded. More importantly, though, local governments can reiterate stay-at-home orders, social distancing mandates, and other protective action orders such as wearing face coverings as part of these messages. Local governments are also in a position to amplify emerging policies regarding testing, contact tracing, and supported isolation that is vital to limit outbreaks moving forward.

Information flow need not be one way. Local governments can monitor for questions or requests and respond accordingly. Personnel should prioritize comments and replies to their content and enable direct messaging so that residents feel free to communicate more privately. Moreover, team members can initiate such interactions by asking for feedback on service quality or about community needs.

Many communications teams already engage in such two-way dialogue. However, encouraging such practices creates work for personnel and the expectation of follow-up, whereas residents anticipate responsiveness. If a communications team does not have the time and personnel to monitor and respond, they should not encourage dialogue in the first place and should make it clear to residents that any request should be communicated through other, more appropriate channels such as 311 or 911.

Relationship building is a component of good customer service. During these extraordinary times, local governments can convey stories about the service and dedication of local government personnel, for it is important to educate residents about what their local authorities are doing for their communities. After Hurricane Florence in 2018, I analyzed all the Facebook posts from affected cities in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, and the most liked post (out of all of them) included a video of a toddler waving goodbye to her firefighter parent leaving for a 48-hour shift. Telling the story of how personnel contribute to protecting their communities, the sacrifices they make, and how hard they work can put a personal face on local government and recognize personnel for their dedication. As residents isolate, any interaction they have with such content may help to foster a stronger relationship between them and their local government.

It's important to educate residents about what their local government is doing for their communities. In analyzing all Facebook posts during Hurricane Florence in 2018, the most liked post included a video of a toddler waving goodbye to her firefighter parent leaving for a 48-hour shift.

Citizens to Engage in Dialogue

The pandemic's economic and financial impacts will be severe and long-lasting. Local governments will have to make difficult and far-reaching budgetary decisions, and they will have to negotiate what the new normal looks like in terms of services offered and the extent to which services will be offered when the pandemic abates. When local governments substantively engage residents in this type of decision-making, they facilitate citizen participation. This type of interaction is relatively uncommon on Facebook and Twitter, which are more useful for information sharing than for careful deliberation. Therefore, it is imperative not to conflate engagement statistics (e.g., reactions, replies, and retweets) with meaningful dialogue. Such statistics may provide an initial indicator of preference or level of interest, but unless they contribute to a larger, more deliberative dialogue on difficult problems, they do not create meaningful citizen participation.

Thomas Bryer, a University of Central Florida professor, asserts that social media managers who successfully engender participation appear to act as neutral conveners, "unafraid of what citizens will say and encouraging of assenting and dissenting views." However, in addition to engendering positive dialogue, Professor Bryer notes "misinformation, erroneous information, or libel can spread just as quickly" and "social media can turn public opinion and action rapidly in any given direction."[6] As a result, local governments cannot control the conversation. Moreover, there are political risks for officials and agencies associated with such conversations. During and after disasters, people seek out meaning and accountability, and while leaders formulate and convey narratives about the event, they often refrain from inviting such open, unpredictable content.[7] Consequently, those decisions deny the public a voice and short circuit feedback to officials.

In a situation like COVID-19, people express frustration and urge for the cessation of social distancing policies or protest the suggestion that they wear face coverings. Not all decisions should be open for extended deliberation, especially evidence-based policies pertaining to public health. In those cases, authorities may consider explaining the rationale to the public in order to undercut false rumors and misinformation. Local governments should take on this job if they are able. Moreover, social media managers should not abdicate their responsibility to fact check and correct false rumors. This is not an easy job when misinformation abounds and conversations tend be polarized, but it is necessary in order to keep the public informed with factual information.

Social media managers should not abdicate their responsibility to fact check and correct false rumors. This is not an easy job when misinformation abounds and conversations tend be polarized, but it is necessary in order to keep the public informed with factual information.

Final Thoughts

With this pandemic comes a remarkable amount of information from many sources—some reliable, some not. Misinformation and disinformation, much of it designed by self-interested actors to confuse, obfuscate, and misdirect, can overwhelm people's ability to make sound decisions about what protective actions to take. It also sows confusion, frustration, and dissension. Facebook and Twitter algorithms privilege such divisive rhetoric. In a previous issue of this magazine, Professor Bryer suggested local governments abandon those applications "and not contribute to their destructive tendencies by giving them more audience."[8] In light of the pandemic, I advise to stay active, provide guidance, and take Professor Bryer's alternative route of innovating to engage residents in more meaningful ways. Local governments perform a valuable service by calmly disseminating straightforward, evidence-based content.

- They curate and reuse guidance from subject matter experts to inform residents' protective action decision-making—whether about the pandemic or other hazards on the horizon. This support engages residents as partners to promote public health and build more resilient communities.
- They remind residents of the gravity of the situation by communicating service disruptions. Furthermore, local governments serve a vital customer service role by responding to questions and requests for help.
- They can convene deliberative conversations about how communities move forward, and they serve a vital role by providing fact-checking and rumor-control functions for the good of their communities' information ecosystems.

Engaging the community in these ways will pay dividends in the future in the form of healthier communities who trust their local governments to do the right thing and look after their best interests. PM

ENDNOTES AND RESOURCES

[1] Thomas, John Clayton. 2012. *Citizen, Customer, Partner: Engaging the Public in Public Management.* Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

[2] Sutton, Jeannette, and Erica D. Kuligowski. 2019. Alerts and Warnings on Short Messaging Channels: Guidance from an Expert Panel Process. *Natural Hazards Review,* 20(2), 1-10.

[3] https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/communication/social-media-toolkit.html

[4] https://www.ready.gov/toolkits

[5] Wukich, Clayton. 2019. Preparing for Disaster: Social Media Use for Household, Organizational, and Community Preparedness. *Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy,* 10(2), 233-260.

[6] Bryer, Thomas A. 2013. Designing Social Media Strategies for Effective Citizen Engagement: A Case Example and Model. *National Civic Review,* 102(1), 43-50.

[7] Boin, Arjen, Paul Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius. 2017. *The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure.* 2nd ed. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

[8] Bryer, Thomas. 2020. Social Media in Local Government: Leave or Experiment:
A Philosophical Look at How Best to Navigate the Online World. *Public Management,* April, 35-38.

CLAYTON WUKICH, PHD, is an associate professor and MPA director at the Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio (r.wukich@csuohio.edu).

A CALL FOR **INNOVATION** IN SAN ANTONIO

The former San Antonio city manager describes her battle to revolutionize police and fire union contracts to help the city avoid a financial crisis.

An Interview with **SHERYL SCULLEY**

f11photo/stock.adobe.com

Sheryl Sculley accomplished many things in her 14 years as city manager of San Antonio, Texas, but none so acclaimed and controversial as her fight to remodel her city's police and fire union contracts. Her book, *Greedy Bastards: One City's Texas-Size Struggle to Avoid a Financial Crisis,* tells the story of her new team's uphill battle to turn around San Antonio city government. She takes you behind closed doors to share the hard changes she made and the strategies she used to create mutually beneficial solutions to the city's biggest problems.

You've been an active ICMA member for four decades while working in three cities in three states. Did the San Antonio experience present the toughest challenge?
Kalamazoo, Michigan; Phoenix, Arizona; and San Antonio, Texas, are very different cities. San Antonio presented the biggest challenge. City infrastructure was crumbling, strong financial policies and systems were nonexistent, many executive positions were vacant, public satisfaction was low, ethical standards were weak, and public safety union wages and benefits were outpacing revenues, crowding out other essential city services.

You were heavily recruited to San Antonio in 2005. What did you face when you became city manager there? What kinds of changes did you make to the city organization?
The city council asked me to elevate the professionalism of city government and increase the residents' confidence level in their city government. My first order of business in year one as city manager was to assess talent and make changes. Second, I focused my energies on getting the city's financial house in order. Third, I focused on improving the city's ethical policies and practices. Next, I reorganized the public works and capital construction functions to enable the organization to more effectively deliver infrastructure projects within budget and on schedule, a concept that had escaped the organization. The city council was anxious to undertake large bond programs similar to what I had overseen in Phoenix. To do that required a complete analysis of the San Antonio debt capacity without a property tax increase, the creation of an organizational structure that could ensure success, talent to execute projects, and a citizenry that participated in the development of the bond projects. We accomplished all of the above and the voters approved three separate bond programs totaling $2 billion.

San Antonio city councilmembers have short tenures due to term limits. Did the constant turnover of city councilmembers make it difficult to make the kinds of changes the city council asked you to undertake?
During my 14-year tenure in San Antonio, I worked with 47 different city councilmembers including four mayors. When I arrived in 2005, the councilmembers could only serve two two-year terms. After we established more confidence with the electorate, the city charter term limits were changed in 2008 to four two-year terms. (I recommended two four-year terms, but the polling did not indicate support for that alternative.) Frequent turnover made it very difficult for councilmembers to focus on long-range issues, such as how to deal with the economic disparities in the community. San Antonio is one of the most economically segregated communities in the country. But I'm proud to have recommended the first city budget incorporating the concept of equity in 2017.

The title of your book is provocative. How did you select that title? And why did you decide to talk on the issue of remodeling the police and fire union contracts?
I can't take credit for my book's title. The president of the local police union inspired it, back when writing a book was just an item on my to-do-once-I-retire list. In 2014, my team and I began guiding the city through the messy process of updating the police and fire collective bargaining agreements, which triggered a campaign of

nasty attack ads against me. The attack ads attempted to cast me in the role of villain for asking the public safety personnel to start paying health insurance premiums for their children and spouses. Sworn personnel had acquired very lucrative contracts in 1988 that included basically free healthcare for themselves and their families, a legal fund that paid for divorces and criminal defense for themselves and their family members, pre-funded free healthcare for retirement, and unlimited college tuition reimbursement for non-job related degrees—you get the picture. San Antonio had ignored the changing financial dynamic of these excessive benefits and kept renewing the contracts plus more. The cost of the unchecked practice was crowding out other city services. We did a comprehensive financial analysis and concluded that the police and fire budgets would consume 100 percent of the city's general fund budget by 2031 if the contracts were not remodeled.


iStock.com/typhoonski

What is the history of the police and fire contracts and why were the public safety unions so adamant about not negotiating any changes to their contracts?

The unions felt a sense of entitlement. They got the excessive benefits in 1988, and they refused to discuss change. I believed that a data-driven, transparent, and community-involved discussion would result in the changes that were needed. There, I was wrong. The unions told me that they would wait me out (the union contracts included a ten-year "evergreen clause") and that if we could no longer afford their 1988 contracts, that I should recommend increasing taxes. That was easy for them to say since less than half of the police and fire personnel actually live in San Antonio, and by Texas law, the city is prohibited from requiring residency. The police union's chief negotiator authored a book about how to fight city hall when councils and city managers try to change their contracts. The unions put a person in the crosshairs and keep them there until they relent. That was me, but I didn't relent.

Texas is a "right to work" state. How and when did the police and fire unions get collective bargaining?

The Texas Local Government Code allows cities to ask their electorate to vote on whether to allow collective bargaining for police and fire sworn personnel. The voters of San Antonio voted to allow collective bargaining for police and fire personnel in 1974 in special elections with few voters.

The fight became very personal and vicious against you. Do you believe the unions would have done what they did to you if you were a man?

No, I do not. If I were a man and from San Antonio, the unions would not have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on prime time television and social media ads and have been so aggressive. The unions were relentless against me and the city council and community members supporting our effort to remodel the police and fire union contracts. In Texas, public safety personnel also can campaign for city councilmembers and contribute to their campaigns. The police and fire unions were able to get an exemption to the city's charter from the legislature in the late 1980's that prohibited city employees from participating in city council elections. The unions had a historical practice of politically intimidating councilmembers into supporting whatever the unions wanted.

What still needs to change in the police union contract that you were not able to change during your tenure as city manager?

Once we reached a mediated settlement with the police union on the financial issues, the city council had grown weary of the three-year battle with the union and asked that we save the disciplinary changes that were also priorities for change for another contract. The current contract gives the police officers tremendous advantage in disciplinary hearing wherein an officer's entire personnel file cannot be used in an arbitration hearing. This and other provisions limit the police chief's ability to discipline and fire bad police officers. San Antonio has a high rate of officers that have been fired by the chief, but returned to the force by outside arbitrators. Changes in the disciplinary process must be made in the next contract as well as an examination of policing policies to ensure greater police accountability. In light of these facts and the Black Lives Matter movement, my book is more timely today than it was when I began writing it one year ago following my retirement in 2019. PM



SHERYL SCULLEY is an award-winning city manager who is considered an authority on city management. During her tenure, San Antonio achieved a AAA bond rating and invested billions of dollars into critical infrastructure updates and additions. Prior to serving in San Antonio, Sculley was the assistant city manager in Phoenix and city manager of Kalamazoo, Michigan. Sculley is a Life member of ICMA and a fellow in the National Academy of Public Administration. After 45 years of public service, Sculley retired from city management in 2019. (sheryl@greedybastardsbook.com)

Learn more about Sheryl Sculley and her book at greedybastardsbook.com.

The VETERAN ADVANTAGE: From Military Service to Local Government Leadership

Hear the stories of four former enlisted service members who are successful local government leaders today

BY LYNN PHILLIPS

When you hear the word *veteran*, what is the first thing that pops into your head? As a veteran myself, the first thing I think of are WWII or Vietnam veterans, or anyone who has served in combat. But the term *veteran* does not mean that the individual has been in combat. In fact, the number-one definition of a veteran according to *Merriam's Dictionary* is simply "a former member of the Armed Forces." That means that today's veteran could easily be a 28-year-old with a bachelor's degree in sociology who enlisted out of college and served as a human resources specialist for six years. The point is that "veteran" does not equal a hard-nosed, zero-tolerance, power-hungry personality like Marine Colonel Thomas Jessup played by Jack Nicholson in "A Few Good Men." Who doesn't remember the scene where he is yelling "The truth? You can't handle the truth," without shaking in their boots?

The "truth" is that veterans, with their diverse skill sets and experience, are a valuable asset to any team. In fact, a 2019 survey conducted by Arizona State University (in partnership with the Center for Urban Innovation, the Center for Organization Research and Design, and the Alliance for Innovation), reported that HR directors found that military experience enhanced the skills of teamwork and striving for results, as well as planning and organizing. If your organization is not taking advantage of hiring veterans, you are missing out on a talent pipeline of service-oriented and results-driven leaders. Become a host organization for ICMA's Veteran's Local Government Management Fellowship and help to promote the local government profession while providing mentorship to transitioning service members. To demonstrate just how talented veterans are, I am going to highlight the stories of four former enlisted service members who are all successful local government leaders today.

Leigh Prather/stock.adobe.com

According to John, his experience in the military translated easily to local government because although he is goal-oriented, he is also flexible and able to adapt when the situation suddenly changes. John says that this is representative of why all non-commissioned officers are a great fit for local government: "They are the individuals charged with accomplishing the mission and there are many different missions accomplished in local government on a daily basis."

★ John Dean

City Manager
Durant, Oklahoma

John Dean enlisted in the Army in 1984 as a young infantry soldier, and spent most of his time in the 82nd Airborne Division. John went on to achieve many great things, to include being awarded two Bronze Star Medals, the Master Parachutist Badge, and a Special Forces Tab. His service involved time in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as well as multiple tours in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan with the 3rd Special Forces Group. But I found it interesting that out of all these accomplishments, John considers his time serving as a first sergeant as the biggest highlight of his career. For those who have never served in the military, here is what one individual describes as a good first sergeant: "Being a first sergeant is not for everyone. It takes special individuals that are selfless, with humility and with regard for others. As a leader, a first sergeant needs to be a servant rather than a master. Most importantly, the first sergeant must be a passionate person that believes in what he or she is doing." Who wouldn't want someone like that on their team?

John is currently serving as the city manager for Durant, Oklahoma, and when I asked him about what drew him to a career in local government, this was his response: "On a mission in Bosnia, I served as a liaison between local governments and the military command. It was on this mission that I learned that there are decisions made daily that impact people in communities. It was on this mission that I knew I wanted to be involved in local government in the future." John wanted the opportunity to be in a position to make decisions that would improve the lives of the residents of a community.

★ William Doerfer

Town Manager
Liberty, North Carolina

"Servant leader" is a great way to describe our next veteran, William Doerfer. When Will sent me his bio, he said "My goal was to connect with transitioning members who are feeling like they're not up to the task. I am not a rock star or super trooper and I was able to make it." But when you read his story, you will realize how humble these words are and perhaps that is what makes him such an outstanding town manager.

Just like John, Will served in the 82nd Airborne Division as an infantryman. Will says, "I served with very little distinction. I showed up, did what I was told to do and tried to stay out of trouble to serve my time, get out, move back to Ohio, and go to college. Then came September 11, 2001. Everything felt a little more serious after 9/11. We were 'heroes' all the sudden." Will continued to train hard, but like many military organizations who thought they were going to war immediately, his unit did not deploy until February 2003, and Will, who's term of service was coming to an end, was not on the plane with them. But then, his orders to separate from the military were put on hold, and instead of going home, he was on a plane headed to Kuwait. Will's story continues, "Once in Kuwait, I was asked if I wanted to remain on rear-detachment or deploy forward to As Samawah, Iraq, and take over a team for a soldier who had been injured in a mortar attack. I chose to go forward and lead a team of soldiers whom I had never met. I served as team leader until I was relieved in August. The stop loss was lifted, and I was sent home to out-process. I found myself in Kernersville, freezing in 90-degree weather only one week after having been in a very intense firefight in Baghdad wondering what the heck I wanted to do with myself."

"THE CAMARADERIE THAT EXISTS AMONG MANAGERS IS A CLOSE SECOND TO THE CAMARADERIE YOU EXPERIENCE IN THE MILITARY.

