



LOCAL RESPONSE TO TERRORISM:

Lessons Learned from the 9-11 Attack on the Pentagon

*Arlington County
Conference Report*

T E A M W O R K

A Model for the Nation



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1.0 Executive Summary

1.1 General

A total of 852 representatives from local jurisdictions and Federal and State agencies from around the country gathered in Arlington, VA, from July 28, 2003, to July 30, 2003, for the Local Response to Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the 9-11 Attack on the Pentagon conference. The 3-day conference focused on the theme Teamwork: A Model for the Nation.

The event was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (USDHS), Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Arlington County, VA, in response to numerous requests from local jurisdictions for more information on lessons learned during the September 11, 2001, attack on the Pentagon. The conference goal was to bring together teams of high-level policymakers from local jurisdictions to learn from Arlington County's experiences in responding to the attack, and to work as a team to analyze the response capacity within their own jurisdiction.

1.2 Conference Format

A total of 122 teams from across the country participated. Teams sat together during plenary meetings, using their conference workbooks to identify issues raised by Arlington County that were applicable to their own jurisdictions. Presentations by responders from Arlington County, the FBI, and other responders focused on critical lessons learned. Keynote speakers highlighted current issues being worked at the Federal level. These speakers included: USDHS Secretary Tom Ridge; Attorney General John Ashcroft; FBI Director Robert Mueller; and Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security Asa Hutchinson.

Participants used the workbook information in interactive breakout sessions focused on the following disciplines: emergency managers/Emergency Operations Center (EOC); fire and emergency services; law enforcement; Emergency Medical Services (EMS); and city/county managers. Breakout sessions identified consensus issues that were consolidated and prioritized. Teams were divided by population to consider the consensus issues and develop a list of critical issues for their population group. Top issues were then presented to a Federal panel on the final day of the conference.

1.3 Major Findings

The disciplinary breakout and team sessions developed a number of crosscutting issues that transcend function or size of the jurisdiction. Key findings include the following:

- A major terrorist event will quickly overwhelm the local response capabilities of virtually every community in the Nation; therefore, more emphasis must be placed on a regional response. This emphasis should include regional planning, training, and exercises.

- Interoperability among, and within, response organizations continues to be a major concern. Interoperability should be viewed in a broader context, including not only communications, but also the full range of response equipment, use of common terminology, and standardization of training and certifications.
- The Incident Command System (ICS) should be adopted as the national standard for emergency response command and control. Education and training on ICS should be significantly expanded, especially among law enforcement organizations.
- State and local emergency response officials need to be actively involved in the development of the new National Response Plan (NRP), not an afterthought for review after the plan is developed.
- State and local jurisdictions require more flexibility in the use of Federal grant funds to cover overtime costs for response personnel to attend necessary training. The flexibility should allow use of funds for personnel who must provide backup coverage to continue the mission while others train.
- More scrutiny should be applied to standardization of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) training so all personnel who complete the courses receive the same training to the same standards, regardless of where the training is taught. This is especially critical in a regional response scenario where continuity and consistency are necessary to save lives and maximize use of limited resources.
- Buy-in from elected officials is key to building relationships in the community and among regional partners. Without this leadership, consensus cannot be reached on the critical planning and response decisions required for a successful response organization.

1.4 Report Format

The Arlington County Conference Report is designed to record the consensus issues and recommendations captured and discussed during the conference. Because of the large number of attendees and the limited time in the breakout sessions, discussion was generally limited to three or four topics per session. As a result, many of the issues and solutions presented in the following sections are in bullet form. Additional details are not available. Regardless, the report captures numerous suggestions for follow up by local jurisdictions. Team consensus issues appear in Section 2.0; issues by disciplinary area are in Section 3.0.

2.0 Population Group Reports

On Day 2 of the conference, teams were divided into population groups and assigned to review critical issues that had been identified during the conference. Teams reviewed summaries from the functional breakout sessions held in the morning and reached consensus on those issues most pertinent to their particular population group. Representatives from each group presented the top issues to the Federal panel.

Each team reviewed the issues and recommendations developed by the functional groups, identified other areas of major concerns within their jurisdictions, and then identified the three or four top issues to be presented at the plenary session. A summary of key issues developed by each population group is below.

2.1 Group One: Jurisdictions of Less Than 100,000 Population

More than 100 representatives comprising 17 teams participated in this population group breakout session. These included teams from communities of less than 100,000 in population from the following areas: Hickory, NC; Hopewell, VA; York City, PA; West Hartford, CT; Golden, CO; City of Fairfax, VA; Bedford County, MA; Hampton, NH; Ingleside, CA; Knox County, IN; North Little Rock, AR; Uniondale, NY; Broomfield, CO; Stuart, FL; Frankfort, KY; Plymouth, MN; Leflore County, MS; Port Arthur, TX; Middletown, NJ; Meridian, MS; Queen Anne's County, MD; Highland Park, NJ; Leesburg, VA; Rocky Mount, NC; Charlottesville, VA; Manassas, VA; Fauquier County, VA; Andover, MA; Durham, NH; Xenia, OH; Hopewell, VA; and the Hanover/Ashland/Caroline area of Virginia. The team from Golden, CO, was selected to be part of the panel that presented the agreed upon top issues to the conference attendees following the breakout session.

Issue #1: Need for Multidiscipline, Multijurisdictional Emergency Regional Response

Observation: Participants agreed that based on their community size, limited personnel, and lack of specialized equipment, an effective response to a large-scale event would require a multidiscipline, multijurisdictional, regional effort. Improvement is needed in coordinating a team effort in the integration of response assets on a regional level. Incompatibility of response protocols and equipment are major impediments to this approach.

Solutions:

- There needs to be a standardization of plans, protocols, and equipment within identified regions.
- Multijurisdiction and multiagency conduct of training and exercises is imperative to increase efficiency and effectiveness in response efforts.
- Community first response agencies must strengthen intra-jurisdictional and interjurisdictional relationships to effectively respond as a regional team.
- Communities must prioritize their needs and this process should be conducted regionally to identify shortfalls and remedies for an effective response.

Issue #2: Interoperability

Observation: Communities need the capability to communicate between agencies and jurisdictions during multiagency/multijurisdictional emergency responses. Interoperability/compatibility of communications equipment needs to also expand into planning, training, equipping, and sustaining response resources and assets. In addition, interoperability and compatibility is further compromised on the arrival of Federal and State response elements that lack integration capabilities.

