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MANAGING THE THREAT OF TERRORISM

On September 11, 2001, local government managers and community leaders felt the terrorist threat to the United States, watched the responses of New York City and the Washington, D.C. area, and wondered about how their own communities would respond.

This report explores what communities can do to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. The central lesson is that dealing with terrorism requires using both traditional and nontraditional methods of dealing with disasters.

In addition to using proven techniques for managing natural disasters, local jurisdictions planning how to respond to a terrorist attack need to pay more attention to preparing the local medical community for terrorist incidents involving biological, chemical, and even nuclear weapons. Communities must learn how to ensure the safety of response personnel, decontaminate all who are involved in hazardous materials incidents, maintain site security, and protect the scene in preparation for a criminal investigation.

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Managing the Threat of Terrorism

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Terrorism is an act of violence (or the threat of the use of violence) that is performed (or issued) by people who want to use fear to promote their ideological goals. Terrorists might work alone (Timothy McVeigh, for example), as part of larger groups (the al Qaeda network, for example), or in conjunction with a state (Afghanistan or Iran, for example). Terrorists may come from the right or left of the political spectrum, and their goals can be as various as reducing government power, limiting taxes, seeking political independence, stopping abortions, promoting equal rights, dismantling capitalism, protecting the environment, and maintaining the drug trade. Terrorists are frustrated with current domestic or international circumstances and, because they recognize their inferior position in terms of political power, they do not seek change through voting, lobbying, and peaceful protest. The fact that some terrorists are willing to die for their beliefs makes prevention difficult and response necessary.

Terrorists obtain financing for their operations through the drug trade, burglary, or other illegal activities or through individual, corporate, or state sponsorship. Some actively recruit people who adhere to

their particular ideology and use the Internet to spread their message. Sometimes terrorist groups like the al Qaeda network set up camps and conferences where recruits are taught to raise money, gather information, disguise themselves, travel discreetly, produce bombs, train with weapons, and plan attacks.

The most common tactics of terrorists are arson and bombings. However, terrorists are also involved in hoaxes (anthrax scares), sabotage (computer viruses), hijackings (the World Trade Center attack), hostage taking (the Japanese embassy in Peru), assassination (Yitzak Rabin in Israel), and the use of weapons of mass destruction (the sarin gas attack in Tokyo). Weapons chosen range from knives, guns, and computer viruses to weapons of mass destruction (biological, nuclear, incendiary, chemical, and explosive devices). Terrorism is often directed against large numbers of citizens, so any area with a high concentration of people is vulnerable to attack. Terrorists also target political leaders, government agencies, and even emergency responders. Thus local jurisdictions need to prepare for an array of disruptive and deadly terrorist incidents.

Emergency managers must be keenly aware of the nature of terrorism in order to be prepared. Managing for the threat of terrorism is both similar to and different from the management of other types of disasters. Counterterrorism activities are divided into two categories:

- **Consequence management.** This is predominantly an emergency management function and includes measures to protect public health and safety; restore essential government services; and provide emergency relief to affected individuals, businesses, and governments.
- **Crisis management.** This is predominantly a law enforcement function and includes measures to identify, anticipate, prevent, and/or prosecute those involved in terrorism.

What is terrorism?

Terrorism is the unlawful use of force against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives.

—Federal Bureau of Investigation

Terrorism is the calculated use of violence, or the threat of violence, to inculcate fear, [and is] intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.

—Department of Defense

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Activities in both crisis and consequence management can be divided into four phases. The first two phases—mitigation and preparedness—begin long before an incident and involve preventive and planning measures. Once a terrorist incident occurs, the jurisdiction must move into response, the third phase. In the fourth phase, recovery, the jurisdiction attempts to return the community to a normal or an improved condition. Each phase, with examples of various important functions, is addressed below.

MITIGATION

Although recent events in New York must erase doubts about whether local jurisdictions need to prepare for man-made disasters, there remains the question of how much can and should be invested in preventing or preparing for such events. While there is no simple answer, careful analysis can help policy-

makers determine the best course of action. Mitigation starts with a threat assessment and includes both structural and nonstructural approaches.

Threat Assessment

In addition to addressing the underlying social, political, and economic factors that encourage violent behavior in some people and working with state and federal law enforcement to gain early warning or prosecute individuals and groups that participate in terrorism, jurisdictions must carefully and continually assess their vulnerability to terrorism. Jurisdictions must identify possible terrorist targets, including government offices; schools; malls; sporting venues; concert halls; businesses; and critical facilities such as power plants, hospitals, and emergency operations centers (EOCs). Because terrorist acts are intended to evade deterrents to terrorism, local jurisdictions must not accept any existing list of vulnerabilities as all-

Recent terrorist incidents

- **Sarin gas attack, Tokyo.** In March 1995, members of Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese group, placed bags of diluted sarin nerve gas in Tokyo subways. Eventually 12 people died and about 5,000 were injured. Fire, police, and emergency medical technicians also succumbed to the effects of the sarin gas because they lacked proper training and equipment. Hospitals were overwhelmed with victims and did not have a clear idea of how to respond.¹
- **Bombing of World Trade Center, New York.** In February 1993, a 1,200 pound bomb exploded in the garage of one of the World Trade Center towers; the explosion killed six people and injured more than 1,000. Thousands of victims and relatives of victims called 911. The emergency response was massive. Although about 50,000 people evacuated area buildings, many others were trapped and suffered injuries and smoke inhalation. Search and rescue lasted more than 10 hours, and numerous floors and rooms were searched and 111 elevators were checked. EMS personnel took the injured to medical facilities in the area, but many victims were self-referred or taken by friends to hospitals as far away as Philadelphia and Connecticut. Because only one portable radio channel was used by nearly 45 percent of New York's total force of firefighters, runners had to be used to send messages. Emergency generators were also damaged and several private radio systems went down because the antennas on the towers could not transmit.²
- **Bombing of Murrah Federal Building, Oklahoma City.** In April 1995 Timothy McVeigh left a 4,000 pound ammonium nitrate and fuel bomb in a truck outside the federal building in Oklahoma City. When it exploded it destroyed about 80 percent of the face of the nine-story building, damaged more than 343 buildings in Oklahoma City, killed 167 people, and injured more than 500. Fifty thousand people had to be evacuated. The crime scene stretched over 200 city blocks, creating the need for site control and more than 20,000 entry passes. For five days calls overloaded the 911 system, electricity and telephone service suffered interruptions, and donated goods created great logistical challenges. Conflicting information provided to the media led to joint briefings that were held several times each day.