Today Will is the city manager for Liberty, North Carolina, which he describes as "a fiercely independent rural community just outside the growth of the Piedmont and the Triangle." His journey from arriving home in Ohio in 2003 to being sworn in as city manager in 2015 was not without struggle.

He started working on his bachelor's degree in 2004 at Guilford College in Greensboro, North Carolina, when he began suffering from undiagnosed PTSD for which he was finally treated, but it was a long hard road to finish his degree. Throughout it all he continued to help other veterans through his job at the Veterans Benefits Administration. It was at a training session that he happened to meet an individual who recommended completing a master's of public administration as a way to advance his career. For Will, who says, "I knew before I signed up to jump out of airplanes as a 17-year-old farm boy from rural Ohio that I wanted to be a public servant," getting his MPA sounded like a great idea. So he got accepted at Appalachian State, earned the Robert Hester Local Government Scholarship, and was awarded an internship with the city of King, North Carolina. He says that it was the internship that absolutely confirmed that he wanted to go on to become a city manager.

Will says that one thing he enjoys about being a city manager is "the camaraderie that exists among managers," saying that "it's a close second to the camaraderie you experience in the military." He also speaks of a career in service "In local government, you are often witness to the impacts of your service. Not everything is immediate, and if you're doing your job, you don't even receive much recognition. But you can recognize the impacts that you have made in your community."

★ Robert Bechtold

Interim Deputy County Administrator

Beaufort County, South Carolina

A career in service was exactly what our next veteran, Robert Bechtold, was looking for when he transitioned from the military in August 2020. Like John and Will, Robert also had an amazing military career, but unlike them, he served in the Marines. He says, "My service began in the artillery and transitioned to the infantry, serving in a plethora of roles over several deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. In the latter part of my career, I served as a first sergeant and sergeant major in several locations." Robert received several awards over his career to include the Bronze Star Medal, and Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with "V" and four gold stars in lieu of fifth award.

Like many veterans, Robert knew he wanted a career in which he could continue to serve, but he didn't know what that career was. He says, "I explored a number of post-service paths in the time leading up to my retirement. The inherent need to be of service continued to surface and I believe that is what pulled me toward local government leadership. The first class in my public administration graduate coursework enabled me to make the decision with absolute clarity. I was able to use Beaufort County as an academic case study and simultaneously line up a Veterans Local Government Management Fellowship through ICMA. Beaufort County Administrator Ashley Jacobs ensured I had exposure to

all aspects of municipal leadership during my fellowship. I cannot envision a better path from the military to working in local government." Beaufort County was so impressed with Robert's performance in the fellowship that they hired him as their interim deputy county administrator.

When I asked Robert why local government is a good fit for veterans, he replied "I believe working in local government has been a good fit for me because so many of the skills and abilities I developed over 22 years in the Marine Corps were transferrable to local government administration. I was, and continue to be, astounded by the level of dedication, determination, and service-driven attitude within the Beaufort County team. I've known hundreds of Marines that left active duty and longed for the lost sense of belonging they had in service. I don't have that problem. We have an incredibly engaged council, a tight-knit leadership team, and are staffed by motivated people eager to serve the community."

★ Demetrius Parker

Talent Manager
Jefferson County, Colorado

When I asked Demetrius Parker, talent manager of Jefferson County, Colorado, if he would agree to be highlighted in this article, he immediately and exuberantly responded, "I would be honored." Demetrius had what I like to call a "unique" military career and was able to have some pretty incredible experiences that most soldiers don't have the opportunity to enjoy. Demetrius established his role as a leader from the day he left the MEPS station as a private in charge of getting eight new recruits from Washington, D.C., to Fort Dix, New Jersey, for basic training. From there he went on to be part of 3rd Infantry Regiment, The Old Guard, which is the Army's official ceremonial unit and escort to the president of the United States. These are also the professionals who guard the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Washington, D.C. And if that wasn't exciting enough, in his next assignment in Korea, he was given the opportunity to run a program that, in his words, "equated to being the catalyst for American Idol, where I was responsible, along with my civilian counterparts, to audition soldiers of all ranks and bring them together to form a band that went on tour for 30 days."

Upon completion of his military career, Demetrius worked in the private sector as a human resources professional, but he says he always felt like something was missing. He wanted to be in a career that made a true impact on people's lives. He says, "One day while doing some soul searching, it hit me—I should be working in government. I went home and chatted with my wife and I clearly remember her asking me what this meant. My response was that I would probably be taking a pay cut, but I will be happier. That was seven years ago."

Like many other veterans, Demetrius chose local government because he wanted to give back to his community. He says,

"I believe that most people that join our military services do so because they want to serve and be a part of something that truly has an impact on the lives of those in our communities. We want to know that our hard work, blood, sweat, tears, and sometimes lives are given to make life better for others. It is this belief that compels me to seek out other veterans and share this gift we call local government."

I cannot thank John, Will, Robert, and Demetrius enough not only for their service to our nation, but for their continued service to their communities. Their stories highlight the competence and capability of those in our military forces, and demonstrates that veterans are an asset to any team.

> **"I BELIEVE THAT MOST PEOPLE THAT JOIN OUR MILITARY SERVICES DO SO BECAUSE THEY WANT TO SERVE AND BE A PART OF SOMETHING THAT TRULY HAS AN IMPACT ON THE LIVES OF THOSE IN OUR COMMUNITIES.**

I encourage all community leaders to take advantage of ICMA's Veterans Local Government Fellowship by visiting icma.org/vlgmf or by contacting veterans@icma.org. This program not only allows organizations to promote the local government profession and attract talent; it provides the opportunity to give back to those who have served our nation. As Darrin Tangeman, a veteran and city manager of Woodland Park, Colorado, put it "Military servicemembers bring diverse skill sets to the table, they can achieve goals and objectives, and they have the moral courage to stand up for what is right. Veteran fellows are zero-risk to the host organization, and they are free of charge. Supporting this program is as beneficial to the veteran fellow as it is to the host organization." PM

RESOURCES

1. "Veteran Hiring Preferences in Local Government," Arizona State University in partnership with the Center of Urban Innovation and the Center of Organization Research and Design as well as the Alliance for Innovation, by Dr. Ulrich Jensen, Dr. Justin Stritch, & Dr. David Swindell, June 2019.

2. "Commentary – Qualities of a Dedicated First Sergeant by Senior Master Sergeant," Anthony J. Servian, 1SG, 482nd Operations Support Squadron. Published Sep 9, 2013.

LYNN PHILLIPS is senior program manager of veterans programs at the International City/County Management Association (lphillips@icma.org).



LOCAL DISASTER IMPACTS:

Post-Earthquake Onsite Research in Nepal

iStock.com/Jules2013

Little research has been done to understand the preparedness, management, and impacts of disasters in developing countries. This study expands the breadth and deepens the knowledge of disaster impacts in those parts of the world. There are a multitude of resources available to carry out disaster mitigation elsewhere, but there is a pressing need for resources in developing countries. This research is the first step to explore the current preparedness, management, and recovery in Nepal after two major earthquakes struck the country in 2015. Five years have passed since the earthquakes, allowing for a more objective and reflective analysis of data and the evaluation and assessment of the disaster impact.

Introduction

The devastating earthquake of 2015 killed 8,891 people, with 198 people reported missing. There were 22,303 people seriously injured and millions rendered homeless. More than 600,000 households were fully damaged and around 300,000 damaged partially.

Nepal has 77 districts and 14 zones (organized into seven provinces). These political divisions were designated in the new Nepal constitution, which was promulgated in September 2015. The 2015 earthquake severely affected 14 districts. Another 31 districts were affected to varying extents.

Nepal's population has reached almost 30 million as of May. Nepal covers an area of 147,181 square kilometers (56,826 square miles), bordering China in the north and India on the other three sides. The livability in the hills and valleys is due to favorable climate and focused developmental activities that have concentrated the population in

Exploring preparedness, management, and recovery in Nepal five years after two major earthquakes

BY **DR. MIRIAM PORTER AND SITU CHITRAKAR**

Pictured left to right: Bijay Krishna Upadhyyay, Director Urban Disaster Risk Management; Situ Chitrakar, researcher; and Dr. Miriam Porter, researcher.

pikyarm108/stock.adobe.com

these areas. The vulnerability due to disasters has increased with the increase in population density in these regions.

Summary

Nepal is a developing country whose constitution was rewritten just a few years ago. The interpretation of the constitution to establish proper laws and guidelines is a work in progress. The model of government has changed from monarchy to democratic to a federal democratic republic in the latest phase. The government has been leading disaster-related organizations since the days of the monarchy. With the rise in the number and types of organizations working in the field of disasters and more varied and frequent disasters, there has been confusion and duplication of efforts during the planning, relief, and recovery phases. There are now platforms developed to keep organizational efforts under one umbrella. However, the process is still unfolding with the recent establishment of Nepal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, (NDRRMA) in 2017.

Our research has explored the institutional level of disaster preparedness, management, and recovery efforts after the earthquake of 2015 in Nepal. Interviews with organizations and four residents were conducted to identify specific areas of risk or areas of struggle. This research has shed light to better understand the existing conditions of disaster-prone areas of Nepal.

During the month of February 2020, our research team interviewed 21 individuals representing 16 institutions and four individuals impacted by the earthquake. Six institutions were governmental or governmental-related, four were nongovernmental organizations, three were international nongovernmental organizations, two were businesses, and one was an activist/documentarian. We studied the challenges faced by different government bodies, nongovernmental organizations, international nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and local residents. Interviewees noted that relief efforts in the field were different than the written policy. This often created uncertainty and confusion. In addition, diversity in geography, culture, religion, and beliefs add complicating factors to disaster mitigation in Nepal.

Economic factors play another important role in adequately addressing needs. For instance, financial support for proper planning is lacking even for the capital city. This is due in part to increasing population and rapid urbanization. Consideration to implement the best practices we have identified would strengthen Nepal's preparation, management, and recovery from the ever-growing threat of disasters.

Questionnaire Part 1: Disasters in Nepal

The first part of the institutional questionnaire was related to identifying the disasters prevalent in different parts of Nepal. All interviewees identified earthquakes as a prevalent disaster. Other commonly occurring disasters frequently identified were floods, landslides, and road accidents. Two of the organizations, Institute for Social and Environmental Transition-Nepal and Pulchowk Campus, broadly categorized the disasters as urban and rural disasters. The urban disasters are road accidents, electrical shocks, fire, flashflood, and vector-borne diseases. Whereas, rural disasters are floods, landslides, glacier outbursts, avalanches, heat waves. Other notable disasters are epidemics and impact of climate change (heat waves, droughts, and torrential rain).

After the 2015 earthquake, most of the organizations have earthquakes as their major focus. Other annual disasters identified were floods, landslides, lightening, heavy rainfall, drought, avalanches, fire, storms, and flashfloods.

There was not a consensus among all the institutes regarding the location of disasters. Earthquakes can happen anywhere in Nepal, but the epicenter is observed to be more prone in the central part of the country, which falls primarily in the Gandaki province. But a detailed seismic hazard map has not been yet produced which can give predictions of tectonic stresses that are likely to be released based on the stresses at different points. According to the statistics provided by a Nepal Red Cross Society representative, earthquakes are more prevalent in the western and central part of Nepal. Another representative from the Nepal Red Cross Society highlighted a study conducted by Durham University, which identified Kathmandu Valley as the most vulnerable city for earthquakes in the world.

Questionnaire Part 2: Preparedness in Nepal

The second part of the questionnaire is focused on identifying preparedness plans to respond to disasters. Overall, all the government organizations stated they have plans and policies to address risk management and mitigate disaster that adhere to national policy. The first act to address disasters was the National Disaster Relief Act of 1989, which addressed post-disaster situations, such as rescue and relief after a disaster. The act was later amended to include preparatory as well as mitigating clauses to the rescue and relief clauses. The joint effort of many organizations brought forth the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act (NDRRMA), 2017.

Organizations discussed the need for flexibility to meet the changing focus and goals of disaster management. Most organizations interviewed—like the National Society for Earthquake Technology-Nepal, Environment and Public Health Organization, OXFAM, Nepal Red Cross Society, Plan International and Department of Urban Development and Building Construction—were partners or advisors in preparing NDRRMA 2017, with the Ministry of Home Affairs. Environment and Public Health Organization and Institute for Social and Environmental Transition-Nepal are NGOs which are based on development and research respectfully and work on the ground level. Their focus is project-based and focuses on certain aspects of disaster management which fall within their mission. Environment and Public Health Organization focuses on water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) and have stockpiled WASH-related materials in case of emergency like chorine, hygiene kits, food supply, and toilet building materials. This stockpiling is done with the support of humanitarian organizations like OXFAM. OXFAM, on the other hand, has a contingency plan which is updated based on simulation exercises and research data that helps predict disasters.

Policies in all governmental and nongovernmental sectors are directed by the national government. The international nongovernmental organizations must adhere to the governmental policies, along with their organizational guidelines. Some organizations, like the Institute for Social and Environmental Transition-Nepal, conduct site visits to gather information that becomes the basis for plan formulation. Nepalese nongovernmental organizations and international nongovernmental organizations are consulted for policy formulation, whereas municipalities and businesses have been excluded from this process. The policies are seen by local government and organizations as a top-down approach. The new Nepalese constitution enacted in 2015, however, has delegated more power to the local government according to the Nepal Red Cross Society's executive director.

When asked about each organization's preparedness for upcoming disasters, the organizations had different perspectives. While each organization viewed their preparation for disaster at various stages, all had a keen awareness of the need to be prepared.

Each organization interviewed except the private businesses said they provided a form of public education. Some of the organizations working on the national level provide education to the public through television, radio, street dramas, posters, and publications. Some work in certain districts or municipalities, so they provide localized emergency plans and training to locals or specific professionals. Some organizations working in specific institutions like schools, colleges, or hospitals educate their students or staff only in their own areas.


Damage seen near the epicenter in February 2020

In order to achieve the goals of the organizations, they have partners among local, regional, or national government, NGOs, INGOs, community organizations, foreign governments, and foreign organizations. The government bodies are mostly governing and policy partners, INGOs are funding partners and NGOs are implementing partners. Business partnerships develop from their sense of corporate social responsibility. They are mostly financial partners for small scale projects related to disaster. Aside from funding, businesses at times supply equipment and resources such as water tanks, pharmaceuticals, and construction materials.

Every generation in Nepal, after the 2015 earthquake have now experienced at least one major disaster. This might be a reason why citizens demonstrate moderate to high concern when it comes to preparedness for disasters. However, as time passes, the citizens' priority moves away from disaster planing into more day-to-day routines.

Questionnaire Part 3: Response in Nepal and Identified Best Practices

The third part of the institutional questionnaire was related to the actual response to events. When a disaster occurred, it was reported that residents came forward to help each other, which was often identified by interviewees as the culture of Nepal. Residents feel highly responsible for helping each other in times of need. *Guthis* —sociocultural and economic units in traditional settlements—have been crucial in organizing support for community members in times of crisis. The organizations were more positive toward

Thomas Dutour/stock.adobe.com

citizens being responsive to disasters than the governmental agencies at the local or national level.

The government agencies interviewed opined that they are adequately or moderately responsive in a post-disaster situation. When a disaster occurs, information is passed on hierarchically to higher bodies and ultimately to the ministry level depending upon the scale of the disaster. The National Emergency Operation Center is an autonomous body for making decisions during emergencies and is activated if a large-scale disaster occurs. The instruction for reacting is then passed on to the agencies concerned to carry out their respective roles, which are predetermined at the national level.

There are many challenges that organizations working in the field of disaster management face. The most common challenge for most of the organizations is funding. Available funds, while often lacking, are allocated during the event, but very limited funds are available for research and planning. Only by understanding the nature and impact of a disaster can the effects be identified and mitigated.

Another common challenge is streamlining and integrating disaster management into projects and programs. This needs to be done within a comprehensive framework involving coordination between local governments and NGOs. Coordination reduces the communication gap, helps to identify people's need to understand and prepare for disasters, creates enough stockpiling of rescue and relief materials, reduces black markets during emergencies, helps with training of professionals, and deters misappropriation of funds. A comprehensive framework can also streamline government permission to carry out projects and mitigate political influence.

Best Practices

The key question asked in this research was regarding the best practices to address risk and mitigate disasters. Most of the organizations have derived best practices from working through various kinds of disasters in recent years, especially the 2015 earthquake. The best practices identified vary depending on a convergence of factors, including different levels of policy-making, preparedness, infrastructure development, deployment mechanism, and reconstruction. The following are the most often cited best practices by the interviewees.

1. Education

Education about disaster preparedness was identified most often among organizations as a best practice. It is seen as most effective when taught to children in schools and communities so they can learn the lessons early in life and convey what they learned to the whole family. However, it is very important to deliver correct and thorough messaging to the students to avoid negative consequences during the actual event. A well-known case in point was when children were not instructed about different protocols between earthquakes experienced inside a building versus outside. They ran indoors during the earthquake to perform "duck, cover, and hold on" even if they were playing outdoors. They were taught this for indoors location, but due to having been taught incomplete information, many went inside and lost their lives when the building collapsed.

2. Construction Methods

Another best practice is construction of buildings that are resistant to earthquakes or floods by using traditional construction methods in conjunction with modern techniques to make eco-friendly and disaster-ready structures. With increasing demand in housing, the quality of construction necessary may be compromised, so oversight is important for safety.

3. Creating Awareness

A best practice also frequently cited was creating awareness of the need to prioritize disaster preparation among competing demands in the general public. People's attention wanes over time. Therefore, it is important to develop campaigns to facilitate ongoing awareness.

4. Streamlined Response

Another best practice identified was coordination of resources for a streamlined response. That includes

- Facilitating training in technical, professional, and social arenas to improve preparedness and recovery after a disaster.
- Consistency in teaching and knowledge delivery.
- A multi-hazard perspective for disaster approach.
- Standardization of plans and policies at the national level that recognizes local communities as first responders for swift and efficient response.
- Simulation exercises in organizations and communities.
- Sharing of technology and information between organizations to avoid repetition and cover larger geographic areas.