Solutions: Temporary solutions that many participants identified was the use of Voiceover IP, and the acquisition of the ACU1000 Cross Channel Switch that allows divergent radios to communicate over a common channel until standardization is achieved regionally. More permanent solutions include the following:

- Before standardization of equipment, securing adequate bandwidth for emergency responders should be a priority.
- The ability to acquire priority access for cellular telephones used by response agencies during an emergency.
- Regional standardization of plans, standard operating procedures (SOPs), protocols, equipment, and terminology.
- Senior elected/appointed officials need to buy-in to the regional approach.
- Tie Federal and State grant monies to development, training, and exercises of regional plans.

Issue #3: Community Commitment to Emergency Management

Observation: Participants agreed that their communities need to commit to planning, training, exercises, and interdisciplinary and multijurisdictional response operations under the ICS. Teams acknowledged that a WMD/terrorist attack would initially be a local response, with mutual assistance requirements. Cross-contamination and possible spread of the agent would require a rapid escalation to a regional response effort. Communities need to identify regional capabilities and the interactions and cooperation required to effectively and efficiently respond to a WMD/terrorist attack.

Solutions: The teams agreed that to get community support for a regional response concept, Federal and State governments need to require the following:

- Regional needs assessments.
- Development of community priorities necessary to protect the citizenry.
- Standardization of regional plans, protocols, and operations.
- Establishment of national equipment standards.

- Establishment of a regional resource base, including capabilities and allocation.
- Training and education of local officials on the benefits of planning, training, exercises, interdisciplinary and multijurisdictional response operations under ICS.
- Public education and awareness of the threats of terrorists attacks, required assets needed to respond to those threats, and the level of citizens commitment (individually and fiscally) necessary to achieve success in preparing their first response community to respond to a terrorist attack.

Participants also identified the need for regional government support in developing legally binding, written mutual-aid agreements and memorandums of understanding (MOUs) throughout the region to ensure a coordinated and cooperative emergency response.

In addition to the three primary issues described, the teams also identified the following issues that need to be addressed:

- Jurisdictions do not have adequate personnel to conduct training provided under WMD/terrorism related grants. Flexibility to use funds for overtime reimbursement is required.
- There needs to be a system to provide communities with updated training from Federal and State partners.
- Management of spontaneous volunteers responding to an incident scene is an issue that was of paramount concern to volunteer agencies. A regionally adopted response plan to eliminate this action of well-intended public and professional volunteers needs to be developed.
- Inadequate surge capacities and decontamination capability of regional hospitals. Lack of participation of hospitals in planning, preparedness, and training contributes to this problem.
- Risk assessment models should be based on potential targets (e.g., chemical plants, military installation, seat of government) in a region rather than being based on generic terrorist's threats.
- Inclusion of the private sector in planning, training, and exercises, especially those entities that have specialized assets (e.g., heavy construction equipment and detection equipment) could assist emergency responders in their efforts.

2.2 Group Two: Jurisdictions from 100,000 to 300,000 Population

More than 170 senior officials were slated to attend this facilitated session; however, because of the conference schedule and attendee attrition, the final session attendance was approximately 60 to 70 attendees representing 11 jurisdictions. Teams included representatives from Union County/Durham County, NC; Hampton Roads, VA; Cambridge, MA; Chesterfield County, VA; Arlington County, VA; San Diego County, VA; Virginia Beach, VA; DeSoto County, MS; and London, England. Union County, NC, was selected to represent the group at the plenary session.

Issue #1: Communications and Technology

Observation: Improvement in multiple forms of communication technologies is needed across jurisdictional and agency boundaries.

Solutions:

- Common terminology, procedures, and checklists for communications of all types across all response agencies.
- Develop multiple redundant communications capabilities for use by response agencies.
- Research and implement advanced technologies for use within communications systems.
- Improve messaging (for all forms of communication) to the public.

Issue #2: Incident Command/Unified Command Education

Observation: Educate and implement Incident Command/Unified Command models across response agencies and organizations.

Solutions:

- Educate response agencies and organizations not currently employing Incident Command/Unified Command structures or principles.
- Provide specific training in the Incident Command/Unified Command structure.
- Multiple joint agency and organization exercises should be conducted using the Incident Command/Unified Command structure.

Issue #3: Commonality of Plans and Procedures

Observation: Planning processes across jurisdictions are not standardized.

Solutions:

- Develop common WMD terrorism plan formats for response agencies.
- Formulate mutual-aid agreements and MOUs beyond public safety agencies.
- Improve and share existing SOPs and Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs) and develop plans for areas not currently addressed.
- Determine the existence of current relevant SOPs and EOPs and share across agency lines.
- Construct and coordinate regional and multijurisdictional response plans.

Issue #4: Relationship Building

Observation: Relationships are not adequately developed across disciplines and jurisdictional boundaries.

Solutions:

- Build regional and local relationships encompassing response agencies across multiple disciplines.
- Identify prospective response agencies for catastrophic events of multiple day/week duration.
- Catalog available personnel, resources, and response times including military and private sector resources. Provide for regular updates.
- Educate and exercise plans with identified resources on a recurring basis.

The following additional issues/recommendations surfaced but were not among the top three:

- Develop equipment standards, protocols, policies and common terminology between jurisdictions, regions, and the State. Develop Regional Response Teams (RRTs), standardized equipment purchasing plans, and implement regular training schedules.
- Develop standardized regional training. Investigate educational resources and partnerships. Integrate use of ICS across all departments and agencies. Increase volume and frequency of training events and exercises.
- Build additional capacity and redundancies in to existing systems. Make the EOC the focal point of information flow. Improve communication methods with citizens through use of new technologies and refined methods.
- Develop plans, agreements, and MOUs, including those crossing State lines. Use standardized equipment. Develop regional EOCs.

2.3 Group Three: Jurisdictions from 300,000 to 1 Million Population

Twenty-three jurisdictions represented this demographic category in the discussion group: Birmingham and Madison, AL; Stanislaus County, CA; West Hartford Area, CT; District of Columbia; Boise City/Ada County, ID; Louisville, KY; Prince George's County, MD; Detroit, MI; Minneapolis, MN; Camden County, NJ; Charlotte/Mecklenberg, NC; Akron/Summit County, OH; Pittsburgh, York County, and Westmoreland County, PA; Douglas County, NE; Collin County and Jefferson County, TX; Knoxville and Nashville/Davidson County, TN; and Arlington County and Prince William County, VA. West Hartford represented the group at the plenary session.