During the following weeks, every firefighter and fire unit in Oklahoma got involved. In addition, 37 ambulances, 29 mutual aid ambulances, 11 federal urban search-and-rescue teams, parts of the National Disaster Medical System, and 44 local, state, and federal police units participated in the response. The participation of 130 agencies created an impressive logistical challenge: food, water, clothing, and shelter had to be provided for 3,000 responders for 17 days. Incident command was established by the local fire departments first and expanded into a unified command with other state and federal emergency management agencies. At the conclusion of the emergency response phase, command was transferred to police and other investigative agencies.³

¹ Adapted from Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, *America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998).

² Adapted from Timothy R. S. Campbell, "Terrorism Case Studies: New York World Trade Center, Tokyo Subway Attack, and Oklahoma City Federal Building Bombing," in *Terrorism: Defensive Strategies for Individuals, Companies, and Governments*, ed. Lawrence J. Hogan (Frederick, Md.: Amlex, Inc., 2001), 259–271.

³ Ibid.

inclusive. Continual reevaluation and subsequent adjustment are essential for effective mitigation against terrorism. As jurisdictions constantly reassess

their situations, they can pursue targeted structural and nonstructural mitigation strategies.

Structural Mitigation

Governments can build physical structures and install special devices to deter terrorists from accessing proscribed areas and limit their ability to damage property and inflict mass casualties. For example, reducing the span of floor joists or improving the connection of beams to columns might prevent building collapse in case of terrorist bombings while the installation of sprinkler systems could extinguish fires initiated by

Weapons of mass destruction—What to look for

Biological

- Unusual numbers of sick or dying people or animals
- Dissemination of unscheduled and unusual sprays, especially outdoors and/or at night
- Abandoned spray devices with no distinct odors.

Nuclear

- Presence of Department of Transportation placards and labels (used during authorized transport of nuclear material)
- Monitoring devices.

Incendiary

- Multiple fires
- Remains of incendiary devices
- Odors of accelerants
- Heavy burning
- Fire volume.

Chemical

- Massive onset of similar symptoms in a large group of people
- Mass fatalities
- Hazardous materials or lab equipment that is not relevant to the occupancy
- Exposed individuals reporting unusual odors and tastes
- Explosion dispersing liquids, mists, or gases
- Limited explosion that destroys very little except the bomb device itself; the intention is to disperse chemicals
- Unscheduled dissemination of an unusual spray
- Abandoned spray devices
- Numerous dead animals, fish, and birds
- Absence of insect life in a warm climate
- Mass casualties without obvious trauma
- Distinct pattern of casualties and common symptoms
- Civilian panic in potential target areas (e.g., government buildings, public assemblies, subway systems, etc).

Explosive

- Large-scale damage to a building
- Blown-out windows
- Scattered debris
- Victims with shrapnel-induced trauma
- Appearance of shock-like symptoms
- Damage to eardrums.

Source: *Emergency Response to Terrorism*, self-study guide, report no. FEMA/USFA/NFA-ERT:SS (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, FEMA, June 1999), 25–26, www.usfa.fema.gov/pdf/ertss.pdf.

Critical infrastructure to be included in threat assessment

Information and communications

- Computer networks
- Line-based phone systems
- Cell towers

Electricity

- Power plants (nuclear and other)
- Step-up and step-down stations
- Transformers

Transportation

- Airports
- Highways and bridges
- Ports

Petroleum/chemical

- Oil wells
- Refineries
- Delivery and storage facilities

Economic

- Banks
- Financial institutions
- Major corporations

Water

- Dams
- Sewage treatment facilities
- Storage and distribution systems

Emergency services

- Fire and police stations
- Emergency operations centers
- Hospitals

Critical government services

- Mayor's office
- City hall
- Court buildings

Source: Nancy J. Wong, deputy director, national outreach and awareness, U.S. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), www.icma.org/IssueIntersections/news.cfm?IID=8&newsID=1278&back=er.

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arsonists. Other precautions such as the erection of concrete and steel barriers outside building entrances might prevent the delivery of explosives by cars and trucks. Walls and fences can be built to limit access to HVAC (heating, ventilation, air conditioning) intakes on large buildings and to protect water sources and treatment facilities from terrorist acts involving chemical or biological agents. Governments can contact the American Institute of Architects and the American Society of Civil Engineers (see Appendix A) for further examples of how to reduce structural vulnerability to terrorist incidents.

Mitigation through *Project Impact*

Project Impact operates on a common-sense damage-reduction approach, basing its work and planning on three simple principles: preventive actions must be decided at the local level; private sector participation is vital; and long-term efforts and investments in prevention measures are essential. In 1997, FEMA partnered with seven pilot communities across the country and was encouraged by the benefits seen and the determined commitment that flourished at the local level. *Project Impact* quickly became a nationwide initiative as more communities began to see the value in disaster planning and mitigation. Today there are nearly 250 *Project Impact* communities, as well as more than 2,500 businesses that have joined as *Project Impact* partners.