In addition, it is necessary to create an awareness of differences between rural and urban areas in their ability to respond to disasters. For instance, in rural areas people may readily move to open spaces during an earthquake, but in urban areas, open spaces must be identified and maintained for people to escape to.

5. Preparation

Preparation was a best practice often underscored as a top priority. This involves a comprehensive framework and coordination of efforts. It includes promoting cluster systems, which involves identified community members and organizations coming together at the ground level to evaluate needs after an event and take appropriate action. Strictly following the zoning plans with the support of local leadership and local government is a necessary part of mitigating the impact of disasters. This is accomplished in part by simplification of policies and acts so the general public can better understand them. Early warning systems for possible disasters like floods also help with preparation. A strategic plan for efficient placement of resources is a preparation measure that helps considerably with response Ensuring that necessary supplies and equipment are already in place.

6. Accountability

Without exception, a best practice identified was accountability. A public audit was recommended for transparency and to ensure government is acting responsibly in the best interest of the public. This would reassure the public that potential for government corruption is being monitored.

7. Nepalese Culture

Lastly, recognizing and applauding the Nepalese culture, which includes service and generous help to others in a time of need. This has been one of the most powerful best practices to help manage through and recover from a disaster in this developing county.

Conclusion

This research has helped to shed light on current disaster preparedness, management, and recovery in Nepal and to better understand the existing conditions of disaster-prone areas of Nepal. Examining these aspects can help us apply similar knowledge of disaster impacts to other developing countries to potentially lessen the impact on affected communities. PM

Funding for this project was made possible by the ICMA Tranter-Leong Fellowship and Minnesota State University –Mankato Faculty Research Grant.

REFERENCES

Anderson, William A., and Shirley Mattingly. 1991. "Future Directions." *Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government,* edited by Thomas E. Drabek and Gerard J. Hoetmer, 311-335. Washington, D.C.: ICMA.

Auf der Heide, Erik. 1989. "Disaster Response: Principles in Preparation and Coordination". St. Louis, Mo.: C.V. Mosby.

Barry, E. 2016. "Nepal's Quake Recovery in Disarray." Star Tribune, A5

Birkland, Thomas A. 1997. "After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events" Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Birkland, Thomas R. 2006. "Lessons from Disaster: Policy Change after Catastrophic Events" Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Boin, Arjen, and Paul 't Hart. "Public Leadership in Times of Crisis." Public Administration Review 63: 544-552.

Bolin, Robert C., and Lois Stanford. 1998. "The Northridge Earthquake: Vulnerability and Disaster". London: Routledge.

Burby, Raymond J. 1998. "Cooperating with Nature: Confronting Natural Hazards with Land Use Planning and Sustainable Communities" Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press.

Canton, Lucien G. 2006. *Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs.* Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley-Interscience.

Comerio, Mary. 1998. *Disaster Hits Home: New Policy for Urban Housing Recovery* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Drabek, Thomas E., and Gerald J. Hoetmer, eds. 1991. *Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government* Washington, D.C.: ICMA.

Drabek, Thomas E. 2003. "Strategies for Coordinating Disaster Responses". Monograph #61. Boulder: Program on Environment and Behavior, Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado.

Erickson, Paul A. 2007. *Emergency Response Planning for Corporate and Municipal Managers.* New York: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Gies, Donald E. 2000. *"By Design: The Disaster Resistant and Quality-of-Life Community."* Natural Hazards Review 1: 151-160.Godschalk, David R., David J. Brower, and Timothy Beatley. 1989. *Catastrophic Coastal Storms: Hazard Mitigation and Development Management.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Grant, Nancy. 1996. "Emergency Management Training and Education for Public Administration." *Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada: The Politics, Policymaking, Administration and Analysis of Emergency Management.* 2nd ed., edited by Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh Jr. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas Publisher.

Gunes, A. Ertug, and Jacob P. Kovel. 2000. *"Using GIS in Emergency Management Operations."* Journal of Urban Planning and Development: 136-149.

Hewitt, Kenneth. 1997. *Regions of Risk: A Geographical Introduction to Disaste".* London: Longman.

Hinshaw, Robert E. 2006. *"Floodplain Management at the Local Level: Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Boulder, Colorado."* Chap. 10 in Living with Nature's Extremes: The Life of Gilbert Fowler White. Boulder, Colo.: Johnson Books.

International City/ County Management Association. 2007. *Emerging management Principles and Practices for Local Government.* 2nd Edition. Washington, D.C.

Laye, John. 2002. *Avoiding Disaster: How to Keep Your Business Going When Catastrophe Strikes.* Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons.

Majone, Giandomenico. 1989. *Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process.* New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press.

May, Peter J., and Walter Williams. 1986. *Disaster Policy Implementation: Managing Programs under Shared Governance.* New York: Plenum Press.

McEntire, David A. 2003. *Emergency Response and Recovery.* New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Nathe, Sarah K. 2000. *Public Education for Earthquake Hazards.* Natural Hazards Review 1: 191-196.

National Research Council. Committee on Disaster Research in the Social Sciences: Future Challenges and Opportunities. 2006. *"Facing Hazards and Disasters: Understanding Human Dimensions".* Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press.

Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center. 2006. *"Holistic Disaster Recovery: Ideas for Building Local Sustainability after a Natural Disaster"* Boulder: Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado.

Passerini, Eve. 2000. *"Disasters as Agents of Social Change in Recovery and Reconstruction."* Natural Hazards Review 1: 67-72.

Perry. Ronald W., and Michael K. Lindell. 2007. *Emergency Planning.* New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Porter, M., Asomani-Boateng, R., K.D., Appiah, G., Sonnek, M. 2015. "Disaster Preparedness in a Developing Economy" *The International Journal of Civic, Political and Communication Studies,* Vol. 13, Issue 4. http;//www.thehumanities.com

Rastriya Samachar Samiti (RSS). 2020. "Phewa watershed area residents fear flooding" *The Himalayan Times,* February 16, 2020.

The Government of Nepal (GoN). 2015. *Nepal Disaster Report 2015.* Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and Disaster Preparedness Network-Nepal (DPNet-Nepal) http://www.drrportal.gov.np/uploads/document/329.pdf

The Government of Nepal (GoN). 2020. Today's Population. National Planning Commission (NPC), Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) https://cbs.gov.np/

Tobin, Graham A., and Burrell E. Montz. 1997. *Natural Hazards: Explanation and Integration.* New York: Guilford Press.

Waugh, William L., Jr., and Gregory Streib. 2006. "Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management," *Public Administration Review* 66 (Suppl. 1): 131-140.

World Bank. 2003. *"Natural Disaster Risk Management in the Philippines: Enhancing Poverty Alleviation through Disaster Reduction."* World Bank.

World Health Organization. 2007. *Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness.* New York: UNO

Yin, R. K. 2003. *Case Study Research: Design & Methods.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

DR. MIRIAM PORTER is a professor at the Institute of Urban and Regional Studies Institute, Department of Government, Mankato, Minnesota.

SITU CHITRAKAR is an architect and urban planner in Lalitpur, Nepal, and former student at the Institute of Urban and Regional Studies Institute, Department of Government, Mankato, Minnesota.

BY JAMES BOUREY AND RICHARD MYERS

Photo from the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies

Innovations in Addressing RACISM and POLICE EXCESSIVE USE of FORCE

A strategic framework for addressing systemic racial bias

Rick Myers, former police chief of Newport News, Virginia, engaging with students.

To most everyone, the idea that one human being could own another is as incomprehensible as it is abhorrent. We have indeed made so much progress in the past century and a half, yet we still have so far to go to achieve racial equality in this country.

It is encouraging that the demonstrations driven by police excessive use of force and biased treatment of African Americans and persons of color have been overwhelmingly supported by people throughout the United States. It is widely recognized that reforms are so very long overdue and mandatory for police behavior against non-white citizens. Despite overwhelming support for change, there is a wide variety of opinions about what needs to be done to address racial bias and ensure equality for everyone. Even though it has been the abusive treatment of Black individuals by some police officers that has brought racial inequality to the forefront, there must be a broader and deeper transformation beyond police reforms to correct discrimination and unequal treatment. We cannot institute some police reforms, pat ourselves on the back, and call it a day. While police reforms are essential, we must seize this opportunity to address the broader issues. This must encompass changes in the entire criminal justice system and the roots of racial bias; unequal treatment throughout aspects of society and governance must be attacked. This is going to require a level of community engagement like never before to take the steps necessary to address policing issues, as well as issues throughout the criminal justice system and the intractable socioeconomic disparities that plague our cities. It is also going to require

a major commitment of resources to reverse the great disparities that have resulted from centuries of ill treatment. Without the wider systemic issues being addressed, policing changes will never be fully effective and racial equality will not be achieved.

Building on the Momentum

We have a great deal of momentum to make change and must seize this opportunity. The good news is that most, if not all, of the tools we need to bring about dramatic change are available. We have knowledge of programs that can bring about major changes and we have experts that are willing and able to help lead the transformation. The challenge will be to reach an agreement on the steps needed and have the community commit to use these tools and persevere through the entire process. Charting the way and maintaining the commitment must have the unequivocal dedication of professional local government managers and city department directors. Moreover, managers absolutely must rise to the occasion to help to lead the effort. Experts in police reform, criminal justice system changes, education and job training, social services, community engagement, as well as the entire human services spectrum, must all come together to join in this vital undertaking. This article provides a suggested conceptual approach for local government leaders. It will, hopefully, provide a framework for local government leaders to develop effective efforts to make meaningful and critically important changes.

We must recognize that there are neither unlimited resources nor boundless will to address these vital issues. Cities and counties need to continue to maintain the critical services they provide, so the investment to address these issues must be strategic and targeted. The recommended framework focuses on the most

Elementary classroom at the Achievable Dream Academy

essential elements to address the disparities and inequalities in our communities arising from racial bias. It is based on the conceptual premise that if people are given the needed support, skills, and opportunity in a setting free from bias to the greatest extent possible, they will be able to obtain an improved standard of living and socioeconomic status.

Some may say, "But what about the substandard living conditions that so many economically disadvantaged non-white citizens live in today?" Indeed, we need to continue to fund and operate the programs we have in place to help to ameliorate these conditions. Improving the living conditions of Black and other non-white populations is valuable, but the goal must be to raise their wealth and provide them opportunities to obtain the same economic status of any community member. Even if we could dramatically increase the investment in these programs to change physical conditions, it will not change the basic socioeconomic disparities that the residents face. In addition, efforts to address neighborhood deterioration often result in gentrification, further exacerbating the problems for residents. Just as communities need to continue to invest in improving physical living conditions, they also need to continue to invest in economic development, particularly job creation, which will help to give all members of the community opportunity for good employment options.

In order to address racial bias and socioeconomic disparities, the effort must be based on a framework that targets necessary investment in the people who need the assistance. In addition, systemic racial bias must be addressed on a community-wide basis to effectuate meaningful change. This framework consists of the following elements:

- An extensive community engagement program addressing racial bias.
- A program of criminal justice system reform.
- Police department operational changes.
- Education and job training.
- Social services support.

Within each of these targets, there should be a laser focus on specific programs that will deliver specific positive outcomes. Communities should seek programs that have an evidence base proving their efficacy and communities should ensure they evaluate and monitor the local success of such interventions.

Community Engagement Program

An extensive and robust community engagement approach is vital to address explicit and implicit racial bias. This must be a joint effort of public and private city leaders and professionals to engage the entire community in order to educate the community about racial bias and win over the hearts and minds of residents. This will require difficult conversations that must take place. Communities will need to take advantage of all means of communicating with citizens, including social media, and diversity trainers and community involvement professionals can design engagement strategies to help guide the efforts. This will not be a quick process and communities need to be willing to see it through to make the meaningful difference that is essential to address racial bias. Certainly not everyone's views will be changed. However, if the overwhelming majority of residents better understand racial bias and are committed to accepting, respecting, and celebrating one another's differences, the dynamic will be very different than it is today in many places.

In addition to the communitywide program, cities and counties need to undertake a program of cultural competency training and eliminate racial bias throughout their staff. A program targeting all those in the criminal justice system will need to be instituted.

Program of Criminal Justice System Reform

In 2015, the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing issued a highly valuable report.[1] Presently, there is a Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice meeting, with publication of recommendations due late in 2020. In both reports, the primary focus is only on the police, the gateway into the criminal justice (CJ) system. Once an individual enters the "system" through an arrest or referral for arrest, the prosecution, the courts, and corrections (including probation and parole) can all have a negative effect on the individual charged. There are scholarly articles suggesting that disparate treatment of minorities within the prosecutorial decision-making process and sentencing by the courts exists and, in some cases, exceeds disparity with policing. Reform cannot simply be focused on the police without addressing the entire system, as racial and economic disparity is systemic throughout the criminal justice system.

For instance, attempts at bail reform may have unintended consequences and some have suggested these changes are more the result of political posturing than a well thought-out systematic approach. They serve to illustrate the need to have a thoughtful process that engages subject matter experts throughout the entire CJ system to create purposeful and effective reform that removes disparity without unintended consequences.

Some necessary changes in the CJ System that are specific to police would include:

- The voluntary reporting of all police uses of force to a national FBI database has floundered, with a minority of the 18,000 agencies in the United States agreeing to participate. Mandating submission would remedy that, but may require state-by-state legislation.
- Traditionally, the courts have ruled on acceptable police practices, use of invasive technologies, etc. This results in a hodge-podge of policies and equipment in use by agencies until such time that litigation passes through the entire level of the courts all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. In the United Kingdom, a national board has certified acceptable technologies allowable by police throughout that country. In the United States, a board that included academics, medical experts, legal experts, and police experts could establish standards for the use of both hardware and policies in key areas, such as use of force, surveillance equipment, etc.
- Where present, unions impact not only collective bargaining, but aspects of police operations, including the administrative functions of discipline and performance accountability. Nationally prominent police chiefs like Chief Chuck Ramsey (retired) have lamented that they have had a significant number of officers fired for cause who were returned to the streets by arbitrators who themselves have no accountability for police misconduct. The role of police unions to protect the pay, hours, and working conditions for police officers must not inhibit the ability of administrators to properly lead their agencies. This is particularly true for ensuring that police department management is able to take action to remove those officers that use excessive force or exhibit racially biased behavior. This requires resolution on a state-by-state basis and will necessitate engaging legislatures.
- A national marketing campaign to increase the attraction of non-traditional candidates for police officers and to other components of the criminal justice system would help to accelerate needed reforms.

Other professions, such as nursing, have benefitted from corporate-sponsored public marketing, and the introduction of applicants drawn to careers with a strong service ethos would strengthen reforms.
- Many experts believe that risk assessment tools used in the criminal justice system are biased against Blacks and other non-white citizens, resulting in more stringent bail and sentencing requirements. The court systems need to review and revise their tools to eliminate racial bias.
- Local drug laws and other ordinances need to be reviewed to identify legislation that disproportionately affects non-white citizens. The strict laws dealing with crack cocaine have often been cited for their heavy consequences for the non-white community.

Police Department Operation Changes

Reforming police operations is a complex process. At a macro level, police operations reform needs to include:

Revamping selection processes to screen out individuals with any tendencies of racial bias, and to screen in candidates with the most important qualities for an enhanced policing model; empathy, compassion, communication skills, problem-solving skills, personal integrity, and a strong grounding in ethics. Recruitment and selection efforts need to support the creation of a greater diversity in new police officers. Part of the selection process must include thorough background investigations. Some agencies

with high vacancy rates or some small agencies that can ill afford any vacancies have not been as thorough as necessary, resulting in some "rogue" officers who have been fired from one agency only to be hired by another. This perpetuates the public image that bad police officers are not held accountable. Recruitment efforts must start well before attempting to fill police officer vacancies. Some agencies begin community outreach efforts as early as middle school, with programs that engage youth throughout their school years and even into college. This is especially important to effectively recruit non-white candidates who may view policing in a negative light.

Revamping the initial training program. Police academy curriculum is not standardized nationally; it is a function of each state's training and standards boards. Entry-level training should include a blend of academics and scenario-based training, including topics usually excluded today such as the history of policing and its adverse impacts on various groups; fair and equitable policing; de-escalation techniques; differentiating between mere "law enforcement" and the broader context of policing; and repetitive training on the proper use of force, with avoidance of practicing improper use of force.

Revamping the field training officer (FTO) experience for newly minted officers. FTOs must be the ultimate role models for new officers, carefully selected for their exemplary work; problem FTOs need to be removed from the program as soon as indications warrant. The "master police coach" program developed by Field Training Associates provides an excellent model and allows supervisors and administrators to readily track the progress of new recruits.

Policy development should follow evidence-based policing examples and also meet the standards of the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA). Policies should strengthen and support the overall mission of the agency and its officers, and not be viewed merely as opportunities to catch employees doing something wrong. Ultimately, even in a very structured environment, police officers should be mission driven more than rules driven.

Evidence-based policies need to be developed and implemented in high-risk, high-liability areas, including uses of force, disparate police actions, the appropriate use of discretion, and other areas of police conduct. These would include:

- A well-used "standard" for decades in policing was the "21-foot rule"—when officers were confronted with someone armed with an edged weapon, it was considered an appropriate use of deadly force to stop the threat presented. Best practices today require police officers to exhaust all efforts of de-escalation first, and even seeking cover, prior to the use of deadly force.
- The application of pressure on a person's throat or neck is widely prohibited in policy and rarely trained as a technique. Only now are some states passing prohibitive legislation. Such legislation should allow exceptions for some extraordinary circumstances that would allow a police officer to use prohibited tactics when they personally believe they are about to perish.
- Progressive police agencies have prohibited shooting at a moving vehicle for many years; however, there are still many agencies that permit this, and officers may use deadly force if they believe the driver is using the vehicle as a weapon. This distinction becomes blurry when officers potentially and purposefully place themselves in the vehicle's pathway as a legal and policy justification for the use of deadly force.