Issue #1: Local Participation in National Planning for Major Incidents

Observation: Participants pointed out the disparity in the fact that the initial response to an incident involves first responders from the local level of government, yet USDHS officials initially appear to be seeking input and advice on local issues primarily from State-level emergency management officials. Further, most local fire and police chiefs and EMS directors appear to have no input into their own State's emergency management organization.

Solutions:

- Resolution by the Federal Government of the confusion between USDHS's outlined NIMS referenced in the draft NRP and the NIIMS and ICS, as well as explanation of the interaction among other Federal agencies' response plans, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Emergency Support Functions (ESFs).
- Collaboration by the Federal Government with local jurisdictions to provide guidance, resources, and mechanisms to offer national best practice models of regional and local response planning that show local jurisdictions how they can be empowered to plan and respond to a WMD attack using their respective regional resources effectively.
- Coordination by the Federal Government with State and local jurisdictions to outline appropriate tiered levels of response based on population and risk assessment needs.
- Consideration of establishing a Homeland Security Coordination Group for each region.
- Encouragement and expedition of the completion of the Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) across the Nation as a process for performing a comprehensive hazard vulnerability/needs/capability assessment.
- Use of existing State and local capabilities assessment for readiness (CAR) information and data by ESF.
- Institutionalization of regional emergency disaster plans with subsequent training and exercising of them.
- Implementation of a national multiagency radio plan that standardizes communication across Federal, State, regional, and local first responder and mutual-aid resources.
- Consideration and implementation of a master regional mutual-aid agreement with preidentified and agreed upon trigger points for activation, followed by training and exercises.
- Planning for inventories of prestaged equipment and supplies to equip a regional response for the first 2 days before the arrival of Federal resources, and planning for replenishment throughout the event as well as equipping support for ongoing everyday community needs.

Issue #2: Provision of Specific Threat and Risk Assessment Information

Observation: Participants were concerned by the lack not only of appropriate and timely information on credible threats to specific regions, but also of comprehensive hazard vulnerability/needs/capability assessment required for local jurisdictions to formulate realistic plans.

Solutions:

- Collaboration by the Federal Government with local jurisdictions to establish local baselines for guidance, resources, and services into and through the NRP based on reasonable threat assessments for specific regions.
- Establishment by the Federal Government of a mechanism for the timely release of threat information from appropriate Federal agencies pertaining specifically to local jurisdictions.

Issue #3: Local and Regional Training and Exercises

Observation: Local jurisdictions are inundated with WMD training requirements that are redundant, use overlapping course curriculums, and are constrained in their ability to obtain the necessary funding to cover personnel cost for needed and required appropriate incident management system (IMS)/WMD training and exercises.

Solutions:

- Development of a standardized approach to WMD training that eliminates redundant and overlapping courses, and standardizes terminology across all first response functions and disciplines.
- Relaxation of Federal restrictions on funding to permit more flexibility for local jurisdictions to meet their training mission, including coverage for staffing, and maintaining ongoing operations.
- Development of consistent standards for training and evaluation based on risk assessment using realistic threats, and exercising and testing them at the regional and State and local levels.
- Formulation and testing of a tiered-level training matrix and exercise program relevant to the community's needs with State and local participation at all stages.
- Reduction of the number of Federal agencies involved in formulating the WMD curriculum.
- Participation by Federal teams in exercises conducted at the local jurisdiction level.

Issue #4: Communications

Observation: There is a lack of interoperability across responding agencies, disciplines, and jurisdictions, and inadequate criteria for assessing the effectiveness of communication systems at the local level.

Solutions:

- Establishment by the Federal Government through the NRP of a baseline methodology and standards for regional acquisition of interoperable communication assets, not only radio channels, but also other types of communication linkage; provision of guidance on maximizing existing capabilities and integrating new technologies to allow for routine daily use and immediate expansion during major incidents; and development of a process for implementing them.
- Maximization by the Federal Government of information sharing for all responders that integrates current intelligence information with the CAR all-hazards ESF data collected by local jurisdictions and States.
- Institution of feedback to the Federal Government from the bottom-up with simplified discussion, debate, reporting, and a review process.
- Inclusion in training and exercises of liaison officer/officials from all responding parties at the unified command post (UCP) and EOC, and integration into the IMS, to partially offset problems with communications equipment and practice what would be done in a real emergency.
- Preidentification and exercising of alternative methods of communication that would be used during an emergency and ensure redundancy.
- Establishment of a regional communication requirement coordinated with appropriating funding for all risk/hazard/WMD response needs.

Issue #5: Buy-In from Elected Officials

Observation: Planning for all-hazards preparedness, including for potential WMD attacks, requires leadership and consensus among top elected officials across multiple jurisdictions.

Solutions:

- Coordination by top officials in the Federal Government with State-level officials to provide leadership from the top-down in support of preparedness, and mandate participation by officials at all jurisdiction levels.
- Inclusion of leaders at all levels—Federal, State, regional, and local—in training on the IMS and mutual-aid compacts at all levels.
- Holding lessons learned conferences/training for elected officials.

2.4 Group Four: Jurisdictions with Greater Than 1 Million Population

Representatives from 11 jurisdictions, including two international cities, were in this group of participants. These included teams or representatives from the District of Columbia; Fairfax County, VA; Franklin County, OH; Houston, TX; London, England; Montreal, Canada; Phoenix, AZ; San Diego, CA; Suffolk County, NY; Toledo, OH; Virginia Beach, VA; and, York County, VA. Franklin County, OH, represented the group at the plenary session.

Issue #1: Training

Observations:

Training should be regional in approach and multidisciplinary in execution with evaluation in accordance with national standards. There is an inability to train law enforcement and fire because of daily demands.

Participants noted that, for the most part, training focused on the local level and often was internal to departments or disciplines. Generally, it did not progress to the stage where training for the multifunctional and multijurisdictional aspects of a response to an incident was conducted. A second consideration that participants noted had an adverse impact on the ability to train was availability of personnel. Training occurs during the workday and personnel pulled from routine daily assignments require backfill. Current limitations on the use of grant funds for personnel costs are inflexible and counterproductive.