To each new community that commits to the partnership, FEMA offers expertise and technical assistance at both the national and regional level, as well as incorporates other federal agencies and states into the equation. By putting the latest technology and mitigation practices into the hands of the local communities, FEMA guides these communities through the complete risk assessment process, which allows each community to identify and prioritize those mitigation initiatives that will have the greatest benefits to the community. Once implementation begins, FEMA works closely with community leaders to generate the public, political and private sector support and resources that are essential for complete success of any mitigation activities.

The incentive of *Project Impact* is clear: a disaster resistant community can rebound from a natural disaster with far less loss of property and consequently much less cost for repairs. Moreover, the time lost from productive activity is minimized for both businesses and their employees. Indeed, FEMA estimates that for every dollar spent in damage prevention, two are saved in repairs.

For more information about how to be a *Project Impact* community, please call 1-202-646-4600 or for publications call 1-800-227-4731 or visit www.fema.gov/impact.

Source: www.fema.gov/impact/impact00.htm.
Updated: September 28, 2000.

Although financial considerations could make it difficult to adequately protect already existing structures, building codes can be changed to ensure that new construction complies with good risk-reduction practices.

Nonstructural Mitigation

An array of nonstructural measures can prohibit terrorist attacks or lessen their impact; special engineering techniques and special equipment to protect facilities may not be required. Setback requirements that put distance between buildings and nearby roads and parking lots will lessen the exposure of both people and facilities to vehicle-delivered bombs. Or, as in the case of New York after the World Trade Center terrorist attacks, temporary barriers such as parked dump trucks full of sand can temporarily block access to sensitive areas.

Armed guards can be deployed to provide security at airports and dams. Metal detectors and X-ray equipment can be used to enforce a ban on weapons and other dangerous items in schools, courthouses, and other public buildings. Even ticket takers at sporting events can search through the personal belongings of sports fans; this was done in Dallas at the American Airlines Center after September 11, 2001.

Jurisdictions can also provide strong, effective community education programs to help citizens know how to respond to a terrorist incident. For example, if the general public is aware of evacuation routes before evacuation orders are issued, an evacuation will be quicker and more orderly. Jurisdictions should include nonstructural measures as a part of their mitigation plans.

PREPAREDNESS

To be ready to react to a potential terrorist incident, it is imperative that local governments have well-devised emergency operations plans in place; this includes acquiring resources and training and taking part in simulation exercises.

Planning

Local jurisdictions should have an all-hazards emergency plan in place. Certain steps—warning, evacuation, search and rescue, emergency medical care, and sheltering—are nearly always taken in every type of disaster, including a terrorist attack. With this in mind, managers can plan for terrorism by making good use of existing emergency documents and procedures.

Although no single plan can include all necessary elements for all jurisdictions, a typical local plan would specify that the leadership of the local government would coordinate the response to disasters. Individuals and departments within the local government can be assigned duties ranging from prevention

Sample emergency operations plan—Who does what?

Mayor/city manager

- Activate the city emergency plan
- Suspend ordinances if necessary
- Use all city resources where necessary
- Transfer city personnel, equipment, and functions as necessary
- Work with public information officer to relay information to the public

Emergency manager

- Serve as adviser to mayor and city manager
- Direct development of city plan with other departments
- Establish information collection, analysis, reporting, and dissemination system
- Conduct exercises with all agencies and organizations in the community
- Coordinate donations management and mutual aid
- Establish a warning system
- Oversee evacuation
- Direct EOC operations
- Work with public information officer to relay information to the public
- Document all response actions

Fire

- Fire suppression
- Emergency medical service
- Search and rescue
- Radiological assessment

Police

- Law enforcement
- Criminal investigation
- Evacuations
- Communications
- Traffic control

Code enforcement/engineering

- Damage assessment
- Condemnation of damaged structures
- Coordinate utility restoration

Public works

- Debris removal
- Water and sewer service restoration
- Heavy equipment
- Engineering

Parks and recreation

- Debris removal

Public buildings and facilities

- Provide offices for state and federal resources
- Shelters

Coroner

- Victim identification
- Mortuary services

Finance

- Accounting
- Procurement

Personnel

- Ensure well-being of responders' families
- Coordinate volunteers

City planning department

- Urban planning
- Damage assessment

Legal

- Public information
- Credentials for media and site control
- EOC representation

and law enforcement to emergency and recovery operations. Many local departments will also serve as secondary providers of specified services or perform any number of roles as needed. It is important to determine beforehand where and how each available department will serve in the event of a terrorist incident. The local government should also establish mutual aid agreements and set up procedures to request state and federal assistance.

Jurisdictions that are considering augmenting their current emergency plans with annexes—detailed functional and hazard-specific plans that support the basic plan—pertaining to terrorism can retool their hazardous materials annexes as bioterrorism annexes. Local jurisdictions can also consult state and federal agencies as well as emergency management professional organizations and local emergency planning committees to find model terrorism annexes or plans from other jurisdictions.

Regardless of the type of plan that is created, jurisdictions should remember five planning principles:

- The plan must be flexible enough to deal with unforeseen or changing issues caused by a terrorist event. Basic procedures and mutual aid agreements in place before an incident cannot anticipate the unique details of every type of event; local governments will have to adapt their plans through improvisation to fit current circumstances.
- Communication will be difficult in the event of terrorism or other types of disasters. Planners should develop resource lists that include contact information and several different telephone numbers for persons and organizations that will be involved in the response. Private contractors are often willing to assist with communications needs in the event of a large-scale event. Departmental

How to add a terrorism annex to your emergency plan

Several considerations relating to terrorism could be included in an annex to a basic local government emergency plan.