City administration and police agencies must reassess the kinds of services and calls to which police can and will respond. Much has rightly been said about the many challenges of police responding to the high number of mental health events. Collaborative responses with mental health professionals that meet the evidence-based models can serve as a foundation to build upon for all "non-traditional"

police responses. It should be noted that the police have inherited a myriad of service requests due to the 24/7 nature of their availability, but based on our experience, officers are frequently poorly trained and poorly equipped to address the underlying needs they confront.

- The principles of community-oriented/problem-solving policing philosophies strongly contributed to the significant crime rate reductions throughout the 2000s; agencies should restore these tenets and create a strong "guardian" culture for police officers.
- Police need to be more engaged with the community. This includes involving members of the community in the overall planning, policies, and procedures of their local police. Police leaders must overcome resistance within their agencies to involving residents in the determination of what kind of policing each neighborhood needs and wants.[2]

Education and Job Training

As fundamental as anything to achieving socioeconomic parity is access to quality education and job training. Educational attainment is a complex matter that has challenged experts for decades. Not only does it require excellent instruction, but it also requires an encouraging and nurturing environment, as well as student motivation. Communities need to continue to give priority to schools in their budgetary decisions and fund the teachers and facilities necessary for a good education. Additionally, communities should develop mentoring programs to assist in nurturing students and encouraging them to learn. This is directly linked to the last element of this network, family support services.

In addition to high-quality schools and a nurturing environment, youth need to learn life skills that will help them to be successful in a complicated world. This includes an understanding of the expectations in an employment setting, financial literacy, and critical thinking and skills for living in a complex world. A great model for this exists in the Achievable Dream Academy, based in Newport News, Virginia.[3] Students are taught important life skills in a nurturing manner that enhances their feeling of self-worth and value.

While many students may wish to go on to college, many can achieve good, well-paying jobs without a college degree. Job training needs to be a centerpiece of this effort. While job training programs exist throughout the country, they frequently are not adequate to train people for the jobs that exist today. To prepare workers for both the jobs of today and the future will require a much greater investment. Communities cannot solely rely on the support provided by federal funding. Businesses need to step forward and help to provide apprentice programs to develop the trainee's skill sets to continue to work in their industries.

We must invest early in training our youth to become successful in the modern economy and labor markets. Summer youth employment programs can help to provide skills to enable youth to be successful, and should include an instructional piece on basic work etiquette and responsibility. They can help to build self-esteem and a sense of hope for the future, and it is vital that the next generation sees a future where they can achieve successful lives.

Social Services Support

Whether it "takes a village to raise a child" or just a very supportive and nurturing family, it certainly takes more than what many children in disadvantaged households are getting today. Due to economic challenges, public health concerns, inadequate educational opportunities, substandard housing, and other limitations, many children across the country do not receive adequate support to grow into successful adults. While there are no easy answers to this situation, there are a number of efforts that can make a major difference and give the children a better chance to lead successful lives. These include parenting skill instruction, youth mentoring programs, and subsidized daycare. It has often been shown that having a caring, responsible adult in a child's life is critically important for their development. Certainly programs that look after the physical wellbeing of families and children are important and need to be continued. However, unless we step up the support for the nurturing and development of our youth, we will not be successful in addressing the socioeconomic disparities of our future adults.

In addition, mental health and drug and alcohol treatment programs need to be improved. Many knowledgeable people believe the deinstitutionalization of mental health patients and lack of adequate funding has created a mental health crisis in this country. As mentioned previously, the police are too often put in positions to handle mentally ill people in distress, situations they are not fully trained to handle. There will need to be resources devoted to mental health well beyond what cities and counties will be able to invest. Communities need to push strongly for additional infrastructure and support at the state level to better provide for the mental health needs of residents. In addition, cities and counties need to push for more drug and alcohol treatment available for those that cannot presently afford this care. This will help the judicial system refer more offenders to alternative sentencing options instead of jail or prison time.

This article has presented a targeted strategic framework for addressing the systemic racial bias that exists in communities throughout this country, especially in the criminal justice system. We recognize that the investment that communities make needs to be aggressive, yet must be within their means and have the support of the elected leaders and general community. For some communities, this investment may be viewed as "reparations" for centuries of unfair, discriminatory treatment. For others, there may be simply an understanding that it is only right and just. However, a major push for change is imperative and must be considered as important as anything else that the community does. There must be reform in policing to address significant issues all clamoring for solutions. But there must also be a concerted community-wide effort to dramatically reduce racial prejudice. We must engage citizens in a dialogue that will, at times, be uncomfortable to some, but without which communities will not make the required progress. Finally, the socioeconomic disparities that have resulted from discrimination and continue to foster discrimination need to be addressed through a comprehensive program that will allow everyone to achieve an equal measure of success. PM

ENDNOTES AND RESOURCES

[1] https://www.themarshallproject.org/documents/2082979-final-report-of-the-presidents-task-force-on

[2] See Neighborhood Driven Policing Revisited, 2020, by Myers, Levin and Schafer

[3] http://aadacademy.nn.k12.va.us/

JAMES M. (JIM) BOUREY is a retired manager, author, and part-time consultant, having served a number of cities and counties. He is a Life Member of ICMA. (jimbourey@gmail.com)

RICHARD W. (RICK) MYERS is a retired police chief, having served over 40 years in policing. A Life Member of IACP, he is a former executive director of the Major Cities Chiefs Association, the former Chair/President of the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, and currently consults through his LLC, RWM Limited. (richardwmyers@gmail.com)

A SPECIAL THANKS TO THE 2019 SUPPORTERS AND FRIENDS OF THE ICMA FUTURE OF PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT FUND

The September 2020 issue of *PM* magazine included a "Special Thanks to Our Supporters" section, which recognized the generosity of our previous year's donations from organizations and individuals. Soon after that issue was published, we learned that a number of donors were unintentionally left off this list. We understand the disappointment and frustration this may have caused.

The following pages provide a corrected list, in its entirety, of the 2019 donors to the Future of Professional Management Fund. Those individuals and organizations whose names appear in blue text were either unintentionally omitted from the list or whose donation was listed at the wrong level.

We at ICMA sincerely apologize for the oversight and thank you for your generous support. We hope that you will forgive this error and continue to be a supporter and friend of the fund for years to come.

Organization Donors

$15,000
Texas City Management Association

$7,400
Illinois City/County Management Association

$5,000
North Carolina City and County Management Association

$4,000
Virginia Local Government Management Association

$1,000
Kansas Association of City/County Management
Management Partners, Inc.
Tennessee City Management Association
Washington City/County Management Association

Individual Donors

$2,500
Lloyd R. De Llamas

$1,005–1,500
Meighan Wark
Lee R. Feldman

$1,000
Kevin M. Flannery
Sam S. Gaston
Tom Lundy
Jerry Newfarmer
Robert J. O'Neill Jr.
Marc Anthony Ott

$800–999
Edwin C. Daley

$600
Thomas M. Markus
Teresa A. Tieman

$500
James B. Baugh
Jane S. Brautigam
Tanisha R. Briley
Duane R. Cole
Larry J. Cunningham
Timothy J. Erwert
Ellen S. Foreman
Heather M. Geyer
Kathleen Jenks Harm
Lloyd V. Harrell Jr.
Robert S. LaSala
James W. Zumwalt

$400–499
James J. Malloy
Douglas J. Schulze

$105–399
Carlos P. Baia
Sheryl D. Bailey
W. Lane Bailey
James M. Banovetz
Gregory J. Bielawski
Eric D. Campbell
John J. Caulfield
Michael A. Conduff
Wayne S. Davis
Homer T. Dearmin
Mary Kay Peck Delk
Milton R. Dohoney
Edward R. Driggers
Kevin C. Duggan
Paul D. Eckles
Candice J. Edmondson
Timothy J. Eggleston
Ron R. Fehr
Gregory C. Fehrenbach
Kenneth R. Fields
Patricia A. Finnigan
Thomas J. Fromme
Anton S. Gardner
Peter Hames Sr.
Jack S. Hamlett
Kenneth C. Hampian
Douglas J. Hewett
James N. Holgersson
Katy Simon Holland
Henry Howard
Brian P. Humphress
Pamela A. Hylton
Julian L. Jackson
David C. Johnstone
Baldev S. Josan
Craig Kocian
Peter A. Korn
Layne P. Long
Craig Lonon
Stephanie J. Mason
Derek M. Matheson
Tony Mazzucco
Molly Mehner
Florentine Miller
David A. Milliron
Maria R. Mondala-Duncan
Bryan Hyrum Montgomery
Thomas M. Moton Jr.
Mark E. Nagel
Eric P. Norenberg
Julia D. Novak
Alan M. Ours
Kenneth W. Parker
Charles W. Penny
John F. Perry
Paige Peterson
George A. Pettit
Marc H. Pfeiffer
Karen E. Pinkos
Jennifer Reichelt
Gregg Schuster
Kathleen B. Sexton
Mark A. Scott
Edward K. Shikada
John F. Shirey
Kyle R. Sonnenberg
Glenn F. Spachman
Monica N. Spells
Greg R. Sund
James Thurmond
Patrick E. Titterington
Mark Alan Towne
Jeanna Troha
Robert L. Wilson Jr.

$100
Abimbola Akande
Craig G. Anderson
John P. Applegate
Nicole C. Ard
Jesus Armas
Barbara J. Avard
Jane Bais-DiSessa
William P. Barlow III
Geralyn R. Barone
Gerald J. Bauer
Martha J. Bennett
James P. Berzina
Todd M. Blake
Howard W. Brown Jr.
David M. Campbell
George C. Campbell
Luis Campos
Victor J. Carpenter
Mike Casey
Nathan M. Cherpeski
Joseph J. Chinn
Edward J. Ciecka
Larry R. Coons
Samuel L. Coxson
Peter J. Crichton
Lowell Crow
Francis J. Culross Jr.
Mike G. Daly, Sr.
James P. Davidson
Stephanie K. Dawkins
Brian K. Dehner
Walter L. Denton
David J. Deutsch
Vince DiPiazza
Lydia E. Du Borg
William H. Edgar
Michael A. Ericson
Lea Eriksen
William H. Fisher Jr.

Laura A. Fitzpatrick
Rebecca L. Fleury
Thomas Fountaine II
Randi Frank
William J. Fraser
Karen S. Gallivan
Kenneth B. Geathers Jr.
Rita L. Geldert
Patrick L. Goff
Magda Alicia Gonzalez
George D. Goodman
James M. Haag Jr.
David T. Harden
David J. Harris
James Hayner
Edmond R. Hinkle
Brent D. Hinson
Laurie A. Hokkanen
Gary C. Holmes
James G. Jayne
Brian L. Johnson
Daniel A. Johnson
Dwight D. Johnson
Jill Benninghoven Keimach
Richard I. Kerbel
Barbara Kesler
Patrick E. Klein
David Krings
John Kross
Mary Jane Kuffner Hirt
Christopher J. Lagerbloom
Edward F. Lavallee
Jacqueline L. Lee
Mark M. Levin
James R. Lewis
Peter F. Lydens
Lynn H. Markland
Patricia E. Martel
Don Maruska
Opal D. Mauldin-Jones
Kelly R. McAdoo
Deron L. McCormick
Robert D. McEvoy
Michael A. McNees
Frans G. Mencke
Donna G. Miller
Justin J. Miller
Scott Mitchell
William A. Monahan
David E. Moran
Roger J.B. Morris
Steven J. Morus
Brian P. Murphy
Joseph Patrick Murphy
Roxanne Murphy
Ghida S. Neukirch
Jack R. Noble
Anne L. Norris
James B. O'Grady
Marcia D. Onieal
Sara Ott
Reid T. Ottesen
Nathaniel W. Pagan
Patrick Pate
Calvin R. Peck Jr.
M. Denis Peterson
John C. Phillips
Rob Philpott
Anthony T. Plante
Daniel Rich
Margie C. Rose
Henry P. Schubert
Warren H. Shafer
Paul Shew
Reid Silverboard
Jack Arthur Simpson
Henry D. Sinda
Robert E. Slavin
Alden F. Smith
Karen A. Smith
Nat Erskine Smith Jr.
Scott Somers
Glenn D. Southard
Catherine P. Standiford
Eric S. Stuckey
James H. Svara
Henry Taboada
Thomas A. Tanghe
Charles O. Thomas
James L. Thomas
Susan K. Thorpe
Peter Troedsson
Alan G. Vanderberg
Theodore L. Voorhees
William R. Wasson
Michael Webb
Paul A. Wenbert
Steven Wheeler
Bryan L. White
Michael Wilkes
Earl D. Wilson Jr.
Michael R. Wilson
Edward A. Wyatt
Joseph W. Yarbrough
Natalie M. Zeigler
Eric G. Ziegler

UNDER $100

Jon J. Allen
Susan M. H. Arntz
Dave R. Anderson
Kim Claudette Anderson
John B. Andrews
Katherine L. Barrett
Seth B. Benjamin
Greg Benson
Laura Ann Biery
James A. Bodenmiller
Jean A Bonander
Julie M. Brenman
Barry M. Brenner
Jeffrey Broughton
John B. Brown Jr.
Michael B. Brown
Karen Bullard
Randall D. Byrne
Victor Cardenas
Joseph P. Casey
Evelyn Casuga
Melissa Caughman
Julia A. Cedillo
Susan M. Cluse
John W. Coffey
Michael S. Collins
Tobias M. Cordek
Cesar Ricardo Correa Jr.
Regina Coyle
Craig Crossette
Nicole Crutchfield
Gary E. Curmode
John C. Darrington
J. Scott Darrington
Kimberly Davis
Daryl J. Delabbio
Francis M. Delach Jr.
Edward Frank Dembowski
John A. DeStefano Jr.
Michael M. Dutton
Masayoshi Eguchi
Mike Ekey
Deidra Emerson
John J. Ernst
Veronica A. Ferguson
Scot E. Fodi
Dennis R. Foltz
Michele Frisby
Charles S. Funderburk
Chantal Cotton Gaines
Robert T. Gaiotti
Dianne L. Gershuny
Candice Gilreath
Corwin Hamilton
David Hankerson
Tamara Hanlin
Daniel J. Hansford
Harry W. Hayes
Kellie A. Hebert
Richard E. Helton
Alexander J. Henderson
Joel Leigh Hensley
Melissa N. Hipp
Otis L. Hollar
Stephen L. Hollister
Michael Todd Hudgins
Shirley D. Hughes
Toshio Ichikawa
Timothy R. Johnson
Robert B. Johnston Sr.
Diane Jones
Pamela Kavanaugh
Tadayoshi Kawawa
Christine Ann Keefer
Tuncer Kiyak
Alice R. Klavans
Thomas A. Klein
Spencer Kyle
Marc Landry
Paul A. Lanspery
Brett Lavender
Robert C. Lawton Jr.
Richard J. Lee
Carolyn R. Lehr
Douglas K. Leslie
Andrea Llamas
Anthony Bonilla Lopez
Samuel D. Mamet
William Martin
Lorin McKnight Mayo
Richard A. Mays
Dominic F. Mazza
Martin Wayne McCoy
Karen L. McLaughlin
Karen Menard
Carl M. Metzger
Gideon Mhlongo
Liz R. Miller
Ronald Molendyk
Janet R. Muchnik
John P. Munoz
Larry L. Nielsen
David J. Niemeyer
Forrest Harley Neuerburg
Anne F. Odell
Roy Oliver
Wayne Olson
Robert L. Palmer
Stephen M. Pappalardo
John W. Park
Jason Parker
Martin Pastucha
James S. Phillips
Michael P. Pleus
Tedd E. Povar
Frederick Presley
William A. Prokop Sr.
Jessica J. Quady
Judy Ramos
Richard T. Reed
Kristen J. Riley
Meredith Roark
Brandon L. Robertson
Kent S. Robinson
Michele Rodriguez
Mark A. Rohloff
Michael Ross
David L. Rudat
Kathleen F. Rush
Elizabeth S. Ruyle-Hullinger
Jim Saco
Kimberly Sanders
James D. Sandoval
Gregory J. Schulte
Gregory Lee Schulz
Michael J. Sedell
Ronald Showalter
Andrew Sibold
Brent Sloat
Rudolph Smith
Laura Snideman
Kurt J. Starman
Erika M. Storlie
David A. Strohl
Robert L. Svehla
Jonathan D. Sweet
Joseph William Taylor
David C. Tebo Sr.
David S. Teel
Mark D. Vanderpool
Melvin L. Waldrop
Ivan L. Widom
Norman M. Wigington
Ernest J. Wilson
Teresa B. Wilson
Christopher A. Workman

ICMA

LGR

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW

Putting Research Into Practice

SPECIAL SECTION OF *PM* MAGAZINE,
NOVEMBER 2020 — VOLUME 6.0

icma.org

PATHWAYS TO THE MAKING OF PROSPEROUS SMART CITIES

AN EXPLORATORY STUDY ON THE BEST PRACTICE

Kevin C. Desouza, Michael Hunter, Benoy Jacob, and Tan Yigitcanlar

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we examine the under-examined issue of the pathways to smart cities. While the extant literature on smart cities offers several insights into what smart cities are, with a few notable exceptions, it has less to say about how they come to be? With this latter question in mind, we identify three pathways to smart cities — a green field development pathway, a neighborhood development pathway, and a platform-oriented platform. Drawing on eight different case studies, we offer some insights into the ways in which each of these pathways is, more or less, able to realize smart city objectives. While exploratory in nature, we offer unique insights into the pathways to smart cities, as well as areas for future research.