Solutions:

- Provide for more flexibility in the requirements of grants funds such as seeking congressional approval for a longer performance period.
- Require the conduct of large-scale regional, multidisciplinary functional exercises that better reflect the complexity communities will encounter in orchestrating a WMD/terrorism response.
- Develop national standards for training and exercises that address all disciplines.
- Continue to incorporate technological advances in training and support in the development of computer simulation models.
- Increase the number of or availability to attend regional/national training sites and use of mobile training teams to support local training efforts.

Issue #2: Regional Planning

Observation: Response to a terrorism incident will rapidly become a regional issue; therefore, plans should reflect how the region will cohesively respond.

Currently, EOPs are developed at the Federal, State, and local levels. Although it was acknowledged that a WMD/terrorist incident would initially be a local problem, mutual assistance requirements, cross-contamination, and migration of the agent may often solely or

collectively expand the incident regionally within a State and perhaps even require a multi-State response. Planners need to begin looking at regional capabilities and the interactions and interfaces required to effectively and efficiently respond to a WMD/terrorist threat or incident across jurisdictional boundaries.

Solutions: The group spokesperson solicited Federal panel members' assistance in achieving the following:

- Ensuring planning has a multijurisdictional, “all-hazards/risks” approach.
- Mandating multijurisdictional/disciplined exercises.
- Requiring national standards of performance which reflect multi-echelon (Federal, State, regional, local) planning.
- Senior elected/appointed officials need to buy-in to the regional focus.
- Tying grants to development, training, and exercises of regional plans.

Issue #3: Interoperability

Observation: Interoperability needs to be achieved across the preparedness, response, and recovery spectrum.

Comment: The group noted that often when the term interoperability is used, the issue of interoperability/compatibility of communications equipment quickly surfaces. In fact, interoperability has a much broader application and includes planning, training, equipping, and sustaining response resources and assets. A point highlighted was that the adverse effects of interoperability and compatibility at the incident are compounded by Federal response elements that also lack standardization and compatibility.

Solutions: The group conveyed to the Federal panel that Nationwide standardization should be a goal. This can be achieved through the following:

- Establishment of national/regional standards for operational procedures.
- Establishment of national equipment standards.
- Implementation of standardized communications compatibility that extends to the Federal sector.
- Development of streamlined Federal/State guidelines for procurement assistance.

In addition to the three issues described, the various jurisdictions also identified several other concerns as issues that, at some point, need to be addressed. A synopsis of these includes the following:

- Jurisdictions do not have the administrative staff to research and manage the significant numbers of WMD/terrorism related grants. Although there have been some portion of grants dedicated to administrative costs, a review may be in order.
- There needs to be a protocol by which communities receive updates on training from the Federal sector.
- Reception and management of spontaneous volunteers responding to an incident scene is an issue that is exacerbated by rapid media coverage of events. Jurisdictions should have plans in place on actions they will initiate to minimize this distraction of well-intended public and professional citizens.
- Lack of or inadequate surge capacities and inadequate decontamination capability in hospitals; the inclusion of hospitals in planning and preparedness activities will help administrators recognize this problem.
- Specialized triage procedures to meet the unique aspects of WMD/terrorism mass casualty incidents (MCIs) need to be considered.
- The ICS and Unified Command System (UCS) are key to a manageable response and responders and first care providers must be trained in these concepts.
- Risk assessment models should be refined and based on potential targets (e.g., chemical plants, military installation, seat of government) in an area rather than being based on the criminal element (terrorist).
- Top-down leadership commitment to training and exercising.
- Inclusion of the private sector in planning, training, and exercises.
- Interoperability:
 - Compatible communications equipment and standardized procedures
 - Exchange between equipment (e.g., air bottles are interchangeable)
 - Common radio procedures
 - Common planning templates

2.5 Group Five: State Representatives

A total of 15 individuals representing emergency management agencies across the country participated in the State group. The State representatives were from diverse backgrounds including the State Police, the Medical Examiner's Office and the State Emergency Management Agency, giving way to a broad-based discussion and identification of two issues that had been identified by a number of other groups as critical—Interoperability and Information Management and Regional Planning and Response.

Issue #1: Interoperability Between Agencies and Organizations/Information Management

Observation: Emergency response agencies need to communicate with each other. Incident-specific information and a tracking capability must be available throughout crisis and consequence management at all government levels and across all disciplines. Communications interoperability between emergency response agencies and levels of government are inadequate.

Solutions:

- USDHS/ODP should establish a national comprehensive communication and information system.
- Develop and implement standards and protocols for communications equipment and software.
- Allocate funding for communication system enhancements.

Issue #2: Regional Response-Based Planning

Observation: Develop all-hazards planning, training, and exercises on a regional basis, which is coordinated by the State.

Solutions:

- The State should establish goals and set priorities for all regional response aspects (i.e., communication interoperability, equipment capability, Statewide mutual aid).
- Funding mechanisms should continue to go through the States, which establish funding allocations based on regional priorities.
- States to provide standard equipment lists and formats for regional response plans.
- Require local jurisdictions to be signatories to Statewide mutual-aid agreements.

Issue #3: Mortality Management

Observation: The Federal Government should identify mortality management as a priority for reallocation of existing funding through the Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and USDHS.

Solutions: HHS or USDHS/ODP should establish a Mortality Management Division recognizing the discipline as an integral component of the emergency management team including the following:

- Set standards for forensic death investigation and Fatality Management.
- Coordinate with Federal law enforcement for body evidence recognition and recovery.
- Implement surveillance programs for bioterrorism for Mortuary Management.
- Develop multidisciplinary training and education.
- Staff for biosurveillance of out-of-hospital deaths and medical forensic investigation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) deaths and provide personal protective equipment (PPE).

3.0 Issues by Functional Disciplines

On the morning of Day 2, participants divided into five functional areas to discuss areas of concern for their particular discipline. Each 2-hour session consisted of additional presentations by those who responded to the attack and a question and answer period. Participants also identified particular areas of concern and possible solutions. Each session had its own distinctive flavor and mix of discussion on the September 11 response and the identification and recommendations on issues raised. Therefore, the level of detail developed in each group varied considerably. Results were provided to the jurisdictional teams later in the day and are summarized below.