Authority:

- Identify local, state, and federal legal authorities pertinent to the subject of terrorism, in addition to those cited in the basic plan.

Purpose:

- Include a purpose statement that describes the reason for development of the annex.

Explanation of terms:

- Explain and/or define terms and acronyms used in the annex.

Situation and assumptions:

- Include a situation statement related to the subject of the annex
- Include a list of assumptions used in planning for terrorist incident response.

Concept of operations:

- Describe the local concept of operations for terrorism crisis management, including the threat/use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- Indicate the lead local, state, and federal agencies for terrorism crisis management
- Describe the local concept of operations for terrorism consequence management, including the threat/use of WMD
- Indicate the lead local, state, and federal agencies for terrorism consequence management
- Describe the role of the incident commander and EOC and their interface during terrorist incidents
- Outline procedures to coordinate crisis management and consequence management
- Describe protective actions suitable for responders and the public
- Outline requirements for coordinating the local medical response to a biological weapons incident
- Include a list of actions, by phases of emergency management, to prevent terrorist incidents, enhance readiness to deal with them, and effectively respond to and recover from such incidents.

Organization and assignment of responsibilities:

- Indicate how the jurisdiction will be organized to respond to terrorist incidents or threats of such incidents
- Include a list by position/title of responsibilities for terrorist incident response activities.

Direction and control:

- Identify by position the individuals who will provide guidance for, direct, and control terrorist incident response operations
- Describe how mutual aid, state, and federal resources will be requested and integrated into response operations.

Readiness levels:

- Describe actions to be taken at various readiness levels.

Administration and support:

- Outline policies on reports and the maintenance and preservation of records
- Provide for a postincident review of terrorist incident response operations.

Annex development and maintenance:

- Specify the individual(s) by position responsible for developing and maintaining the annex
- Make reference to the schedule for review and update of annexes contained in the basic plan.

References:

- Identify references pertinent to the content of the annex.

Other:

- Include a terrorism incident response checklist
- Include a basic description of terrorist weapons, their effects, and emergency response needs that may be generated by their use
- Include a list of specialized terrorist response resources.

Source: Adapted from "Planning Standards Checklist for Annex V, Terrorist Incident Response," <ftp://ftp.txdps.state.tx.us/dem/plans/vstanan12.rtf> (Austin, Tex.: Governor's Division of Emergency Management, November 2000), www.txdps.state.tx.us/dem/.

frequencies should be placed in the plan to ensure adequate frequencies and knowledge of how to communicate. Redundancy is important, and jurisdictions should build close working relationships with local amateur radio operators who can assist with relaying information in case other forms of communication fail.

- An incident of terrorism differs from other emergency situations because the area affected requires

the active and full participation of law enforcement. The police department should be included in the plan to limit access to the crime scene and search for clues about persons involved.

- The emergency operations plan should provide for continuity of government. Because terrorists could target the political leaders and institutions of a community, it is absolutely crucial that lines of succession are clearly identified in advance.

- Although the plan is important, it is the process of planning and the coordination among relevant organizations before a disaster that make the most significant impact on response and recovery effectiveness.

Resource Acquisition

Managers need to consider the ability of the community to respond to any potential disaster, including terrorism. Communities with an integrated emergency management process can determine their current capability levels and learn what resources will be required in the future:

- The local jurisdiction's emergency management coordinator should identify the hazards that threaten the community and the possible magnitude of any probable event. Because each community is likely to be confronted by different hazards, the capability assessment must begin with the most likely events and should help identify personnel and equipment the community currently has access to in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors.
- The community must recognize the gap between the existing capability and what may actually be needed to respond to the event; the difference between the needed response items and the actual resources on hand is called a capability shortfall.
- The community must decide what is most critical, set priorities, and work to obtain necessary resources.

Jurisdictions need to ensure that the necessary manpower, equipment, and facilities are available to responding agencies. Additional emergency personnel should be hired if needed, and all participants must be properly equipped to perform their roles in a disaster.

Personal protective equipment is not limited to turnout gear for firefighters and bulletproof vests for law enforcement. Specific protective equipment for chemical and biological terrorism must be available as well. Each jurisdiction need not have every conceivable device or piece of equipment, but jurisdictions must have prompt access to things they do not have.

These resources can be acquired from the municipality, private companies, nonprofit organizations, mutual aid agreements, or memorandums of understanding with neighboring jurisdictions to ensure assistance in times of need. Mutual aid agreements and memorandums of understanding are particularly beneficial in that they provide for the acquisition of technical services that a jurisdiction does not possess; for example, some cities do not have a hazardous materials team to respond to chemical spills or releases but a neighboring jurisdiction does. A jurisdiction could also get help from bomb disposal and special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams if it makes agreements with other communities in advance. Mutual aid

agreements and memorandums of understanding are beneficial also because they may provide relief to strained human resources during a prolonged response to a community disaster. It is imperative, however, that the parties in any agreement consider the legal ramifications of joint operations.

If local hospitals cannot process victims of terrorism, the jurisdiction is not prepared. Community leaders must therefore work closely with medical facilities to ensure they are prepared and have or can get trained medical personnel, special vaccines, and needed medical equipment for each type of terrorist disaster agent. Health care providers should also be in contact with nearby hospitals, veterinarians, health departments, and state and federal resources to determine the capabilities of the area for mass casualty or fatality incidents. National Guard civil support teams, disaster medical assistance teams (DMAT), and disaster mortuary services (DMORT) can aid local governments if states request their assistance or the federal government declares an area qualified to receive their services. These teams provide expert advice and additional medical equipment and vaccines.