INTRODUCTION

Cities continue to invest significant resources in information and communication technologies (ICT) that increase their 'smartness' and 'intelligence' (Cosgrave; 2013, Angelidou, 2015). These efforts have come to define the smart city movement which, over the past decade, has become an important part of the urban agenda (Kitchen, 2014; Husar et al, 2017). As cities have continued to invest in creating smart (or smarter) cities, scholars have sought to develop an intellectual foundation for understanding this movement. There is now extensive 'smart city literature' that: 1) conceptualizes and defines smart cities (Yigitcanlar et al., 2018), 2) explores its social and political implications (Rossi, 2016), and 3) examines the data that defines and shapes smart city efforts (Hashem et al., 2016). An important, yet understudied issue, is the way in which smart cities actually emerge. With a few notable exceptions, (e.g., Yigitcanlar et al., 2019a; Desouza et al., 2019) there is little in the way of a systematic examination of the pathways that lead to smart cities. Thus, while we have some sense of *what smart cities are*, we know far less about *how they come to be?*

Much of the scholarship suggests that the emergence of smart cities is a "natural" or organic process (Husar, 2017). It represents the 'conclusion' of an ongoing pattern of integrating information and communication technologies (ICT) with the everyday activities of cities. While this "natural" progression represents an important part of the story of smart cities, such as path dependency, it is incomplete. It does not account for the *deliberate and intentional efforts* to create smart cities. This omission is non-trivial. The increasing awareness of urban fragility and need for resilience in the face of a growing population and numerous environmental challenges create a need for cities to deliberately identify new urban efficiencies and planning approaches (Hunter et al., 2019. Desouza et al., 2019). These intentional efforts vary from city to city and, depending on the approach taken, they will present different challenges for the realization of smart city objectives. In this paper, we consider three different types of deliberate approaches, i.e. pathways, to the creation of smart cities: 1) the development of entirely new (smart) cities—from scratch development, 2) smart city development projects within particular parts of the city—infill smart precinct/neighborhood development, and 3) the advancement of smart cities through the integration of ICTs within the city organization—retrofitting the city with smart technologies and platforms to increase efficiencies.

To better understand the different pathways to smart cities, we employ eight case examinations. It is worth noting that some of the cases in this study are considered canonical examples of smart cities. The reliance on these oft-employed examples have been met with some criticism. For example, Kichen (2015) notes that these examples may be "exceptional in nature, rather than typical." As a result, they have become "master tropes for smart cities…[that] provide idealized visions of possible futures." That said, unlike previous case study research on smart cities, we put these cases forward not as examples of best practices to be emulated, but rather as examples that reflect the continuum of smart city efforts.

Following this introduction, this paper proceeds in four parts. The first part describes our conceptualization of 'pathways to smart cities,' as well as the framework we use to examine these pathways. The second section provides an overview of our cases and their relationship to the three pathways we consider. The third section summarizes our key findings, and then we offer some concluding thoughts in the final section with respect to future directions for research.

PATHWAYS TO SMART CITIES

In this paper, we are interested in understanding the different pathways taken for creating or facilitating smart cities. While scholars have yet to offer any systematic examination of these different pathways, the literature offers fairly clear descriptions thereof. Drawing on this literature, then, we are able to conceptualize three different pathways to smart cities. As depicted in Figure 1 (below) this conceptualization allows for different understandings of 'a city,' and, thus, implies different types of challenges.

First, in many instances, smart cities are developed from scratch. This conceptualization of—and operational approach to—smart cities draws upon the idea of a city as a singular physical entity. As such, it can be built 'from scratch' to draw upon the economic benefits typically attributed to cities. Often referred to as *green field developments*, these new cities are created through a series of public-private partnerships. Often as part of a federal government initiative, these developments are marketed in terms of their potential for solving issues regarding urbanization, congestion, and employment. In this paper, we examine this pathway through three cases: Songdo, South Korea; Masdar, Abu Dhabi; and, Gujarat, India.



FIGURE 1. Pathways to Smart Cities



FIGURE 2. A Framework for Examining the Pathways to Smart Cities

A second, but related, pathway focuses on the development of particular neighborhoods within a city. To some degree, this is the most challenging conceptualization and operationalization of a smart city. It requires "retrofitting infrastructures and systems" to existing cities. We examine this pathway through two cases: the Hudson Yards development project in New York City, and Jurong Lake development in Singapore.

Finally, the third pathway we consider focuses less on developing the physical space that occupies the city, but rather pursuing a smart city through the development of a technological platform that integrates data from various organizational silos within the city. From this perspective, the city is understood in its organizational and managerial forms. The emphasis here is on the 'smartness' of the city as it relates to improved delivery of public services. We consider this pathway through four cases: Amsterdam, Netherlands; Manchester City, England; Barcelona, Spain; and, Tel Aviv, Israel.

As noted above, these pathways are not wholly unique. Other scholars have described smart city cases in similar terms. The contribution that we offer in this paper, then, is to provide a side-by-side examination of these pathways. To focus our examination, we consider each of these pathways in terms of three dominant themes that comprise the smart city literature—*governance and services*, *integration of ICT infrastructure*, and *the role of sustainability and social capital*.

As depicted in Figure 2 (above), these themes offer a lens through which we can examine the different pathways to smart cities. The themes, as we describe below, reflect key ideas about the objectives and potential outcomes of smart cities. They provide a reasonable basis, then, by which to consider the different paths toward smart cities. More specifically, we can examine—through our cases—how these objectives and outcomes have been, more or less, realized through different pathways.

Over the previous two decades, scholars have put forward numerous definitions of smart cities. For example, Bowerman, Braverman, Taylor, Todosow, and Wimmersperg (2000) defined a smart city as a place capable of monitoring the conditions of all critical infrastructure while optimizing resources, planning preventative maintenance activities, and monitoring security aspects to maximize services to residents. This definition focuses on the relationship between the physical infrastructure, technology, and systems in place capable of maximizing services to residents. In contrast, Rios (2008: 4) defines a smart city as "A city that gives inspiration, shares culture, knowledge, and life, a city that motivates its inhabitants to create and flourish in their own lives. An admired city, a vessel to intelligence, but ultimately an incubator of empowered spaces." While this idea is on the far side of human centered, it demonstrates the variance between "smartness" through technological means and "smartness" through human capital. Finally, a third definition focuses on governance and information systems. In particular, Piro's (2014: 169) definition denotes "A smart city is intended as an urban environment, which, supported by pervasive ICT systems, is able to offer advanced and innovative services to residents to improve the overall quality of their life."

These definitions reflect the three main themes behind the smart city concept (Waart, 2016); namely a technological theme based on the use of infrastructures; a human theme based on people, education, learning, and knowledge as key drivers; and an institutional theme based on governance and policy and as a result of the importance of cooperation between stakeholders and governments (Nam and Pardo, 2011). We employ these three themes—*'governance and services,' 'integration of ICT infrastructure,'* and *'the role of sustainability and social capital'*—in our analysis. They provide a lens through which to examine the motivations, processes, and outcomes of each case study. As an exploratory project, we seek to develop insights into how each of the pathways manifest the different outcomes described in each theme.

THEME ONE: SMART CITY GOVERNANCE AND SERIVCES

Information systems and urban policy research have launched a large body of scholarly work surrounding the intersection of technology and city governance, with a strong focus on digitalization of services to improve resident's quality of life. For example, Liu, Gavino, and Purao (2014) regard smart governance as a city that develops policies, strategies, and frameworks that serve the unique needs of individual residents. Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, and Tinkler (2006) describe this as Digital Era Governance and notes a transition towards a re-aggregation of public services under direct government control around the resident.

Over the past two decades, this perspective has largely defined the use of ICT within public services and has been identified as having three separate phases. Liu et al. (2014) regard the first generation as a mirror of the private sector with a focus on reducing costs and increasing automation. The second generation saw government adopting market-based mechanisms to increase efficiencies, however, it often resulted in increased complexity for government organizations. In the final phase, governance has adopted a platform-based approach where ICT products are enablers of outcomes, with a focus on service to residents (Fishenden, 2013).

THEME TWO: SMART CITY ICT/ INFRASTRUCTURE

Another focus of smart city research has been the movement toward technologically enhanced public infrastructure. By focusing on technological advancements, researchers considered that efficiencies of the urban environment could be increased considerably to deal with rising populations (Yigitcanlar et al., 2009b). Heo et al. (2014) divide a smart city into six main technological areas: 1) Smart power grids, 2) Structural approaches, 3) Surveillance applications, 4) Transportation and traffic management, 5) Food, water quality, and environmental monitoring, and 6) Ubiquitous healthcare applications. This approach varies considerably from the digital governance focus of other researchers. This approach has a definite focus on a city's infrastructure rather than the services it can offer to residents. Thus, this theme requires that we consider how, as a city's infrastructure is improved by technological advancements, it might open the city to challenges regarding network scalability, security, and privacy concerns; network communication standards; and system interoperability (Heo et al., 2014).

THEME THREE: SMART CITY SUSTAINABILITY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

The concept of sustainability developed from the realization that current social, economic, and urban development research failed to fully account for the risks of environmental disasters or social decays (Bibri, 2018: 100). Following this, the premise of sustainability has risen as a holistic approach to aligning city practices and urban development with nature (Bibri and Krogstie, 2017). Its defining factor is that it looks at all-inclusive decisions for long-term benefits. This is a key distinction from the Digital Era Governance approach (described above) that look toward individualized services. Instead, sustainability is based in the holistic, all-encompassing nature of future developments. As such, sustainability can be thought of as a state in which the natural and social systems are not undermined by society (Bibri, 2018: 101).

Smart city sustainability research has largely focused on ICT enablement to support the natural environment and, as such, the common understanding of smart city sustainability tends to focus on renewable energies, waste removal, and other environmentally sustainable practices. While these practices often focus on the physical environment, researchers have begun to suggest that sustainability must also consider the social sphere in general, and social capital, in particular (Lara, 2016; Granier and Kudo, 2016).

Social capital can be understood as: “the links, shared values and understandings in society that enable individuals and groups to trust each other and so work together” (OECD, 2007: 102). Within the smart city literature, this idea has been adopted to consider the influence of information technologies to empower communication, community engagement, and co-creation. This approach to a city’s “smartness” is based on creating a network of communication that simultaneously shares, educates, and involves all residents, helping the city adapt to the problems that arise. This thinking follows the idea that “human capital will transform how people live and interact with each other, leading to advancements in tech innovation. Investments in communities and their learning capabilities would lead to a better yield in innovation and entrepreneurship” (Kummitha, 2017: 47).

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Our objective in this paper is to begin to develop some insights into the different pathways that lead to the making of prosperous smart cities. In particular, we sought to understand how the pathways differed (or not) with respect to achieving key outcomes that define smart cities; notably governance and services, integration of ICT infrastructure, and the role of sustainability and social capital. In this section we summarize the key insights from our case examinations for each of these outcomes.

First, at the core of the *governance and services* theme, is a question of the provision of public services. That is, how is the adoption of ICT’s facilitating government services? It may not be surprising, but the two development pathways—green field and neighborhood development—seem less successful than the platform pathway in enhancing public service delivery. This insight, however, may be somewhat premature. The primary objective of the development pathways is to establish a new physical infrastructure—which these development projects have, more or less, achieved. The question of how these infrastructure efforts have effectively met the needs of residents remains somewhat of an open question. In contrast, the platform-based pathway, perhaps predictably, is more quickly and effectively enhancing the service provision for local residents. For example, Tel Aviv’s population has seen a large improvement in technological capabilities from the Digi-tel platform, noting residents even developing their own improvements to the software. This technologically educated population provides an attractive talent pool for business and investment and allows residents to engage further with the co-creation of solutions to numerous urban challenges. Additionally, to the degree that “transparency” is an objective of public sector service provision, the platform pathway far exceeds the two development pathways. For example, in smart city initiatives in both Amsterdam and Barcelona, the government enhanced transparency toward the community by publishing documents and websites that clearly outline the goals of the initiative. Rather than attempting to reach these goals independently, council launched a platform where the community can contribute and become a part of the discussion.

The second theme, *integration of ICT infrastructure*, shifts the emphasis from service delivery to infrastructure development. As one might anticipate, both development pathways are clearly more successful at integrating ICT's with their physical infrastructure than the platform-based approach. That said, these development pathways face multiple challenges in terms of achieving "smartness." That is to say, projects have demonstrated varying levels of success, partly due to the complexity, duration, and scale of the transformation. For example, green field developments like Masdar City show little success in terms of population, but large success in terms of global partnerships and economic return. Also, Hudson Yards is one such example that has received public criticism due to its failure to so far deliver on the advanced data and sensor technology it promised. The physical construction is successful, but without delivering on some of the initial smart city deliverables, the development has been interpreted as purely an exercise for commercial investment, without a clear benefit for the greater public. What these examples demonstrate is that even as the physical infrastructure is developed, one of the most difficult challenges with these development projects—both green field and neighborhood—is in aligning the development processes with the socioeconomic and political conditions in which they operate. Often, the most impressive infrastructure upgrades have been left underutilized due to a lack of public interest, or the political conditions change before the project's completion.

In our final theme, *the role of sustainability and social capital*, we find some unique findings. At the heart of this theme is the idea that smart communities are both environmentally and socially sustainable—where social sustainability is understood in terms of resident engagement and connectedness. Interestingly, the platform pathway has provided far greater reported level of engagement and connectedness. This is somewhat surprising. Because the development pathways occur in the physical space of the city and are, typically, part of a public development approval process, one might expect to see more resident engagement than in smart cities created through the platform pathway. Conversely, we found the opposite. For example, a noticeable trend across the European smart city landscape; Amsterdam, Barcelona, and Manchester have all focused on the development of a platform that allows residents to participate within the urban transformation conversation. At the outset, these initiatives are cheaper and tend to result in greater buy-in from the public. Less examples of public criticism can be found within these initiatives, as the public is a present actor within the transformation. These initiatives tend to align with the transformation of existing areas and the integration of ICT systems to enable the resident-government conversation. Relative to the development pathways, the platform pathways are, in some ways, developed and implemented through a more engaged and bottom-up approach. That said, both development pathways are clearly far more complex undertakings. As a result, more top-down approaches may seem to be the more expedient way forward. But to pursue smart city developments from this perspective presents clear limits on the ability to fully develop a city's "smartness."

CONCLUSION

Transforming urban areas into prosperous, livable, and sustainable settlements is a longstanding goal for local governments. Today, countless urban settlements across the globe have jumped onto the smart city bandwagon to achieve this goal. Under the smart city agenda, presently, many government agencies are attempting to engineer an urban transformation to tackle urban prosperity, livability, and sustainability issues mostly through the means of technology solutions (Yigitcanlar et al., 2019a). Nevertheless, there is limited understanding on what smart cities really are, how they emerge, and how prosperous and sustainable smart cities can be erected. This paper aimed to shed light on this understudied area and generate insights to assist cities and their administrations.

Our exploratory study focusing on the smart city best practices across the globe helped us develop insights into the making of prosperous smart cities. The investigation revealed that we are at the beginning of a new era that technology and the city are converging; but at the same time the traditional tools of urban policymaking and planning—such as stakeholder/community engagement, placemaking, participatory design, urban metabolism approach—are still highly relevant. A healthy mix of contemporary and traditional tools and approaches are critical in the development of prosperous and sustainable smart cities. This is to say, while smart technology is critical, technology alone cannot create smart cities, as it takes more than just the state-of-the-art technological solutions to transform cities into truly smart and sustainable ones (Yigitcanlar and Kamruzzaman, 2018).

Additionally, as the study reveals, different approaches are followed in different corners of the globe for the development and practice of smart cities. This finding has helped us to conceptualize three distinctive pathways for smart cities. These pathways to the making of prosperous smart cities are: 1) the development of entirely new (smart) cities—from scratch development, 2) smart city development projects within particular parts of the city—infill smart precinct/neighborhood development, and 3) the advancement of smart cities through the integration of ICT's within the city organization—retrofitting the city with smart technologies and platforms to increase efficiencies.

Finally, while each of the above-mentioned pathways has their strengths and weaknesses and suitability for certain country contexts, they shed light on the future research studies that will focus on the development of new and consolidated pathways. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the making of prosperous smart cities highly depends on adequately linking the guiding principles (such as having a system of systems approach, adopting a quadruple-bottom-line sustainable urban development perspective, and mainstreaming the urban metabolism approach) and traditional policymaking and planning methods with technological advancements and the needs of the societies (Yigitcanlar et al., 2019c). This rule applies to all of the distinctive pathways this study introduced, and the prospective ones yet to be formed.

Adapted from a forthcoming paper in the Journal of Urban Technology: [*https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10630732.2020.1807251*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10630732.2020.1807251)

KEVIN C. DESOUZA
Professor of Business, Technology and Strategy
School of Management, QUT Business School
Queensland University of Technology
kevin.c.desouza@gmail.com

MICHAEL HUNTER
Researcher
School of Information Systems
Queensland University of Technology
Mg,hunter@qut.edu.au

BENOY JACOB, PhD
Director, Community Development Institute
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Affiliated Faculty
LaFollette School of Public Affairs
benoy.jacob@unlv.edu

TAN YIGITCANLAR
Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
School of Built Environment
Queensland University of Technology
tan.yigitcanlar@qut.edu.au

BIBLIOGRAPHY

R. Abhirup and R. Jain, *India's jobs deficit: Project in Gujarat struggling to create employment* (n.d, USA: Reuters, 2019) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-election-giftcity-insight/indias-jobs-deficit-project-in-gujarat-struggling-to-create-employment-idUSKCN1SU04Y Accessed May 24, 2019.

E. Albers, *Using Free Software to build a more democratic, inclusive and sustainable digital society* (n.d, ES: Free Software Foundation Europe, 2018). https://fsfe.org/news/2018/news-20180705-01.en.html Accessed June 12, 2019.

V. Albino, U. Berardi & R. Dangelico, "Smart Cities: Definitions, Dimensions, Performance, and Initiatives", *Journal of Urban Technology*, 22:1, (2015).