3.1 Emergency Managers/EOC Session

More than 230 Federal, State, local, and international emergency management representatives discussed the major issues affecting their communities and shared lessons learned and examined alternative solutions. The first hour of the 2-hour session was devoted to a presentation from Michael Cline, the Director of the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) and fielding questions from the audience to the Arlington County representatives in the room. Captain Mark Penn of Arlington County, who had just assumed new duties as Arlington County's Deputy of Emergency Services the day before the attack, managed the EOC and Director Cline, who served as the Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR), discussed the challenges they faced following the September 11 attack on the Pentagon. This provided session participants a firsthand account of Arlington County's response and recovery efforts and highlighted some of the lessons learned.

Captain Penn and Director Cline emphasized how important it is for local governments to rethink how they would respond to the challenges of a large-scale disaster now, before, not when it happens. They stressed the uniqueness of the Pentagon situation and that without Arlington County's connection with national leadership in emergency management, which was established before the event, response and recovery operations would not have been as successful. In particular, the officials underscored the teamwork needed to respond to a major event given the myriad of issues including Incident Command/EOC interface, individual and organization roles, mutual-aid systems, Federal assistance and the Stafford Act, victims' assistance, volunteer management, economic and political considerations, and a host of other challenges that EOPs should address.

The group identified three overarching issues impacting emergency management.

Issue #1: Program Support and Commitment

Observation: Successful response requires top-down leadership commitment to a Comprehensive Emergency Management Program (CEMP). All State and local governments need to be committed to a CEMP through mandated, competency-based training and education for senior officials attached to program funding.

Solutions:

- Develop and conduct orientation training for key leadership on the operational aspects of the emergency management program.
- Train all staff, including nonemergency personnel, so they understand their roles and responsibilities during emergency situations.
- Develop resource-typing standards, leverage key resources, and standardize procedures and protocols.
- Extend grant periods from 1 to 2 years to 3 to 4 years so local government councils and boards are not reluctant to hire additional staff.
- Encourage MOUs between municipalities for personnel and resources and joint training.
- Incorporate lessons learned from disasters and training.
- Promote collaboration between State and local jurisdictions for EOP integration.
- Design comprehensive tools to assist emergency management personnel with writing EOPs.
- Expand ICS protocols beyond the fire service to include all emergency management and local responders and integrate ICS into local EOPs.
- Offer incentives to get more personnel.
- Mentor and cross-train new, inexperienced staff to build a knowledge bank because of high turnover in the field.
- Emphasize better coordination of public and environmental health capabilities and responsibilities into emergency response planning.
- Coordinate training and exercises in WMD.

Issue #2: Interoperability/Operability

Observation: There should be a set of **comprehensive** standards for all levels of government and all disciplines; the response community should train and equip to those standards.

Solutions:

- Institutionalize cross-jurisdictional interoperability through collaborations, coordination, standardization, protocols, sharing of equipment, and multidisciplinary training to create a seamless response, especially in anticipation of long-term sustained operations.
- Credible EOC/Incident Command/Joint Operations Center (JOC)-focused training, equipment, and skills development, etc., to better prepare jurisdictions to integrate technology/equipment between State and local agencies and the private sector. Tie funding eligibility to documented participation by EOC Communications Officers and Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) Directors/Managers.

- Improve systems to support command, control, and communications across jurisdictions and Federal, State, and local levels of government—similar to unified systems and networks used in military command and control. Israel’s Homefront Command is one example.
- Extend the concept of technology operability/interoperability of communications to overall interagency communications, including interpersonal communications.
- Dedicate and fund specific, common airwave frequencies/spectrums for emergency responders.
- Implement an organizational framework to effectively communicate and provide interoperability capabilities of State and local assets.
- Use common communications/emergency management software.

Issue #3: Need for Comprehensive Assessment

Observation: A comprehensive threat risk, vulnerability, and capability assessment completed for every State, region, and jurisdiction that is shared at all levels of government is required.

Solutions:

- Develop a coordinated comprehensive evaluation tool that incorporates all response disciplines and allocate sufficient time for all government levels to complete the assessment. The result of the assessment should be shared between all levels of government and disciplines.
- Design standards—knowledge and skill sets for every individual and organization involved in emergency management—to use as a benchmark of the Nation’s preparedness and for staffing requirements, (e.g., a city of 1 million has to have X number of techs, X number of FEMA staff).
- Compile risk vulnerability assessments to assess national and State needs.
- Identify and commit resources to sustain programs.

The group also identified the following additional recommendations for improved response:

- Recognize and integrate medical examiners/coroners in Federal, State, and local planning and response operations for Public Health Surveillance & Disease Outbreak and Forensic Recovery and Management of the dead by:
 - Drafting Federal policies for the disposition of contaminated remains.
 - Allocating funds specifically to this field.
 - Including the discipline in National Fire Academy (NFA) and Emergency Management Institute (EMI) and Incident Command training.
 - Tasking the FBI to develop team concepts with medical examiners/coroners.

- Providing services (e.g., crisis intervention, counseling, daily briefings, financial assistance information and referrals) to the victims and victims' families at one-stop centers—similar to the Pentagon Family Assistance model.
- Downplaying political divisions within jurisdictions so relationships extend beyond mutual-aid agreements.
- Defining the emergency management team.
- Restructuring emergency management operations so responses are built at the local level, rather than being driven down from the Federal and State governments.
- Including nongovernment partners, such as the American Red Cross, in funding and planning.
- Implementing a public warning system using modern technology.
- Funding Information Technology (IT) equipment purchases, such as server display screens for EOCs.
- Funding EOCs for those counties and municipalities that do not have a facility.
- Providing funding (straight and overtime pay) for training and exercises of career emergency personnel so they do not have to lose pay or work forced overtime, and reimburse volunteers.
- Exploring the further use of the National Guard, particularly for Day 1 of an emergency.
- Clarifying ESF, ICS, and NRP procedures.
- Standardizing FEMA's response to terrorism versus traditional role of responding to natural disasters.

3.2 Law Enforcement Session

More than 250 Federal, State, and local law enforcement representatives met to share their major concerns in responding to a WMD/terrorist incident facing their communities. Two hours were allocated for this discussion; the first hour was spent caucusing among their jurisdictions to reach a consensus on the major issues of concern; the second was dedicated to prioritizing those issues and reaching an agreement on the top five that all participants agreed needed to be addressed. A synopsis of these issues follows this section.