Each jurisdiction must also have a well-equipped EOC, a facility where political leaders, department heads, and representatives from various community organizations meet to plan for potential emergencies or disasters. In the case of an actual terrorist attack, the EOC provides the link between the incident commander in the field and the multitude of local, state, federal, and volunteer resources needed at the scene. Without an established EOC, an incident commander at a terrorist event would be paralyzed by the volume and variety of issues demanding immediate attention.

The jurisdiction's emergency manager should be responsible for setting up the EOC, and, because terrorists may launch attacks on those making decisions in the primary EOC, the emergency manager may also want to consider the need for a backup that also has telephones, computers, and other useful equipment.

Training

Training is vital for an effective response, and federal and state agencies offer disaster-related courses—such as donations management, damage assessment, and debris removal—for emergency managers and response personnel. The Emergency Management Institute run by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has specific courses that train management to respond to terrorist and other disaster events. Additional courses are offered by the Department of Justice, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Transportation. The White House's Office of Homeland Security states that 11 federal agencies offer more than 90 courses on terrorism and terrorism-related topics, and it provides a compendium of training opportunities on its Web site (see Appendix A). Community-specific training conducted by state emergency management agencies is

Emergency operations centers

Emergency operations centers (EOCs) enhance the ability of government to perform crucial disaster functions:

- **Coordinating.** The EOC brings together numerous agencies and organizations to facilitate an understanding of each other's roles and ensure that there are no gaps in response operations.
- **Policy making.** A wide range of decisions are made in the EOC both before and after a disaster (for example, coming to agreement about planned emergency operations procedures).
- **Managing operations.** Decision makers must continually evaluate needs and the assignment of resources.
- **Gathering information.** The EOC provides a central location where information can be collected, analyzed, and processed.
- **Informing the public.** A public information officer in the EOC can ensure that correct and consistent messages are provided.
- **Hosting visitors.** An EOC can educate local, state, and even federal officials about the disaster and harness resources necessary for an effective response.

Emergency operations centers:

- Must be established in a safe (or less hazardous) area and in a room or building that is able to withstand floods, high winds, and even small-to-moderate explosive devices. Guards and check-in procedures should ensure that the EOC is not accessible to unauthorized personnel.
- Should contain generators, televisions, tables, chairs, and office equipment and supplies (such as phones, radios, fax machines, copiers, computers, phone books, contact lists, and pens and paper); rest rooms and eating and sleeping facilities should be provided; access to the Internet and weather information would be beneficial.
- Can be arranged by agency, disaster function, or according to the incident command system (command, planning, logistics, operations, and finance). Regardless of which method or organization is chosen, the EOC should be staffed by knowledgeable and well-trained individuals.

Costs for EOCs can vary greatly depending upon their location and size. Retrofitting existing structures significantly reduces the initial expenditure. Obtaining funds from special taxes, state emergency management programs, federal disaster assistance, or even a portion of insurance company collections helps to allay costs.

Sources: Adapted from Ronald W. Perry, "Managing Disaster Response Operations," in *Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government*, ed. Thomas E. Drabek and Gerard J. Hoetmer (Washington, D.C.: ICMA, 1991), 204–206; and William Moore, "Developing an Emergency Operations Center," IQ Service Report, vol. 30, no. 7, item no. 42350 (Washington, D.C.: ICMA, July 1998).

also vital to keeping all involved parties ready to respond. Some government-provided training is free (see FEMA's independent study courses) and some is inexpensive.

Making sure first responders have earned credentials and are maintaining their required training for terrorism should be a top priority. The recent anthrax mailings and the possible use of other weapons of mass destruction show that firefighters need to be trained and tested in specific skills such as personal protection from hazardous materials and decontamination. Training should not stop with emergency responders; public works personnel, engineering departments, city managers, elected officials, and others who respond to disasters must understand their particular roles in responding to terrorist incidents.

Local jurisdictions should also participate in incident management training. The best strategy available for managing a disaster site, including a terrorist incident, is the incident command system (ICS), a management system that was created specifically to alleviate the resource management and coordination challenges inherent in all types of multiagency disasters.

Jurisdictions following ICS principles divide responsibilities and prevent duplication of effort by assigning each participant in the on-site response to one of five management areas: command, planning, logistics, operation, or finance. Using ICS also facilitates responder safety, accurate public information, liaison with other agencies, a common vocabulary, and an accepted method for emergency operations.

The ICS is flexible enough to apply not only to a small emergency or an ordinary incident involving one or two responders but also to a large terrorist disaster that requires the participation of several thousand responders. As the most common incident management system in use in the United States, ICS is the best choice for an incident sure to involve mutual aid and multiple outside agencies. Every department in the jurisdiction should therefore be trained in the same system so that they can effectively fill their designated roles during a terrorism incident.

Training in the use of the EOC is also vital to maintaining an appropriate state of readiness. EOC training will help to ensure that the necessary equipment, tools, and resources are available and functioning. Group meetings of EOC personnel will also help increase familiarity with the facility and the emergency operations plan. Relationships among all levels of government as well as different community-based agencies in a jurisdiction can be enhanced while training in the EOC. Building working relationships among agencies can lessen the stress of managing the response to terrorism.

Exercises

In addition to planning, acquiring resources, and training, local jurisdictions should also hold exercises to increase preparedness and test plans to identify

weaknesses in response capabilities. Exercises also play a valuable role in making sure that resources are sufficient, equipment is functioning, and responders know how to react to any emergency. Exercises may start with a discussion of possible terrorism scenarios and lead to formal and in-depth full-scale enactments. Exercises should take place periodically to ensure that new personnel know the plan and that the community can respond to developing threats. Disaster simulations should involve every organization that responds to disasters (including state and federal agencies when appropriate).