I. Amsterdam, Amsterdam: *Capital of Innovation* (Amsterdam, NL: Amsterdam and Partners Foundation, 2019) https://www.iamsterdam.com/en/business/news-and-insights/capital-of-innovation Accessed May 28, 2019.

Amsterdam Smart Citizens Lab, *Citizen Science – The Bottom Up Way*. (Amsterdam, NL: Amsterdam Smart Citizens Lab, 2016) https://amsterdamsmartcity.com/projects/amsterdam-smart-citizens-lab-3901oh7g Accessed May 28, 2019.

M, Angelidou. The Role of Smart City Characteristics in the Plans of Fifteen Cities, *Journal of Urban Technology*, 24:4, 3-28 (2017).

ANS: *Creating the 1st blueprint for UK smart cities - ANS means business* (Manchester, UK: ANS, 2018) https://www.ans.co.uk/case-studies/cityverve/ Accessed June 11, 2019.

ASTAR (2017). Opening Address by Chairman of A*STAR, Mr. Lim Chuan Poh, at the Future of Manufacturing Summit Singapore on 5 September 2017 at Resorts World Sentosa https://www.a-star.edu.sg/News-and-Events/News/Speeches/ID/5671 Accessed June 20, 2019.

J. Anuta, *Hudson Yards to be first 'quantified community'* (New York, NY, Crains New York Business, 2014) https://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20140414/REAL_ESTATE/140419932/hudson-yards-to-be-first-quantified-community Accessed May 12, 2019.

R. Au-Yong, *The Story of Jurong Lake District - from the boondocks to boom-town and beyond*: The Straits Times, 2017) https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/from-the-boondocks-to-boom-town-and-beyond Accessed June 18, 2019.

T. Bakici, E. Almirall & J. Wareham, "A Smart City Initiative: the Case of Barcelona", *Journal of the Knowledge Economy*, 4:2, (2013).

Barcelona, *General Principles of Technological Sovereignty* (Barcelona, EG: Barcelona Government, 2016) https://www.barcelona.cat/digitalstandards/en/tech-sovereignty/0.1/general-principles.

P. Berrone, J. Ricart, & C. Carrasco, "The Open Kimono: Toward a General Framework for Open Data Initiatives in Cities", *California Management Review*, 59: 1, (2016).

J. Bhatnarga (2015) "Gujarat International Finance Tec-city: A Smart GIFT". Smart Cities of Tomorrow. Accessed October 15, 2019.

T. Bhattacharya, A. Bhattacharya, B. McLellan, B. & T. Tezuka, "Sustainable smart city development framework for developing countries", *Urban Research & Practice*, (13:2), (2018).

Bibri, S. (2018). *Smart Sustainable Cities of the Future The Untapped Potential of Big Data Analytics and Context–Aware Computing for Advancing Sustainability* (1st ed. 2018).

S. Bibri, & J. Krogstie, "Smart sustainable cities of the future: An extensive interdisciplinary literature review", *Sustainable Cities and Society*, (31: issue), (2017).

J. Blackman, *We will seriously 'productize' CityVerve* (United Kingdom, UK: Internet of Things Enterprise, 2018) https://enterpriseiotinsights.com/20180620/channels/news/we-will-productise-cityverve-says-cisco-tag40 Accessed June 21, 2019.

Bloomberg, *Gujarat International Finance Tec-City and Bloomberg Collaborate to Advance India's International Financial Services Center to Global Investors* (United States of America, US: Bloomberg Professional Services, 2018). https://www.bloomberg.com/company/press/gujarat-international-finance-tec-city-gift-city-bloomberg-collaborate-advance-indias-international-financial-services-centre-ifsc-global-investors/ Accessed June 10, 2019.

I. Boughed, C., Alalouch & N. Fava, "Towards smart sustainable cities: A review of the role digital citizen participation could play in advancing social sustainability", *Sustainable Cities and Society*, (50) (2019).

B. Bowerman, J. Braverman, J. Taylor, H. Todosow, & U. Wimmersperg, "The Vision of a Smart City", paper presented at 2nd International Life Extension Technology Workshop (Paris, September 28, 2000).

B. Byung-yeul, *Incheon FEZ becomes global business hub* (Korea, KOR: The Korea Times, 2018) http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2018/12/693_259369.html Accessed June 14, 2019.

I. Capdevila, & M. Zarlenga. Smart city or smart citizens? The Barcelona case. *Journal of Strategy and Management*, 8(3), 266–282 (2015).

A. Charles, *How can India make smart cities a reality?* (Davos, CH, *World Economic Forum*, 2015) https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/11/how-can-india-make-smart-cities-a-reality/.

J. Choque, A. Medela, J. Echevarria, L. Diez, & L. Munoz, "Enabling incentivization and citizen engagement in the smart-city co-creation paradigm", paper presented at *2018 Global Internet of Things Summit* (June 4-7, Bilbao, 2018).

CISCO, *CISCO announces $1 billion program for Smart Cities* (Manchester, UK: CISCO, 2017) https://newsroom.cisco.com/press-release-content?type=webcontent&articleId=1895705 Accessed June 15, 2019.

CISCO, *Public Sector Digital Transformation Map - CISCO Case Studies* (Manchester, UK: CISCO, 2019) https://www.cisco.com/c/m/en_us/solutions/industries/smart-connected-communities/digital-transformation-map.html Accessed June 15, 2019.

J. Cluer, *Top Five: Israel's Innovation Centre* (Western Australia, AUS, *Australia-Israel – Chamber of Commerce WA Inc., n.d)* http://www.aiccwa.org.au/Profiles/aiccwa/Assets/ClientData/Images/Events/Israels_Innovation_Culture.pdf Accessed July 2, 2019.

B. Cohen, *The three generations of smart cities* (New York, NY: Fast Company, 2015) https://www.fastcompany.com/3047795/the-3-generations-of-smart-cities Accessed September 15, 2015.

C. Cooper, *How Israel became a start-up nation* (Melbourne, AU: *InTheBlack – Economics, 2017*) https://www.intheblack.com/articles/2017/11/01/israel-start-up-nation Accessed July 2, 2019.

E. Cosgrave, K, Arbuthnot, & T. Tryfonas. Living Labs, Innovation Districts and Information Marketplaces: A Systems Approach for Smart Cities. *Procedia Computer Science, 16*(C), 668–677 (2013).

F. Cugurullo, *"How to Build a Sandcastle: An Analysis of the Genesis and Development of Masdar City", Journal of Urban Technology*, 20:1, (2013).

Cugurullo, F. (2016). Urban eco-modernisation and the policy context of new eco-city projects: where Masdar City fails and why. *Urban Studies*, 53(11), 2417–2433.

R. Dameri, *"Searching for smart city definition: A comprehensive proposal"*, International Journal of Computers and Technology, 11:5, (2013) 2544-2551.

K. Da-sol, *IEFZ unveils plans to make Songdo world-class bio industry hub* (Korea, KOR: The Korea Times, 2018) http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20180424000721 Accessed July 2, 2019.

K. Desouza & A. Bhagwatwar *"Citizen Apps to Solve Complex Urban Problems," Journal of Urban Technology*, 19:3, (2012) 107-136.

K. Desouza & A. Bhagwatwar "Technology-Enabled Participatory Platforms for Civic Engagement: The Case of US Cities," *Journal of Urban Technology*, 21:4 (2014) 25-50.

K. Desouza & T. Flanery "Designing, Planning, and Managing Resilient Cities: A Conceptual Framework," *Cities*, 35:1 (2013) 89-99.

K. Desouza, M. Hunter and T. Yigitcanlar "Under the hood: A look at techno-centric smart city development," *Public Management 101:11*, (2019) 30-35.

T, Dodd, *Hebrew University of Jerusalem earned US20b revenue from commercializing its research.* (Australia, AUS: *Australian Financial Review*, 2017). https://www.afr.com/work-and-careers/management/hebrew-university-of-jerusalem-earns-us20b-from-commercialising-its-research-20170713-gxaqb9 Accessed July 4, 2019.

C. Drubin, *"Singapore tops in smart city rankings," Microwave Journal, 61*:6, (2018). https://gateway.library.qut.edu.au/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.ezp01.library.qut.edu.au/docview/2060947949?accountid=13380 .

P. Dunleavy, H. Margetts, S. Bastow and J. Tinkler, "New public management is dead—long live digital-era governance," *Journal of public administration research and theory, 16:3*, (2006) 467-494.

European Commission: Amsterdam Smart City. (Amsterdam, N: *European Commission*, 2011). https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/projects/best-practices/netherlands/2115 Accessed June 2, 2019.

J. Fishenden, and M, Thompson. Digital government, open architecture, and innovation: why public sector IT will never be the same again. *Journal of public administration research and theory*, 23 (4), 2013, 977-1004.

M. Fitzgerald, Data Driven City Management. *MIT Sloan Management Review*. (2016). https://sloanreview.mit.edu/case-study/data-driven-city-management/.

Garber, B. (1991, Oct 24). Israel opens labor force for Russians. *Jewish Advocate* Retrieved from https://gateway.library.qut.edu.au/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/205159350?accountid=13380.

Garfield, L (2017). South Korea is building a $40 billion city designed to eliminate the need for cars. *The Business Insider – Research – Tech Insider.* February 15, 2017. https://www.businessinsider.com.au/songdo-south-korea-design-2017-11?r=US&IR=T.

Gascó-Hernandez, M. Building a smart city: lessons from Barcelona. Communications of the ACM, 61(4), 50–57 (2018).

GIFT (2019). GIFT Special Economic Zone. *Gujarat International Financial Services Centre.* 2019. http://www.giftgujarat.in/gift-sez.

Goh, E., & Reilly, J. (2017). China's Belt and Road Initiative. *East Asia Forum Quarterly*, *9*(4), 33–34. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/2185821625/.

Goldenberg, S. (2016). Analysis shows Hudson Yard's Impact of City's Economy. *Politico*. 3rd May, 2016. https://www.related.com/sites/default/files/2019-03/acquiadam-assets/relatedcorporate-news-05-2017-Politico-HudsonYards-economic-impact.pdf.

Goldenberg, S. (2016). Masdar's zero-carbon dream could become world's first green ghost town. The Guardian, Greenhouse Gas Emissions. February 17, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/feb/16/masdars-zero-carbon-dream-could-become-worlds-first-green-ghost-town.

Granier, B., & Kudo, H. (2016). How are citizens involved in smart cities? Analysing citizen participation in Japanese "Smart Communities". *Information Polity*, 21(1), 61–76.

GUCD, (2019). About Us. *Gujarat Urban Development Company.* 2019. http://www.gudcltd.com/.

GulfNews (2019). 10.5 billion worth of deals reach at energy summit in Abu Dhabi. *Gulf News – Energy.* January 21, 2019. https://gulfnews.com/business/energy/105-billion-worth-of-deals-reached-at-energy-summit-in-abu-dhabi-1.1548070371434.

Haag, M. (2019). Amazon's Tax Breaks and Incentives Were Big. Hudson Yards are Bigger. *The New York Times.* March 9, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/09/nyregion/hudson-yards-new-york-tax-breaks.html.

Hammer, S., Kamal-Chaoui, L., Robert, A., and Plouin, M., Cities and Green Growth: A Conceptual Framework, OECD Regional Development Working Papers 08, OECD Publishing, 2011.

Hanifan, L. J. (1916). The Rural School Community Centre. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 67, 130-38.

Hashem, I. A., Chang, V., Anuar, N. B., Adewole, K., Yaqoob, I., Gani, A. & Chiroma, H. (2016). The role of big data in smart city. *International Journal of Information Management*, *36*(5), 748-758.

Heo, T., Kim, K., Kim, H., Lee, C., Ryu, J., Leem, Y., Ko, J. Escaping from ancient Rome! Applications and challenges for designing smart cities. *Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies*, 25(1), 109–119 (2014).

Hollands, R. (2008). Will the real smart city please stand up?: Intelligent, progressive or entrepreneurial? City, 12(3), 303–320.

Hudson Yards, New York (2016). New Report Details Substantial Economic Impact of Hudson Yards Development. *Hudson Yards – Press Releases*. May 2, 2016. https://www.hudsonyardsnewyork.com/press-media/press-releases/new-report-details-substantial-economic-impact-hudson-yards-development.

M. Hunter, JD. Selby, K.C. Desouza "Cities Are Surprisingly Fragile" Observations: Scientific American, 2019. https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/cities-are-surprisingly-fragile/.

IMD, 2019. IMD and SUTD unique ranking shows importance of citizens' needs in policy making. *IMD Smart City Index.* 2019. https://www.imd.org/smart-city-observatory/smart-city-index/.

Incheon Global Campus (2019). About. *Incheon Global Campus.* 2019. http://www.igc.or.kr/en/index.do

India ICT (2019). Digitel – Tel Aviv, Israel. *Case Study – ICT Enabled Integration for Green Growth Project*. 2019. http://icities4greengrowth.in/casestudy/digitel-tel-aviv-israel.

Indianix (2019). Services, About Us. *International Financial Services Centre.* 2019. https://www.indiainx.com/static/ifsc.aspx

Ismail, N. (2018). 3 Smart City Lessons from Manchester and the UK's Smart City IoT demonstrator, City Verve. *Information Age, Topics, Smart Cities.* August 20, 2018. https://www.information-age.com/smart-city-lessons-123474272/.

JTC Corporation (2019). Jurong Innovation District. JTC – *Projects and Properties.* 2019. https://www.jtc.gov.sg/industrial-land-and-space/Pages/jurong-innovation-district.aspx.

Kaye, L. (2017). Pushing the low carbon boundaries: South Korea's smart grid initiative. *The Guardian,* 5th September, 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/south-korea-smart-grid-low-carbon.

Khare, V. (2019). India Election 2019: Have '100 smart cities' been built? *BBC News.* March 25, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-47025472.

Komninos, N., Kakderi, C., Panori, A. & Tsarchopoulos, P. (2019) Smart City Planning from an Evolutionary Perspective, *Journal of Urban Technology*, *26:2*, 3-20, DOI: 10.1080/10630732.2018.1485368.

Kummitha, R., & Crutzen, N. (2017). How do we understand smart cities? An evolutionary perspective. Cities, 67, 43–52.

Lara, A., Moreira Da Costa, E., Furlani, T., & Yigitcanlar, T. (2016). Smartness that matters: towards a comprehensive and human-centered characterisation of smart cities. *Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, and Complexity*, 2(1), 1–13.

Lawrence, C. (2019). Why Smart City Amsterdam is the Home of Innovation. *IoT Zone.* October 25, 2017. https://dzone.com/articles/why-smart-city-amsterdam-is-the-home-of-innovation.

Liu, N., Gavino, A., & Purao, S. (2014). A method for designing value-infused citizen services in smart cities. *Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research*, 34–43.

Macpherson, L. (2018). 8 Years on, Amsterdam is still leading the way as a Smart City. Towards Data Science. September 8, 2017. https://towardsdatascience.com/8-years-on-amsterdam-is-still-leading-the-way-as-a-smart-city-79bd91c7ac13.

Malon, D. (2016). Despite troubled development, Masdar City forges ahead. *BCD Network, Urban Planning.* October 20, 2016. https://www.bdcnetwork.com/despite-troubled-development-masdar-city-forges-ahead.

Mancebo, F. (2019) Smart city strategies: time to involve people. Comparing Amsterdam, Barcelona and Paris, Journal of Urbanism: International Research on Placemaking and Urban Sustainability,

MASDAR (2019). Clean Energy - Projects. *Masdar City Website – The City*. 2019. https://masdar.ae/en/masdar-city/the-city/sustainability.

MASDAR (2019). Sustainability. *Masdar City Website – The City*. 2019. https://masdar.ae/en/masdar-city/the-city/sustainability.

Mckinsey (2018). Smart Cities: Digital Solutions for a more livable future. *Mckinsey Global Institute*. June, 2018. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-insights/smart-cities-digital-solutions-for-a-more-livable-future.

Meetup, 2019. Amsterdam Smart Citizens Lab. *Meetup.com*. October 17, 2019. https://www.meetup.com/Amsterdam-Smart-Citizens-Lab/events/.

Menny, M., Palgan, Y., & McCormick, K. (2018). Urban Living Labs and the Role of Users in Co-Creation. *Gaia*, *27*(S1), 68–77.

Microsoft (2017). Microsoft driving intelligent, connected smart cities. *Microsoft in Government, Industry Blogs*. November 12, 2018. https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/industry-blog/government/2018/11/12/microsoft-driving-intelligent-connected-smart-cities/.

Microsoft (2019). Welcome to Microsoft CityNext. *Partner Network, Microsoft*. 2019. https://partner.microsoft.com/en-us/solutions/citynext.

Mora, L., Deakin, M., & Reid, A. (2019). Strategic principles for smart city development: A multiple case study analysis of European best practices. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, *142*, 70–97.

Moser, S (2013). New Cities: Opportunities, Visions and Challenges: Summary and Analysis Report. *Cityquest – KAEC Forum 2013*. November 25, 2013. https://newcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/PDF-CityquestKAECForum-Report-Sarah-Moser.pdf.

Mullins, P & Shwayri, S (2016) Green Cities and "IT839": A New Paradigm for Economic Growth in South Korea, *Journal of Urban Technology*, *23:2*, 47-64.

Nam, T., & Pardo, T. A. (2011). Conceptualizing smart city with dimensions of technology, people, and institutions. In 12th Annual International Digital Government Research Conference: Digital Government Innovation in Challenging Times (pp. 282–291).

Newton, P. (2012) Liveable *and* Sustainable? Socio-Technical Challenges for Twenty-First-Century Cities, *Journal of Urban Technology*, *19:1*, 81-102.

Nolan, H. (2019). New York's Hudson Yards is an ultra-capitalist Forbidden City. *The Guardian, Opinion, New York*. 13th March, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/13/new-york-hudson-yards-ultra-capitalist.