Many issues presented in the second hour of the breakout session were unique to particular jurisdictions. It was decided by the group that only those issues of concern that crossed all jurisdictions would be considered in developing the top five for inclusion in the functional disciplines report.

Issue #1: Communications Interoperability

Observation: Participants agreed that a response to an event the size of the attack on the Pentagon would require mutual aid from numerous local communities and eventually Federal and State partners. The ability to communicate interjurisdictionally and interdisciplinary is crucial in providing a coordinated response. A stop-gap temporary solution was to use the ACU1000 Cross Channel Switch to enable noncompatible radios from different agencies to communicate on a common channel. More permanent suggested solutions are listed below.

Solutions:

- Mandated regional standardization of communications technology.
- Establishment of regional standards for acquisition and replacement of equipment.
- Establishment of regional communications standard operating procedures and protocols.
- Regional standardization of common radio terminology, including 10 codes.

Issue #2: Staffing/Personnel

Observation: Most community law enforcement commanders rued the lack of ability to meet authorized personnel strength. Replacement of officers in the current fiscal crisis, the delay from hiring to training to on-the-job, personnel on disability or on Worker's Compensation precluding the hiring of replacements, and lack of qualified candidates ensured operating with a shortage of personnel. This shortage of personnel also inhibits the ability to provide training and services simultaneously.

Solutions:

- Mutual-aid agreements and MOUs to supplement response must include clearly defined and understood roles and responsibilities.
- Authorization to pay overtime for replacement of personnel in training.
- Reinstitution of fiscal grants to put more officers on the streets that was initiated under the previous Federal administration.

Issue #3: Incident Command System

Observation: Participants from local communities agreed that there was a lack of overall knowledge and acceptance of the ICS among law enforcement.

Solutions:

- Increase training in ICS at all levels of law enforcement.
- Follow up training with multiagency, multidiscipline exercises to test practical application of ICS concept.
- Strengthen regional interdisciplinary, interagency relationships to better facilitate emergency response under ICS.

Issue #4: Training and Exercises

Observation: There is a need among all law enforcement agencies to conduct and participate in interdisciplinary training. However, there is an inability to train law enforcement because of daily demands. Participants noted that for the most part training focused on local departments and disciplines, and rarely progressed to the stage where multidiscipline and multijurisdictional aspects of a response to an incident were practiced. A second consideration that participants noted as having an adverse impact on the ability to train was the unavailability of personnel. Training usually occurs during the workday and personnel pulled from routine daily assignments, or in the case of volunteers, from their civilian jobs, require replacements. Community priorities and fiscal constraints are further impediments to this approach.

Solutions:

- Authorization for overtime to provide services to the community while officers are in training.
- Coordination is required among community response agencies while personnel are in training to backfill emergency response, when necessary.
- Educate elected officials and the general public on the need for this type of training to foster support.

Issue #5: Equipment

Observation: There was general agreement that law enforcement lacks proper PPE to respond to a WMD or hazardous materials (HazMat) event. In addition, equipment acquired needs to be compatible among communities.

Solutions:

- Regions must coordinate standardization of equipment.
- Establish regional guidelines and lists of equipment that can be purchased initially or for replacement of existing items.
- Once acquired, it is imperative that agencies have the ability to train with this equipment to increase efficiency.

3.3 Fire and Emergency Services Session

More than 160 chief fire officers and senior emergency service personnel met to share their perspectives of the major concerns facing their communities in responding to a WMD/terrorist incident or threat. Chief Edward Plaughter of the Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD) began by reviewing Fire and Emergency Service specific recommendations contained in the Arlington County After-Action Report (AAR). This review presented additional information to the assembly and prompted further discussion of common issues facing the fire and emergency service community as well as proposed options and solutions.

Twelve significant fire and emergency services issues and solutions were identified, of which the top three are presented below. Other important issues and solutions gathered from the facilitated session and functional area comment sheets are condensed and summarized on subsequent pages.

Issue #1: Interjurisdictional Relationships

Observation: A critical need exists to establish and strengthen interjurisdictional and regional relationships through interagency cooperation and communication.

Solutions:

- Plan, train, and exercise across jurisdictions.
- Establish and use common terminology.

Issue #2: Catastrophic Event Planning

Observation: Greater emphasis should be placed on preparation for catastrophic incidents.

Solutions:

- Refine EOPs.
- Develop a CEMP.
- Form and participate in work groups (i.e., Joint Terrorism Task Force [JTTF]).
- Train and exercise.
- Integrate and use nontraditional resources (i.e., military and public health).

Issue #3: Standardized Planning and Training

Observation: Unify and coordinate planning and training on a national, State, and/or regional basis.

Solutions:

- Build relationships among emergency response agencies.
- Identify lead agencies as appropriate.
- Solicit local input and participation in development of the NRP.

The following additional concerns/recommendations also surfaced:

- Develop regional policies on unit/resource dispatch. Develop and implement a unit/personnel identification system (i.e., Smartcard).
- Resolve differences through the use of common, integrated education, training, and exercising; especially between law enforcement agencies and fire departments.
- Develop baseline skills and qualifications for training, equipment, and specialized team training. A Statewide or national model could be developed.

- Plan, train, and exercise on a multiagency, multijurisdictional and/or regional level on a regular basis.
- Develop local and regional standards, policies, and hardware purchasing programs for communications equipment.
- Develop a national 700 MHz strategy. Move broadcasters off of 700 MHz spectrum. This will give State and local jurisdictions the ability to make decisions on their participation.

3.4 EMS Session

Representatives and teams from 45 jurisdictions in the United States, two guests from Montreal, Canada, and one guest from Israel gathered to discuss their respective jurisdiction's top EMS issues: Birmingham and Huntsville, AL; Sacramento and San Diego, CA; West Hartford, CT; New Castle County and Sussex County, DE; St. Lucie County and Stuart County, FL; Boise/Ada County, ID; Knox County, IN; Frankfort, KY; Kalamazoo County, MI; St. Paul, MN; Desoto County and LeFlore County, MS; Albuquerque, NM; Charlotte, County of Durham, and Union County, NC; Woodbury and Camden County, NJ; Suffolk County, NY; Columbus, Grandview Heights, and Franklin County, OH; Pittsburgh and York County, PA; Knoxville and Nashville, TN; Lubbock and Port Arthur, TX; Chesapeake, Chesterfield, Virginia Beach, and Arlington County, Hampton County, Hanover County, Loudon County, Portsmouth County, Stafford County, and York County, VA; Washington, DC, Military District; and Cheyenne, WY.