RESPONSE

Because of the vulnerability of modern societies, terrorists may commit individual attacks that create a plethora of emergency needs. Terrorists may also threaten multiple violent acts or deliver simultaneous attacks that overtax emergency response systems. Some responses to disaster are suitable regardless of the disaster; terrorism requires additional responses and skills.

Necessary Responses to Every Disaster

Warning. Issuing a warning might not be possible because of the nature of terrorism. However, if an unfolding terrorist attack is discovered by citizens, local government employees in the field, or by the media, this information should be quickly relayed to the community dispatch center and should be quickly passed to the police chief, the emergency management coordinator, and the elected politicians of the jurisdiction. Once leadership is notified, they must decide who needs to be warned and what warnings to issue.

In some cases, only residents in certain affected neighborhoods need to be warned, but in large terrorist attacks, the entire population may require warning. A great volume of information must be communicated in a manner that will promote a response that is best suited to deal with the situation.

Decisions must be made about how to issue warnings. For example, the media can be helpful, but if broadcast media are off-line, decision makers must consider other methods such as door-to-door warnings and quickly implement them. Civil defense sirens, route alerting via public address speakers mounted on vehicles, and reverse 911 systems (which use telephone lines to call a group of phone numbers and play recorded messages) are other possible ways of alerting citizens in the community. Because each approach has advantages and disadvantages, the method of warning must be chosen for each jurisdiction. Regardless of the method used, effectiveness is typically dependent on community education during the preparedness phase as well as clarity of communication, consistency of message, accuracy of past warnings, and authority of the person issuing the warning.

Evacuation. Terrorist acts might be planned to take advantage of structural, atmospheric, and topographic conditions as well as routine human activities. In cases of arson and bombing, people must be removed from areas subject to fire, explosion, or collapse. Innovative ways of transporting people should be used as needed. For example, Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani of New York used city buses to take prospective blood donors to alternate facilities in the wake of the terrorism of September 11. This alleviated some of the strain on health care facilities in the World Trade Center area.

Airborne particles must be considered, however, when dealing with chemical and biological incidents. A geographic information system (GIS) and weather modeling can plot contaminated areas to facilitate decision making (people might need to shelter in place instead of proceeding to a designated evacuation area). In addition, to avoid the further spreading of a toxic agent, it might be best not to use helicopters for evacuation. Reverse 911 systems can be used to contact affected homes to alert them of appropriate defensive measures, whether evacuation or shelter in place. Managers should call on the expertise and services of the police, transportation, public health, and other departments to facilitate effective, safe evacuations.

Incident management and coordination. Disasters of any type present unique management and coordination difficulties because they are emotionally charged situations that occur under high levels of public and media scrutiny. Disasters cause diverse people and agencies to come together to perform important functions. In addition, droves of volunteers and curious individuals arrive at the scene immediately after an event. This is called convergence.

Two waves of convergence can be expected at a disaster. The first wave occurs immediately—when nearby citizens, first responders, and other personnel arrive at the scene. The second wave arrives shortly thereafter and includes news media and the public (who come to view the damage and the response activities) and state and federal agencies. Large numbers of unsolicited volunteers continue to arrive throughout the response. Such convergence heightens the need for scene control to make sure that response activities are undertaken in as orderly a fashion as possible.

The interaction of public officials from various departments at the city, county, state, and federal levels, along with private and nonprofit agencies must be organized and coordinated. For example, the U.S. government concept-of-operations plan (see www.fema.gov/r-n-r/conplan/) shows the vast number of individuals and agencies that an emergency manager must work with in a terrorist incident.

At the disaster site, one or several unified command posts should be established to coordinate the response. Field personnel report their observations to incident commanders so they can make informed operational decisions. Incident commanders work with the planning, logistics, operations, and finance sections of the ICS to deploy resources and respond

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effectively. Incident commanders also work to ensure personnel safety and public information, and they carry out liaison with other organizations. Participants in the on-site incident command post must also relay information to the EOC, which will help acquire additional resources and coordinate activities with outside agencies while the incident commander deals with the immediate on-site issues.

Emergency services. Emergency services organizations must respond immediately (or be staged and ready to respond) after any terrorist attack. Firefighters and paramedics should deploy quickly to extinguish fires and provide medical attention. Jurisdictions should be wary of sending all their resources to one area because additional terrorist attacks could take place. Mutual aid agreements should be activated to respond to major events or ensure that services are available for other emergen-

Command Post—El Cerrito, California

Command Post

The Command Post is the location chosen as the neighborhood base of operation during a disaster. Main site and back-up sites should be known in advance. It is the location neighbors know to come to for information on displaced family members, stray pets, hazardous areas, work assignments, first aid station and shelter locations, etc. It also serves as a message center. . .

The Command Post should be in a centralized location with shelter, or a large open area where a temporary shelter such as a tent can be placed, . . . Some examples of Command Post locations include private homes, garages, carports, or patios; child care facilities; churches; parks or playing fields; recreation rooms, lobbies, garages, or parking lots of apartment or condominium buildings, etc.

Supplies

Large sign reading Command Post; signs listing shelter and first aid station sites; table and chairs; status board (chalkboard with chalk and eraser, or dry erase board with markers and eraser, or flipchart or large pad or sheets of paper with tape); clipboards; pads of paper; pens and pencils; sign-in sheets; name tags; checklists and forms; neighborhood and area maps; NEAT [Neighborhood Emergency Assistance Team] Manual; neighborhood disaster and evacuation plan; completed NEAT Neighborhood Data sheets; list of names and addresses of people with special needs; message board (board or corkboard with tacks, or paper, pens, and tape); AM-FM radios and batteries; communication equipment; megaphone; whistles; flashlights and lanterns and batteries; rain gear; comfort items, facial tissues, food, water, etc.