Nonko, E. (2019). Hudson Yards promised a High-Tech Neighborhood – It was a greater challenge than expected. *Metropolis Magazine*. February 5, 2019. https://www.metropolismag.com/cities/hudson-yards-technology-urbanism/.

OECD Insights. (2007). The Bigger Picture. Human Capital: How what you know shapes your life. 6, 102-105.

Oliveira, E. (2017). [Review of *Citizen Empowerment and Innovation in the Data-Rich City*]. *Journal of Urban Technology*, *24(2)*, 111–114.

Otgaar, A., & Carvalho, L. (2016). Mobile world capital (Barcelona). *In Delivering Sustainable Competitiveness: Revisiting the Organising Capacity of Cities* (pp. 92–107).

Pereira, G., Cunha, M., Lampoltshammer, T., Parycek, P., & Testa, M. (2017) Increasing collaboration and participation in smart city governance: a cross-case analysis of smart city initiatives, *Information Technology for Development*, 23:3, 526-553.

Piro, G., Cianci, I., Grieco, L. A., Boggia, G., & Camarda, P. (2014). Information centric services in smart cities. *Journal of Systems and Software*, 88(1), 169–188.

Plitt, A. (2019). Hudson Yards opening: Timeline of the megaproject's major moments. *Curbed New York – NYC Development News*. March 13, 2019. https://ny.curbed.com/2019/3/13/18252323/hudson-yards-new-york-construction-timeline.

Poon, L (2018). Sleepy in Songdo, Korea's Smartest City. Citylab. 22nd June 22, 2018. https://www.citylab.com/life/2018/06/sleepy-in-songdo-koreas-smartest-city/561374/.

Press, G. (2018). 6 Lessons From Tel-Aviv For Successful Digital Transformation Of Smart Cities. *Forbes, Enterprise and Cloud*. March 22, 2018. www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2018/03/22/6-lessons-from-tel-aviv-for-successful-digital-transformation-of-smart-cities/#351873965330.

A Record-breaking Edition of Smart City Expo Will Focus on Building More Liveable Cities. (2018, November 13). *PR Newswire*. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/2132240521/.

Reboredo, R. (2019). What a failed Johannesburg project tells us about mega cities in Africa. *The Conversation – Business and Economy*. March 6, 2019. http://theconversation.com/what-a-failed-johannesburg-project-tells-us-about-mega-cities-in-africa-112420

Rios, P. (2008). Creating "the smart city". https://archive.udmercy.edu/handle/10429/393.

Rojc, P. (2019). Promised Data-Driven Infrastructure on Hold at Hudson Yards. *Planetizen – News*. February 24, 2019. https://www.planetizen.com/news/2019/02/103015-promised-data-driven-infrastructure-hold-hudson-yards.

Rossi, U (2016) The Variegated Economics and the Potential Politics of the Smart City, Territory, Politics, Governance, 4:3, 337-353.

Shwayri, S., (2019). "A Model Korean Ubiquitous Eco-City? The Politics of Making Songdo," *Journal of Urban Technology*, 20: 1 (2013) 39–55.

SmartCities (2019). Smart Cities Mission. *Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, Government of India.* 2016. http://smartcities.gov.in/content/.

SmartCitiesWorld (2018). Citizen Engagement is the key to smart city success. *Smart Cities World – News.* March, 8 2018. https://www.smartcitiesworld.net/news/news/citizen-engagement-is-key-to-smart-city-success-2685.

SmartCity.com (2019). Oslo – A Smart City with a Pioneering Thinking Against Climate Change. *Environment, Climate Change, Europe, Smart City Press.* April 2, 2019. https://www.smartcity.press/climate-change-in-oslo/.

SmartCityExpo (2014). SCEWC 2014 Report. Change The World. *Smart City Expo, World Congress.* 2014. http://www.smartcityexpo.com/the-event/past-editions-2014.

Soyata, T., Habibzadeh, H., Ekenna, C., Nussbaum, B., & Lozano, J. (2019). Smart city in crisis: Technology and policy concerns. *Sustainable Cities and Society*, 50.

Tieman, R. (2017). Barcelona: smart city revolution in progress. *Financial Times – Special Report – Smart Cities.* October 26, 2017. https://www.ft.com/content/6d2fe2a8-722c-11e7-93ff-99f383b09ff9.

Tyler, J. Bendix, A (2018). Hudson Yards is the most expensive real-estate development in the US history. Here's what it's like inside the $25 billion neighbourhood. *Business Insider – Research – Briefing.* October 1, 2018. https://www.businessinsider.com.au/hudson-yards-tour-of-most-expensive-development-in-us-history-2018-9?r=US&IR=T.

UN, United Nations, "World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database" (2008), http://esa.un.org/unup/.

USGBC (2019). Green building leadership is LEED. *Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design.* 2019. https://new.usgbc.org/leed.

van den Bosch, H (2018). Smart beyond technology push. Smart City Hub, Technology and Innovation. December 18, 2018. http://smartcityhub.com/technology-innnovation/smart-beyond-technology-push/.

van Waart, P., Mulder, I., de Bont, C., Bolívar, M., Meijer, A., & Gil-Garcia, J. (2016). A Participatory Approach for Envisioning a Smart City. *Social Science Computer Review*, 34(6), 708–723.

Venkataraman, P. (2018). Gujarat's GIFT City named among top three emerging business hubs in the world. *News18, Business.* September 13, 2018. https://www.news18.com/news/business/gujarats-gift-city-named-among-top-three-emerging-business-hubs-in-world-1876885.html.

Wade, G. (2017). China's 'One belt, One Road' initiative. *Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security. Parliament of Australia.* 2017. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/ChinasRoad.

Yigitcanlar, T. (2011). Moving Towards a Knowledge City?: Brisbane's Experience in Knowledge-Based Urban Development. *International Journal of Knowledge-Based Organizations (IJKBO)*, *1*(3), 22–38.

Yigitcanlar, T., & Lee, S., (2014). Korean ubiquitous-eco-city: a smart-sustainable urban form or a branding hoax? *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, *89*, 100-114.

Yigitcanlar, T. (2016). Technology and the city: Systems, applications and implications. Routledge.

Yigitcanlar, T., Kamruzzaman, M. (2018). Does smart city policy lead to sustainability of cities? *Land Use Policy 73*, 49–58.

Yigitcanlar, T., Kamruzzaman, M., Buys, L., Ioppolo, G., Sabatini-Marques, J., Costa, E., & Yun, J., (2018). Understanding 'smart cities': intertwining development drivers with desired outcomes in a multidimensional framework. *Cities*, *81*, 145-160.

Yigitcanlar, T., & Inkinen, T. (2019). *Geographies of Disruption: Place Making for Innovation in the Age of Knowledge Economy.* Springer International Publishing.

Yigitcanlar, T., Hoon, M., Kamruzzaman, M., Ioppolo, G., & Sabatini-Marques, J., (2019a). The making of smart cities: are Songdo, Masdar, Amsterdam, San Francisco and Brisbane the best we could build? *Land Use Policy*, *88*, 104187.

Yigitcanlar, T., Kamruzzaman, M., Foth, M., Sabatini-Marques, J., Costa, E., & Ioppolo, G. (2019b). Can cities become smart without being sustainable? A systematic review of the literature. *Sustainable Cities and Society*, *45*, 348–365.

Yigitcanlar, T., Foth, M., Kamruzzaman, M. (2019c). Towards post-anthropocentric cities: reconceptualising smart cities to evade urban ecocide. *Journal of Urban Technology*, 26(2), 147–152.

Zarroli, J. (2015). How Singapore became one of the richest places on earth. *Weekend Edition Sunday.* NPR. March 29, 2015. https://www.npr.org/2015/03/29/395811510/how-singapore-became-one-of-the-richest-places-on-earth .

Zhang, X. (2019). Remaking Sustainable Urbanism Space, Scale and Governance in the New Urban Era (1st ed. 2019).

TRUSTING POLITICIANS AND INSTITUTIONS IN A MULTI-LEVEL SETTING

Sune Welling Hansen And Ulrik Kjaer

Trust in government and in politicians is a very crucial prerequisite for democratic processes. This is true not only for the national level of government, but also for the regional and local levels. We make use of a large-scale survey among citizens in Denmark to evaluate trust in politicians at different levels of government. And we find that trust in local politicians is somewhat higher than trust in members of Parliament (MPs)—especially among citizens who are well satisfied with the municipal service delivery. By introducing several municipal-level variables in a multi-level analysis (MLA), it is also found that very chaotic government formation processes can negatively influence trust in the mayor and the councilors. Reaching out for local power by being disloyal to one's own party or by breaking deals already made can sometimes secure the mayoralty, but it comes at a cost: lower trust among the electorate.

POLITICAL TRUST IN A MULTI-LEVEL SETTING

The defining feature of representative democracy is the representative connection between voters and elected representatives by which voters elect politicians who then make decisions on their behalf until the next election, when voters then evaluate the representatives by voting them in or out of office (Manin, 1997; Przeworski et al., 1999; Trounstine, 2010). In its simplicity, this vital mechanism for representative democracy looks ingenious at first, but it is worth noticing how radical the idea of representational democracy is. For an extensive period of time (in many cases, four or five years) the many voters allow the few politicians to rule them and let them make sometimes critical political decisions on their behalf. Deliberative arrangements, which make discussions between citizens and politicians possible in between elections, are, of course, also a part of the representative democratic set-up in many countries, but what basically keeps the system together and enables political representation as a continuously working form of democracy is *trust*. If the voters trust the politicians and the political institutions, then the system is viable and can survive; otherwise it will be seriously challenged. And in a world where representative democracy in many countries is seen as the preferred form of democracy, it is therefore essential to monitor the level of the citizens' trust in their representatives and in the legislatures these politicians inhabit.

Therefore, it is no surprise that the concept of political trust has been discussed and researched extensively for many years (e.g., Easton, 1965; Miller, 1974; Bianco, 1994; Norris, 1999; Levi and Stoker, 2000). The definitions of *trust* are many; for now we will follow Miller and Listhaug who state that: "Trust…reflects evaluations of whether or not political authorities and institutions are performing in accordance with normative expectations held by the public. Citizen expectations of how government should operate include, among other criteria, that it be fair, equitable, honest, efficient, and responsive to society's needs. In brief, an expression of trust in government (or synonymously political confidence and support) is a summary judgement that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny" (Miller and Listhaug, 1999).

We fully acknowledge that several different dimensions of political trust can be identified, but instead of getting involved in that discussion, we will stick to the definition's point that trust is a kind of "summary judgment." And therefore, throughout the article, we will take for granted the summary judgment of the citizens that we have surveyed—if they say that they have trust in politicians when asked directly, we will trust their evaluation.

We will take the discussion and the empirical analysis in a very specific direction, since we also find it important that this concept and the empirical understanding hereof is more multi-level in nature than what has previously been seen. Despite more and more focus on multi-level governance (Bache and Flinders; Piattoni, 2010), it seems that in most cases this means including the supranational level (e.g., the European Union), whereas the local government level continuously is, if not outright forgotten, then somewhat overlooked in many branches of political and administrative science.

FOCUSING ON THE LOCAL LEVEL

The scarcity of studies on political trust at the local level might have something to do with the tendency to pay less attention to "low politics" compared to "high politics." Local governments often take care of roads, sewage, water, zoning, and other "technical" matters, whereas economic policy and foreign policy are decided at the national level and in the national political realm, sometimes even in supranational spheres. (Although in many countries, local governments are often in some ways involved in important policy fields such as schools, social services, and care for the elderly). However, without taking sides in the debate on whether local or national governments are the most important, it could be argued that more attention should be paid to the local government level. In all countries there are by far more politicians elected at the local level than at the national, and therefore it seems a bit peculiar not to take these many local politicians into account when political trust is discussed. Also, by including the local level in the analyses of political trust, we get a better empirical understanding of this specific political/administrative phenomenon. Not only does the local level supply us with more cases to scrutinize, it also offers a unique comparative basis of analysis. We might be able to learn from comparing trust at different political levels within the same country and learn from the comparison different local governments within the same country, thereby being able to have many comparable cases (Lijphart, 1975).

Paradoxically, the sheer number of local governments not only makes them interesting from a scholarly point of view, it sometimes also makes them less accessible for scholars since data on local governments are often harder to access compared to data on national governments. Precisely because of data scarcity, it has been concluded, in regard to the study of trust, that: "The extant literature is thus ill equipped to comment critically on the nature of public trust in local government" (Rahn and Rudolph, 2005: 531). But data on local government can be produced, and therefore we will accept the challenge and partake in an MLA on trust in governments.

We will do this by asking two questions. First, we will ask where the level of political trust is highest—at the national, regional, or local government level? Second, we will focus on the local government level and try to explain the variation across different municipalities. This is in line with Rahn and Rudolph when they ask: "Why is local political trust higher in some places than in others?" (2005: 531).

We will conduct the study as a single country study (comparing across levels and local governments) and have chosen Denmark as our case. The reason for the case selection is mostly related to the unique data situation in Denmark. The official statistics on the regional and municipal level are among the best in the world (since most official statistics are split by region and municipality). Also, and most importantly, it has been possible to conduct several large-scale surveys among Danish citizens over the years—surveys where the number of respondents in each municipality has been sufficiently high to apply MLA to the data.

Denmark consists of 98 municipalities and five regions so that every Dane votes for three elective bodies: municipal council, regional council, and national parliament (Folketinget). In a survey conducted in 2013, we asked 4,902 Danes about their level of trust in these three institutions and their level of trust in the politicians at each of the levels (municipal councilors, regional councilor, and MPs). We have sampled at least 30 respondents in each municipality so that variables at the municipal level can be included in multi-level analyses.

In the next two parts of the article, we will use this unique dataset to answer the two questions posed above. In the first part, we will compare the trust among the citizens to different levels of government and in the next part we will explain the variation in the trust of local politicians between citizens living in different municipalities.

THE LOWER THE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT, THE MORE TRUST?

Does citizen trust differ depending on which level of government is under scrutiny? And if so, which level of government receives the highest level of trust? The hypothesis derived from the literature is quite clear: "Trust is anticipated to grow as it becomes closer in spatial scale—thus, the more local, the higher the trust" (Petrzelka et al., 2013: 338). It is claimed that it is distance between the citizen and the politicians/administrators that can potentially create mistrust, and from this premise it follows that trust is relatively higher at the local government level than at the regional and national level of government. The claim has been made by several authors (e.g., Jennings, 1998; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Cole and Kincaid, 2001) and it has also found some empirical support (Cole and Kincaid 2000), although the evidence is not conclusive (e.g., Petrzelka et al. 2013).

The argument that trust is higher at the lower levels seems sound and consistent with the tendency not to trust strangers; the larger the jurisdiction, the farther away the political/administrative system will ceteris paribus be to the average citizen, in terms of physical distance and in more figurative terms, and therefore the politicians will be less known and thereby less trusted. However, this line of argument could also be challenged. First of all, some people might actually trust strangers. Secondly, the way citizens get to "know" their politicians is not only by meeting them in person—today most people probably "know" their politicians from the media. Thirdly, by hypothesizing that the closer the citizens are to their politicians, the more they trust them, it is more or less implied that knowledge can only be advantageous for the way citizens perceive politicians, thereby neglecting that information can also reveal less trustworthy traits of the politicians.

Therefore, the question of trust at different levels of government is more an empirical question. When surveying citizens' trust, it is, however, important to make a few distinctions. A distinction can be made between trust in the politicians and trust in the institutions—it is possible to trust the parliament as an institution without trusting the MPs currently serving there, and vice versa. Also, politicians are different—some of them are not only representatives but also hold executive power and/or a leadership position.

Therefore, in the Danish case, we have asked the citizens about their trust in the parliament as an institution, the MPs, and those MPs who hold a leadership position. And we have asked about their trust in these three institutions/politicians at the national, regional, and local government level, respectively. The results in terms of the average level of trust for these nine groups, based on the survey conducted in Denmark, are reported in Table 1.

As demonstrated in Table 1, Danish citizens' trust in their politicians and the institutions they inhabit is not that overwhelming. On the 10-point scale applied, most of the results are around the middle of the scale, indicating that Danes in general are not mistrustful of their politicians, but they do not trust them a lot either.

For all three levels of government, it is also demonstrated that the trust in politicians is a little lower than the trust in the corresponding legislatures. The differences are not huge, but as it can be seen in Table 1, they are statistically significant. Citizens trust their national parliament, their regional parliament, and their local parliament to some extent, but they trust the politicians who are presently holding the seats there a little less. As for the leadership, the findings are inconclusive.

For our purpose, the most interesting finding reported in Table 1 pertains to trust across levels of government. No matter whether we analyze trust in legislatures, leadership, or politicians, a clear pattern can be observed: The citizen's trust in the local government level is higher than the same citizen's trust in the regional and national level of government. The difference is not huge, but it is statistically significant. So, in the Danish case, the traditional hypothesis claiming higher trust at the local level cannot be rejected.

Table 1. Trust in politicians and institutions at different levels among voters in Denmark 2013 (mean on a 10-point scale – 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses)

	Legislature	Leadership	Politicians
National level	5.02 (4.95-5.10)	4.27 (4.19-4.36)	4.76 (4.69-4.83)
Regional level	4.82 (4.76-4.88)	4.60 (4.53-4.66)	4.66 (4.59-4.72)
Local level	5.53 (5.47-5.60)	5.41 (5.34-5.49)	5.28 (5.21-5.34)

Notes: The nine numbers on trust represents (from left to right, top to bottom): Parliament, the national government, members of parliament, regional council, chairman of regional councils, regional councilors, municipal council, mayors, and municipal councilors.

Scale 0 (”No trust at all”), 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 (”Very high level of trust”).

n = 4.902 (weighted).

Source: Danish Local Democracy Survey 2013

WHO TRUSTS LOCAL POLITICIANS THE MOST?