Speaker Captain Carl Lindgren, ACFD and Deputy Director of Emergency Management (EM) for Arlington County, opened the session with his account of the EMS response to the September 11 attack on the Pentagon. Captain Lindgren spoke of the criticality of establishing early medical communications with area hospitals; establishing command and control of the EMS branch with all responding allied health and medical personnel, and managing it within the incident management structure; designating a Staging Area for EMS and also an alternative location for use in the event of an evacuation; and obtaining full information on the whereabouts of all patients and all the channels being used for transfer and self-referral to hospitals and medical facilities.

The EMS Branch of the response was established by Dr. James Vafier, Operational Medical Director (OMD) from Alexandria Fire & EMS, and John White, Assistant Fire Chief, Technical Services – ACFD. Dr. Vafier spoke of the absolute importance of maintaining medical discipline across all responding allied organizations; establishing a command presence to organize all units and maintain organization of medical services throughout an overwhelming event; and having a standardized template in place outlining the best practice of things that need to be done in the first 2 hours of a catastrophic event. Assistant Fire Chief John White recounted his focus on logistics issues involved with the big picture, including integrating the national and regional response teams with medical components, such as the National Medical Response Team (NMRT) team; anticipating exposure of the first responders to HazMat and ensuring all responders and their equipment could be properly decontaminated; and resolving the shortage of proper PPE and replacement supplies and equipment, in particular Level C HazMat air respirator protection devices took priority.

Issue #1: Communications

Observation: There is a lack of communications interoperability and coordination across all EMS response and medical and healthcare providers, including public-private, civilian-military, and Federal-State-local.

Solutions:

- Establish early linkage between incident management and area hospitals with repeated timely incident status reports to involve them in the incident action planning (IAP) process and the IMS.
- Establish a multijurisdictional system integrating the EMS response and medical and healthcare providers, including a medical response communications center (MRCC)/ medical command hospital (MCH) independent of the first responder communications center to coordinate patient distribution and to ensure linkage/lines of communication to urgent care and off-site medical clinics in the affected area for self-referring patients.
- Establish and exercise a plan for providing communications as early as possible to the public concerning the event, actions for them to take and not take, and guidance on self-care in the event of a chemical or biological (C/B) WMD attack.
- Establish Statewide or regional communications systems that are workable, user-friendly, and integrated with daily routine use. Exercise and use them frequently.

Issue #2: Surge Capacity

Observation: Representatives from jurisdictions across the country believe they lack the capability to respond to a rapid surge in demand for managing the medical support structure onsite and in medical care facilities.

Solutions:

- Develop a database and procedures for alerting backup medical personnel that are both hospital and first responder based.
- Have incident management notify area hospitals as early as possible.
- Identify alternate care facilities (ACFs) and stock them with sufficient equipment and supplies to manage all hazards, specifically mass casualties from a WMD incident.
- Increase the number of MMRS teams and their use.
- Educate the public in their response and action to a terrorist attack using lessons learned from the Israelis and Japanese, and develop civil defense style/American Red Cross chapter educational programs for the whole country.
- Plan for and consider use of hospitals sending response teams to the incident site.

- Study models for assigning hospital personnel and representatives from Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) to ACFs as a standard part of a response to a WMD MCI.
- Develop a plan for achieving surge capacity expansion by region to 120 percent to 130 percent of their present daily coverage/response capabilities through identifying and securing additional response vehicles, and appropriate equipment and supplies not only for responding to the incident but also supporting existing community needs.

Issue #3: Training

Observation: There is insufficient real time training with all first responders and hospitals using a nationally standardized IMS and compatible equipment and procedures.

Solutions:

- Provide training and compatible equipment and supplies for all public and private first responders.
- Aggregate existing MCI training programs from local jurisdictions and States into a model national best practice methods for roles, responsibilities, and tactics to be used during the first and second hours of the incident by first responders.
- Provide funding for full-time equivalents (FTEs) necessary to free up responders to attend important training.
- Conduct training for all responders, both public and private, on C/B agent recognition.
- Include volunteer organizations and agencies in training to follow IMS direction and control, and provide liaison officers to the command post.
- Incorporate the element of chaos management in training and exercises.
- Incorporate lessons learned by those communities that have experienced MCI/WMD incidents.
- Mandate MCI training in time-efficient modules from the Federal Government that can be presented at the local level using the first responders' national incident management model.

Issue #4: Complete Integration of Prehospital/EMS/Hospital Care into IMS

Observation: Currently, there is a lack of a standardized IMS that fully coordinates and controls the triage and delivery of medical care by all responding public and private EMS response units and hospitals. There is no best practice system for controlling public-private, civilian-military, and regional-State-Federal agencies. Given lack of understanding of IMS, there is a lack of discipline resulting in self-dispatch of allied healthcare resources and first responders, and self-referrals by patients.

Solutions:

- Make IMS part of the EMS training/certification process for all first responders.
- Review and enhance EOPs to ensure full integration of prehospital/EMS care into incident management.
- Adopt standard operating guidelines (SOGs) and SOPs to ensure early notification of EMS units and hospitals, and to ensure the connection of private EMS units to centralized dispatch.
- Train basic response disciplines and mutual-aid responders in one triage system that is coordinated by unit leaders/branch directors designated by the Incident Commander (IC).
- Put in place a system for credentialing medical personnel onsite: MDs, registered nurses (RNs), physician assistants (PAs), emergency medical technicians (EMTs), paramedics, VOADs, and independently responding fire service personnel.

Issue #5: Daily Operations, Equipping, and Assistance for First Responders

Observation: There is a lack of planning and scheduling to ensure ongoing maintenance of daily operations to serve the community and capability to respond to multiple attacks elsewhere in the jurisdiction, including staffing, equipment, sufficient supplies of different levels of PPE, decontamination facilities to handle secondary contamination, and long-term monitoring of responders.