Source: www.el-cerrito.org/fire/incident_command.html.

cies as well. Constant communication between these responders and the incident management staff, the EOC, and hospitals helps ensure that decision makers have the fullest view possible of the nature and scope of the terrorist incident.

Search and rescue. Search-and-rescue efforts during and after disasters are problematic. Large numbers of well-intentioned volunteers often converge on the scene and attempt to fill a real or perceived need. Volunteers often do provide valuable search-and-rescue assistance in the immediate aftermath of the event but may lack equipment and expertise and could cause injury to themselves and even to the people they are trying to save.

Volunteers who undergo FEMA-sponsored civilian emergency response training can be trained beforehand for basic search-and-rescue operations; such training occurs in many jurisdictions throughout the United States. Volunteers should be replaced by well-trained, equipped, and experienced search-and-rescue teams as soon as possible.

Another challenge during response operations is how to limit noise at a disaster site. Many of the technological tools used by urban search-and-rescue teams are extremely sensitive listening devices; their effectiveness requires that all movement and sound at a site cease from time to time.

Those participating in search and rescue after a terrorist attack must also consider the high probability of hazardous materials in the disaster area. A local hazardous materials team, military personnel, or state and federal environmental protection agencies must continually evaluate air, water, and soil around the disaster site for traces of weapons of mass destruction.

Medical care. Hospitals must care for victims of terrorism who arrive on their own, by ambulance, or via a friend or relative. Depending on the magnitude of the incident, hospitals may have to reroute patients to other medical centers or recall enough doctors and nurses to meet the demands of the disaster. Hospitals need to recall staff on a rotating basis—on different shifts—so operations can continue for an extended period of time.

During hazardous material, chemical, and biological terrorist events, hospitals must ensure that patients are decontaminated before they enter the facility; if they are not, they risk contaminating all hospital personnel and even the facility itself. The recent anthrax mailings and resulting infection of postal workers who were exposed to the spores (although they were not the intended targets) show the need to consider secondary contamination issues. Medical staff should also pay close attention to the types of symptoms and number of victims, and staff should report periodically to other public officials and hospitals and strive to obtain effective medicines.

Hospitals should also expect a great number of inquiries about victims and should draw up master lists that include the names and locations of victims.

Although the patient's right to privacy is always a major concern, St. Vincent's Hospital in Manhattan found that the Internet was a useful tool for sharing patient information with other medical facilities after September 11.

Public information. The media can be a valuable asset during disaster response. There is no better channel through which warnings and evacuation notices can be issued.

Emergency managers should therefore find an appropriate location to accommodate large numbers of print and broadcast media representatives. This location must be close enough to the incident to permit the necessary flow of information but far enough away to ensure the media representatives' safety and not interfere with response operations. During the response, jurisdictions should also work to correct any inaccurate media reports about the incident or response activities.

Because terrorists often try to use the media as a conduit to send their messages to the public, government managers at the site of terrorist incidents should try to ensure that the media does not receive information that could be useful to terrorists. For example, it might be prudent to withhold the numbers of responders or the locations of staging areas because that knowledge might be used by terrorists to plan secondary attacks. Of course, the management of information needs to be balanced with the public's right to know. Jurisdictions should also warn the public through the media that violence against suspected terrorists is not tolerated and will result in legal action.

The government should make every effort to provide clear and consistent information about what it is doing to respond to the disaster situation; this should go a long way toward placating fears and helping citizens understand what they should do in times of peril.

Damage assessment. Damage assessment must begin immediately after a terrorist event because the evaluation of casualties and estimated costs to respond and rebuild are starting points for all that follows. Although a state or federal disaster declaration can take place before an assessment of damages has been completed (because of the scope or severity of the event), all declared disasters will eventually require some type of damage assessment. Without a damage assessment, the ability to obtain assistance from state and federal sources is severely hindered.

Jurisdictions must therefore identify and train personnel (e.g., building inspectors) and/or departments (e.g., public works) to assess the degree of devastation. Jurisdictions may also work with other groups (for example, the American Red Cross or businesses) to gain data on personal and corporate loss.

Regardless of who is involved in the damage assessment, it must be performed in an organized manner by assigning teams to different geographic areas and having them report their findings. Because an initial damage assessment will most likely be

wrong or incomplete, it should be reviewed and updated frequently to keep abreast of circumstances and resource needs. Information should be tracked carefully because state and federal officials need to verify the accuracy of the damage assessment before assistance is provided or extended.

Donations management. Disasters of all types, including terrorist events, lead to an outpouring of relief from the public. The mass of donations received at the site can develop into what some call the second disaster; relief supplies could be dumped at the site and get in the way of those responding to the incident. For this reason, financial contributions are generally regarded as the most effective way to meet needs.

If manpower, equipment, and supplies are needed, officials must be careful about what they ask for. Specific requests for donations can be issued as long as the requests are coordinated with the resources-tracking unit of the incident management team and the EOC. Requests should include specific details about the materials requested as well as the

Search and rescue by community emergency response teams

Community emergency response teams (CERTs) can provide life-saving services to disaster victims until professional search-and-rescue personnel arrive. The goals of CERT operations include maintaining volunteer and victim safety, providing basic first aid and triage, and evacuating victims to obtain further medical care. CERT volunteers should:

- Obtain necessary equipment (gloves, masks, helmets, ropes, cutting devices, lifting tools)
- Conduct a mini evaluation of the disaster area to look for voids where victims could be trapped
- Work in pairs to search for victims
- Call for victims and stop periodically to listen for responses
- Cover the entire scene and look at each area from various angles
- Create a safe work environment by carefully removing debris or shoring up unstable areas
- Use spray paint to mark (with a \) areas currently being searched
- Provide triage and basic first aid to victims
- Remove victims carefully by lifting with bended knees and keeping back straight
- Carry a reasonable load next to the volunteer's body only
- Use spray paint to mark (with an X) areas already searched
- Rest, eat, and drink to maintain energy
- Document search results with maps and/or drawings
- Brief search-and-rescue professionals when they arrive and turn over operations to them.