Not all the citizens have the same level of trust in their politicians. Therefore, we will move on to the second question posed in the introduction, namely: Who trusts their politicians the most? We will focus on the local politicians—the councilors—since this will allow us to search for explanations also at the institutional level. Studies of trust have already included several individual-level variables, but our claim is that not only is the individual interesting in that respect, but the political jurisdiction where this individual is living can also be important for our understanding of the individual’s evaluation of the political jurisdiction and its politicians. We will follow Rahn and Rudolph who state, “[Trust]… cannot be explained solely by accounting for variation in the attributes and attitudes of the individuals who live in each city” (Rahn and Rudolph 2005: 531) and have as our main focus to expand the analysis by also including institutional-level variables.

We will, of course, in our models, still include variables at the individual level, but they will mostly serve as controls. These individual-level variables will be the “usual suspects”; that is, variables that are often included in studies of trust (Levinsen, 2003). We will include in our analyses a number of sociodemographic variables, namely age, education, employment sector, and income, hypothesizing that older, more educated, higher-income citizens, as well as those employed in the public sector, will have higher trust than their counterparts. We will also include a number of attitudinal variables, namely how informed the individual is about local politics, their interest in local politics, their satisfaction with the municipal services provided, and their general trust in other people (social trust), hypothesizing that the more informed, the more interested, the more satisfied, and the more socially trusting, the more the individual will trust their local politicians.

Then there is our additional claim, namely that explanations to the variation in trust should also be examined at the institutional level—in this case, at the municipal level. Already, two municipal-level variables have been introduced in the literature. First, at least since Dahl and Tufte’s seminal book on size and democracy (Dahl and Tufte, 1973), there has been an interest in the potential effect of the municipal size (in terms of the number of inhabitants) on different dimensions of local democracy. Politicians are supposed to be more responsive in smaller democracies (Dahl and Tufte, 1973: 12ff), leading to more trust in smaller municipalities than in larger. And even though there has not been a lot of empirical testing of the “small is beautiful”-thesis (Petrzelka et al. 2013), some studies have found a negative correlation between municipal size and citizen trust (Rahn and Rudolph, 2005: 547; Denters, 2002; see however Levinsen, 2003). Therefore, the following is our first hypothesis at the municipal level: **Hypothesis 1: The larger the municipality, the lower the citizens' trust in their local politicians.**

Municipal size is one thing—another is if the municipality has recently merged with other municipalities and therefore if citizens have experienced a change in the size of their municipality. If an amalgamation has been implemented, the citizen may have lost some of their faith in the councilors; for instance, in some cases councilors may no longer live in the citizen's own village or neighborhood. Even though reform effects are in some studies discarded (Reitan et al., 2015), a negative effect of municipal mergers on citizen trust has been empirically demonstrated (Hansen, 2013), and therefore our second hypothesis is: **Hypothesis 2: If the municipality has recently been part of an amalgamation, the citizen's trust in their local politicians will be lower.**

As clever and insightful as Dahl and Tufte's book on size and democracy is, it has, however, also led to a tendency to focus almost exclusively on the question of size when dimensions of local democracy are evaluated (e.g. Denters et al., 2014; Kjaer and Mouritzen, 2003). We will, however, also go beyond size and include specific political variables. First, we will include the level of political conflict in the municipality; if the politicians regularly engage in infighting, it might lead to higher levels of mistrust among the citizens. It is often claimed that local politics is more consensual than politics at other levels (Barber, 2013), and not least in Denmark where local politics has been assessed as being very consensual with a widespread norm of consensus (Berg and Kjær, 2009). The most important determinant of how consensual politics is conducted in the municipalities is supposed to be the width or breadth of the coalition forming the majority behind the mayor (the mayor is indirectly elected by and among the councilors), and therefore, our third hypothesis is: **Hypothesis 3: The broader the mayoral coalition, the greater the citizen trust in local politicians.**

When there have been negative stories about the councilors and the mayors in Denmark in the past years, it has mostly been regarding the coalition formation processes. At the 2009 local elections (the latest election before our survey was administered in spring 2013), several municipalities experienced unusually chaotic formation processes characterized by extreme political tumult. In no less than 10 out of the 98 municipalities, a situation occurred where the coalition formed right after the election was cancelled and a new one formed before the original coalition was formally put into effect. In some of these cases, councilors left their own party to join the opposing party (and get the mayoralty themselves). The stories from the 10 municipalities differ slightly (see Elklit and Kjaer, 2013), but what they have in common is that they were intensively covered by local and national media, and the citizens were in most cases not only surprised but also somewhat offended by the councilors failing to respect the electoral result and not honoring their own original deals with each other. Therefore, our fourth hypothesis is: **Hypothesis 4: In municipalities where the coalition formation process at the latest election was extremely chaotic, the citizen's trust in their local politicians will be lower.**

We have run three different models including these variables stepwise. In the first model, only the sociodemographic explanatory variables are included, while in the second model, the attitudinal variables and individual-level variables are also included. In the third model, the municipal-level variables are also included, making it possible to test our four hypotheses (therefore, this third model is run as an MLA).

We run each of the three models using three different dependent variables, namely trust in the mayor, trust in the councilors, and trust in MPs (the last one as a control). The results are reported in Table 2.

In Table 2, it can be seen that among the individual-level variables, the attitudinal variables are far more important than the sociodemographic ones. None of the sociodemographic variables are significant in the model explaining trust in the mayor, when the attitudinal variables are included, and only minor effects (negative ones) are found regarding age and education in the model explaining trust in councilors. The explanatory power of the attitudinal variables is much higher—a clear and statistically significant positive correlation with trust in mayors and councilors is found for level of information, interest in local politics, satisfaction with local service, and general social trust. This is more or less as expected (see also Levinsen, 2003).

Table 2. Danish citizens' trust in mayors, councilors, and members of parliament (MPs)

	Trust in mayor			Trust in councilors			Trust in MPs		
Age	0.022***	0.004	0.004	0.014***	-0.006***	-0.006***	0.010***	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
High school diploma	0.242***	-0.052	-0.050	0.133**	-0.148***	-0.146**	0.225***	-0.001	0.002
	(0.082)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.065)
Employment sector									
Private sector	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Public sector	0.066	0.040	0.041	0.185**	0.121*	0.118	0.092	0.040	0.037
	(0.101)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.084)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.088)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Unemployed	0.054	0.126	0.131	0.037	0.099	0.100	-0.129	-0.062	-0.065
	(0.093)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.081)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Low-income family	-0.188**	-0.012	-0.015	-0.167**	0.014	0.012	-0.236***	-0.081	-0.079
	(0.087)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.072)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.075)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Informed about municipal politics		0.120***	0.119***		0.101***	0.102***		0.127***	0.129***
		(0.044)	(0.044)		(0.036)	(0.036)		(0.040)	(0.040)
Interest in municipal politics		0.112**	0.112**		0.253***	0.254***		0.079*	0.076
		(0.052)	(0.052)		(0.042)	(0.042)		(0.047)	(0.047)
Satisfaction with municipal services		0.534***	0.534***		0.429***	0.429***		0.303***	0.305***
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.013)	(0.013)		(0.014)	(0.014)

	Trust in mayor			Trust in councilors			Trust in MPs		
Social trust		0.149***	0.149***		0.174***	0.174***		0.197***	0.197***
		(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.012)	(0.012)		(0.014)	(0.014)
Municipal size									
-30.000 inhabitants			-0.163			-0.016			0.057
			(0.172)			(0.088)			(0.098)
30.001-45.000			0.120			0.105			0.089
			(0.154)			(0.079)			(0.088)
45.001-60.000			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.
60.001-90.000			0.073			0.038			0.112
			(0.184)			(0.094)			(0.105)
90.001+			0.068			0.049			0.045
			(0.213)			(0.109)			(0.122)
Municipality part of merger in 2007			-0.066			0.028			0.159**
			(0.136)			(0.070)			(0.078)
Width of mayoral coalition									
50-59 % of seats			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.
60-69 %			0.223			-0.019			0.108
			(0.171)			(0.087)			(0.097)
70-79 %			0.368**			0.110			0.146
			(0.169)			(0.086)			(0.096)

	Trust in mayor			Trust in councilors			Trust in MPs		
80-89 %			0.370			0.193			0.006
			(0.325)			(0.164)			(0.184)
90-99 %			-0.102			-0.116			0.026
			(0.244)			(0.123)			(0.138)
100 %			0.405***			0.121			-0.015
			(0.157)			(0.080)			(0.089)
Chaotic coalition formation processes			-0.652***			-0.260**			0.163
			(0.201)			(0.102)			(0.114)
Intercept	4.172***	0.626***	0.515**	4.517***	1.154***	1.077***	4.236***	1.466***	1.229***
	(0.193)	(0.197)	(0.255)	(0.151)	(0.154)	(0.175)	(0.152)	(0.173)	(0.197)
Var(intercept)	0.515***	0.273***	0.190***	0.119***	0.027***	0.014***	0.030***	0.027***	0.017***
	(0.093)	(0.053)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Var(residual)	5.252***	3.859***	3.859***	3.651***	2.592***	2.592***	3.981***	3.269***	3.268***
	(0.115)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.080)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.087)	(0.072)	(0.072)
ICC	0.089	0.066	0.047	0.031	0.010	0.005	0.007	0.008	0.005
No. of obs./groups	4,296/93	4,242/93	4,242/93	4,296/93	4,242/93	4,242/93	4,296/93	4,242/93	4,242/93

Notes: The dependent variable is trust in the municipal mayor, local politicians, or members of parliament. Reported are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The ten municipalities with chaotic coalition formation processes are Allerød, Helsingør, Rebild, Frederikshavn, Nordfyns, Syddjurs, Randers, Kerteminde, Holstebro, and Lyngby-Taarbæk.

Source: Danish Local Democracy Survey 2013.

But how about the four variables at the municipal level? Table 2 demonstrates that our first and second hypotheses can be rejected without much further discussion. There is no statistically significant correlation between municipal size or municipal mergers and trust in the local politicians, regardless of whether it is trust in the councilors or in the mayors.

As for the size of the mayoral coalition—hypothesis 3—the results are not conclusive, but it is demonstrated that if the mayor can form a very broad coalition including the entire council (this actually sometimes happens in Denmark) he or she will gain more trust from the citizens. However, the causal mechanism here cannot be established, since a very trustworthy mayor probably has better chances to form a broad coalition.

This leaves us with the chaotic coalition formation processes—Hypothesis 4—and here the results are very clear. As Table 2 demonstrates, trust in local politicians is—even three years after the events—lower in municipalities where the mayoral coalition was formed under very chaotic and politically "bloody" circumstances. In the municipalities where some of the politicians violated done deals, shifted party, and behaved disloyal to their political allies, the citizens trust their politicians less than in municipalities where everybody played by the rules and where the government formation was conducted, as they usually are, in a calm, orderly manner.

The lower level of trust is clearer regarding trust in the mayor than regarding trust in the councilors. The mayor who wins the mayoralty in a process characterized by tumult pays a price in terms of lower trust, but also the councilors in general are punished when the citizens afterward evaluate how trustworthy they are. In Table 2, the same models are also run with trust in MPs as the dependent variable, and it is seen that, as hypothesized, this trust is not affected by the chaotic coalition formations, which strengthen the finding.

As a robustness check, we have also run the models with the difference in trust of politicians at the local and national level as the dependent variable. This analysis is therefore targeted on the difference in trust—who is it who trusts their local politicians relatively more than their national politicians? In these analyses a few of the findings from Table 2 are moot, but most of the findings are repeated in this relative analysis, not least of which is that the degree of satisfaction with the municipal service is still important to the level of trust. If local councilors and mayors would like to have their constituents to trust them, they should focus on the delivery of municipal services. And then there is the issue of chaotic coalition formations, a variable in this model that is highly statistically significant. And the negative effect is still greater on the trust in mayors than on the trust in councilors. The chaotic coalition formation processes have given the mayor the office, but not without costing them the trust of the citizens. The citizens trust the mayors who conquered mayoral office in an atmosphere of tumult less than mayors who avoided this chaos, and the councilors in these municipalities also pay a price for being partakers or at least bystanders in the chaotic processes.

CONCLUSION: INCREASING CITIZEN TRUST IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

This article has demonstrated that the citizens trust their local politicians—mayors and councilors—more than they trust their national politicians in the country of Denmark. This is not very surprising since this is in accordance with the general perception that trust increases when the level of government decreases. Therefore, we have also devoted a part of this article to analyze citizen trust across municipalities; even though the trust in local politicians is relatively high compared to other levels of government, it is not equally high in every municipality. Several variables at the individual level have been included in the analyses together with a number of variables at the municipal level, namely size, merger status, coalition breadth, and chaotical coalition formation.

The findings are that trust in local politicians is affected by the experienced level of satisfaction with services delivered by the municipality (the more satisfied, the more trust) and then, more surprisingly, by how the coalition formation process was conducted (if chaotic, then less trust).

This indicates, that if trust in local governments is to be increased, there are at least two important ways to do so. First, results matter and therefore the municipality should focus on delivering the highest quality of service. In Denmark, the municipalities are in charge of, for instance, day care, primary schools, social services, elderly care, housing, planning, and water/sewage, and they should focus on these tasks. This goes for the politicians themselves who are involved in many of the decisions—especially the more detailed ones—through their seats on committees. And it also applies to the administrative officers and the people employed at the municipality; local government administration should optimize delivery of municipal services so that the municipality and the politicians will be trusted.

Second, the paper has demonstrated that the very chaotic coalition formation processes seen in a tenth of the Danish municipalities at the 2009 elections were not without costs. The political game can be muddy, bloody, and chaotic and it produces political winners and losers when the game is over and the prizes are distributed (not least, in the mayoral office). The politicians are, of course, very involved in these processes and they will go to great length to secure themselves the best rewards. But it seems that councilors and prospective mayors can also be too tactical and too determined to achieve power. If they break done deals or are disloyal to their own party, it comes at a cost since the citizens do not like this kind of game and lower their level of trust in politicians acting in this way. The message is clear for councilors and prospective mayors: Follow the rules and avoid chaos because your constituents are watching, and their trust is at stake.

REFERENCES

Bache, Ian and Flinders, Matthew (eds.) (2004). *Multi-Level Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barber, Benjamin (2013). *If Mayors Ruled the World*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Berg, Rikke and Kjaer, Ulrik (2009). "Facilitation in Its 'Natural' Setting: Supportive Structure and Culture in Denmark" in James H. Svara (ed.) *The Facilitative Leader in City Hall: Reexamining the Scope and Contributions*, pp. 55-72. Boca Raton: CRC Press.

Bianco, William T. (1994). *Trust – Representatives and Constituents*. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.

Cole, Richard L. and Kincaid, John (2001). "Public Opinion and American Federalism: Perspectives on Taxes, Spending and Trust," *Spectrum: The Journal of State Government* 24: 14-18.

Dahl, Robert A. and Tufte, Edward R. (1973). *Size and Democracy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Denters, Bas (2002). "Size and political trust: Evidence from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom," *Environment and Planning C Government and Policy* 20: 793-812.

Denters, Bas, Goldsmith, Michael, Ladner, Andreas, Mouritzen, Poul Erik and Rose, Lawrence E. (2014). *Size and Local Democracy*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Easton, David (1965). *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: Wiley.

Elklit, Jørgen and Kjaer, Ulrik (2013). *KV09. Analyser af kommunalvalget 2009*. Odense: University of Southern Denmark Press.

Hansen, Sune Welling (2013). "Polity Size and Local Political Trust: A Quasi-experiment Using Municipal Mergers in Denmark," Scandinavian Political Studies 36: 43-66.

Jennings, Kent M. (1998). "Political trust and the roots of devolution" in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi (eds.) *Trust and Governance*. New York, Russel Sage Foundation.

Kjaer, Ulrik and Mouritzen, Poul Erik (2003). *Kommunestørrelse og lokalt demokrat*i. Odense: University of Southern Denmark Press.

Lijphart, Arend (1975). "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research." Comparative Political Studies 8: 158-177.

Levi, Margaret and Stoker, Laura (2000). "Political Trust and Trustworthiness," *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 475-507.

Levinsen, Klaus (2003). "Kommunalpolitisk tillid" in Ulrik Kjaer and Poul Erik Mouritzen (eds.), *Kommunestørrelse og lokalt demokrati*. Odense: University of Southern Denmark Press.

Manin, Bernard (1997). *The Principles of Representative Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Miller, Arthur H. (1974). "Political issues and trust in government: 1964-1970," *American Political Science Review* 68: 951-972.

Miller, Arthur. H. and Listhaug, Ola (1999). "Political performance and institutional trust" in Pippa Norris (ed.) *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, pp 204-216. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Norris, Pippa (ed.) (1999). *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Petrzelka, Peggy, Marquart-Pyatt, Sandra T. and Malin, Stephanie A. (2013). "It is not just scale that matters: Political trust in Utah," *The Social Science Journal* 50: 338-348.

Piattoni, Simona (2010). *The Theory of Multi-level Governance – Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Przeworski, Adam, Stokes, Susan C. and Manin, Bernard (1999). *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rahn, Wendy M. and Rudolph, Thomas J. (2005). "A tale of political trust in American cities," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69: 530-559.

Reitan, Marit, Gustafssona, Kari and Blekesaunea, Arild (2015). "Do Local Government Reforms Result in Higher Levels of Trust in Local Politicians?", Local Government Studies 41: 156-179.

Trounstine, Jessica (2010). "Representation and Accountability in Cities," *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 407-423.

SUNE WELLING HANSEN, PHD
Associate professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark. He heads the research section on Public Administration. His main fields of expertise are local finances and local democracy. (swh@sam.sdu.dk).

ULRIK KJAER, PHD
Professor of political science at the Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark. He serves extensively as a consultant for the Association of Local Governments in Denmark. His main fields of expertise are local elections, local democracy, and mayoral leadership. (ulk@sam.sdu.dk)

MARKETPLACE | professional services

Human Resources

Government Consulting/Administration