Solutions:

- Plan for a pool of equipment and supplies to be on standby for the first 2 hours of a response to a MCI WMD event before Federal assets being available especially if multiple attacks occur within the jurisdiction.
- Identify sources for replacement equipment and supplies and procedures required to access them, including the Pre-positioned Equipment Program (PEP), the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) (formerly the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile [NPS]), and mutual-aid resources.
- Meet with regional mutual-aid response agencies and draw up plans for long-term multiple incidents.
- Develop plans for multiple decontamination stations for victims, and technical decontamination stations for responders and equipment/canine support/vehicles.
- Plan for critical incident stress management (CISM) for responders and their families and also for victims and their families.
- Practice these plans in tabletop and full-scale formats with regional first responder agencies (public, private, and industrial) with local emergency management offices, and with appropriate Federal and State agencies and their response teams and/or liaison officers.

3.5 City/County Managers Session

More than 90 elected and appointed city and county leaders, or representatives, met to share their perspective of the major concerns facing their community in responding to a WMD/terrorist incident or threat. Although 2 hours were allocated for this discussion, the first hour was spent with Mr. Ron Carlee responding to questions and providing additional insights into factors important for senior elected and appointed officials to consider in the WMD/terrorism environment. A synopsis of these is at the end of this section.

The second hour began with volunteers submitting key issues from their jurisdiction's perspective. Nineteen issues were identified and from these the group selected the three most significant. Time constraints precluded detailed discussions of the final three, or the 16 others. By consensus, it was agreed that the extended discussions with Mr. Carlee far outweighed the value that might have been derived from devoting 3 to 4 minutes each to the 19 issues.

Issue #1: Develop a Regional/Multijurisdictional Approach

Observation: Response to a terrorist incident will not be a local event. Preparedness, response, and recovery will be regional, and plans and funding should reflect this regionalism. Teamwork spanning the Federal, State, and local level is critical to a successful response and recovery.

Solutions:

- Develop regional plans using a core-planning group representing a cross-section of the region.
- Funding should be focused at the regional level and recognize the jurisdictional capabilities and interfaces essential to a successful response.
- Federal legislation should be prepared that would mitigate legal impediments to inter-State support agreements.
- Consider establishing regional Homeland Security coordination groups within each State.
- Conduct regional training in ICS and UCS.
- Establish national standards for response through the NRP and NIMS.
- Develop plans and procedures that address the vagaries encountered in responding to incidents without addresses (e.g., no definable incident scene such as in bioterrorism).
- Elected and appointed leaders must accept responsibility for their role in fostering a suitable environment for the effective preparation of their communities to meet this threat, and lead by example.

Issue #2: Communications and Information Flow

Observation: Communications in the broad sense is a recurring issue that requires continual attention. Participants identified a need to ensure the flow of information about the incident was all encompassing. Adjacent jurisdictions, nonemergency response workers, the public at large, and local officials should all receive prompt and recurring information from an authoritative source.

Solutions:

- From a technical standpoint, the assurance by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of its intent to identify a specific designation of frequencies for responders should overcome some anticipated emergency communications degradation.
- Although all encouraged the incorporation of new technologies into plans and procedures, it was recognized that technological advances themselves are not a panacea and that redundancies had to be considered and built into plans and procedures.
- Continued development and widespread implementation of reverse 9-1-1 capabilities will aid many communities alerting and informing the public.
- Communications centers and public affairs teams need to have plans or procedures for rapid augmentation to meet surge requirements.
- Federal and State plans should require communications compatibility including the acquisition of regionally compatible communications systems.
- Encourage the use of the local EOC as the focal point for information flow for:
 - Public officials
 - Between jurisdictions
 - Within the community
 - Among employees

Issue #3: Sufficiency of Local Resources

Observation: Local resources are often inadequate to meet the needs of a terrorism response. Local and regional capabilities, mutual aid, and integration of local businesses are all factors affecting the sufficiency of local resources.

Solutions:

- Efforts to develop Statewide mutual-aid compacts must continue to receive emphasis.
- The capabilities, shortcomings, and needs of remote jurisdictions need to be considered as funds are allocated and regional plans developed.
- Strength in response is achieved by what can be brought to bear regionally; plans should recognize the requirement for regional interoperability.

- The traditional first responder may be supplemented by an expanded role from those in the nonpublic safety arena in a major disaster or WMD event, communities should prepare this second tier (non-public safety personnel and functions) by instituting awareness, training, and exercises.
- The private sector will have an important role in meeting emergency requirements, so emergency managers must develop an awareness of what local businesses and other private sector resources can provide in an emergency.

Additional points surfaced in extended dialogue with Mr. Carlee centered on the following:

- **Management of Elected Officials.** It is important that elected officials are kept updated on the event and are provided a role. Means to accomplish this must be thought through, and the responsibility cannot be passed to another (e.g., use conference calls; have at least one daily face to face).
- **Communications Interoperability.** A cache of radios and batteries that can be passed to external reinforcing entities help circumvent the interoperability problem many encounter.
- **EOC.** Arlington County did not have a functioning, dedicated EOC, they had an “EOC in a box.” It is important that communities have the capability to rapidly activate an EOC; failure to have this capability will detract from the efficient early coordination and off-scene management of the incident.
- **Workman’s Compensation.** Early retirements, and post-incident stress will all have a lasting effect post-event.
- **Joint Information Center (JIC).** The unique situation at the Pentagon resulted in a JIC not being formed; in some respects, this was easier on the county because the focus of the three key players (i.e., Department of Defense [DoD], DOJ, and the county) was different. Meeting your constituents’ interests is paramount and in most cases a JIC will be formed. How this functions and unanimity achieved should be developed pre-event.
- **Adjacent Jurisdictions.** It is important that relationships be built before an event occurring, post-incident is too late for the emergence of smooth and transparent multijurisdictional relationships.
- **Volunteers.** The community volunteered its services in many ways; it is important to husband and direct these resources so all feel they have played a part in the community-wide effort.
- **Emergency Declaration.** The County Manager declared the emergency and the County Board later ratified it. If you have the authority, it may be prudent to always have a blank copy available.
- **Public Workers.** Those not working the incident have an important role in keeping the community running, they also have an need to know what is happening. A call was made to each employee and a system established to keep employees and the community alike informed using a variety of means, including the local cable channel.