Source: www.fema.gov/emi/cert/

Brochure for citizens—Fairfield, Ohio

What YOU can do...

While our nation is in a heightened sense of awareness to terrorism, the reality is that the potential for a natural disaster or major accident remains the larger threat to our everyday lives. Each family should always be prepared for the unexpected. Emergency preparedness and coping security measures in each household make sense... not just because of recent events.

Security: Lock doors and windows, especially when away from home. Never hesitate to call police if you see something suspicious. In an emergency, dial 9-1-1, or call the non-emergency number at (513) 638-7820.

Suspicious Packages: Although the likelihood is slim that you would receive a tainted letter or package, be mindful of items you receive. Be suspicious of unexpected packages, particularly from someone unfamiliar to you. Misspellings of common names and words in the address, the lack of a return address, or a return address not matching the postmark may heighten your sense of concern. If you receive a suspicious item, do not further disturb the item, close the door to the room, turn off ventilation, wash your hands with soap and water, and call 9-1-1.

Emergency Kit: While gas masks and expensive chemical suits are a bit drastic, having an emergency supply kit is a prudent idea in every household in the event a widespread disaster isolates your family from normal services or prevents easy access to grocery stores. As you stock your emergency kit, consider essential items that your family would need for up to three days. The rule of thumb is one gallon of water per person per day, stored in an unbreakable container. Mark the date the container was filled and change water every six months. Use a sturdy plastic case in which you can store non-perishable foods like peanut butter, canned beans, tinned, non-electric, can opener, flashlight, battery-powered radio, plenty of extra batteries, spare car keys, extra credit cards, medications (three-day supply minimum), a list of family contacts, and special items needed for infants, family members or pets. Also useful is a small tool kit with essential tools for turning off gas and water lines.

Contacts

24-Hour Numbers:

Police/Fire/Medical Emergencies	9-1-1
Fairfield Dispatch (non-emergency)	639-7300
American Red Cross (Local Chapter)	866-7676
Emergency Management (Butler County)	366-6810
Ohio Relay Service for the deaf	1-800-735-0750
Business Hours:	
City of Fairfield	867-5300

Bully Points: You should have three locations at varying distances from your home to meet in the event your family is separated by a disaster situation. A tree in the back yard might serve well for a house fire. A park three blocks away may serve as a meeting place in case a tornado devastates the neighborhood. A grandparent's house at the other end of town may be a meeting point if entry to a wide area is prohibited.

Educate Your Family: Perhaps recent events have sparked discussion within your family of safety issues or what you would do in a disaster situation. While no pamphlet, such as this one, can provide comprehensive information, you may want to research issues that concern you and your family.

No Laughing Matter: Instruct your children as to the seriousness of false statements which may alarm others. With current events, there should be zero tolerance to hoaxes within your household.

For a comprehensive review of issues and items important to family disaster preparedness, log onto www.redcross.org/national-disaster-response/unexpected.html.

Source: www.fairfield-city.org/forms/SecBro.pdf.

tions plans or memorandums of understanding are not developed before disaster strikes, local jurisdictions could be solely responsible for the immediate and long-term needs of the populace after a disaster.

Because shelters might be used for an extended period, local governments should avoid opening shelters in vital buildings such as city hall, where necessary business is regularly conducted. Specific circumstances could create exceptions to this rule, however.

Additional Responses for Incidents of Terrorism

Responder safety. Because any disaster (other than a natural hazard) could be the result of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, emergency workers should approach the scene of the incident carefully. When possible, local governments should ensure that emergency workers size up any disaster situation from a distance (using binoculars while remaining uphill and upwind from the site) to obtain information about what they are dealing with. Emergency workers should consider physical clues such as fires, structural collapse, hazardous materials placards, and the symptoms of victims before they approach and respond to the incident. Knowledgeable and well-equipped local hazardous materials teams, private companies, military personnel, and state and federal environmental agencies may also help identify hazardous agents.

If nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons have been used, responders must shield themselves with the proper personal protective equipment. Limiting the time of exposure and maintaining an adequate distance from the incident site are also ways to protect emergency workers.

Hazardous materials containment and decontamination. If hazardous materials or nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons have been used by terrorists, emergency workers should do all they can to contain the agent and ensure complete decontamination of victims, personnel, and equipment. For example, shutting off HVAC systems can limit the spread of airborne agents, and spreading dirt on the ground can soak up or surround hazardous materials runoff.

The area around the disaster site should be divided up into different sections to permit proper decontamination operations. A hot zone should be cordoned off to denote a dangerous area and limit access to authorized personnel only. A cold zone should also be identified as a safe area to locate the command post, the media, and staged resources. A warm zone is also set aside as the decontamination area. If disaster victims or even first responders are contaminated, their clothing might need to be removed (if possible in a private setting such as a tent specially made for use in responses to emergencies). Brushes, water, and cleaning agents can then be used in the decontamination process. Only well-trained and equipped personnel should be involved in hazardous materials containment and decontamination.

exact location where the donations should be delivered, remembering that after a disaster well-known landmarks and street signs might not be in place.

The local jurisdiction should establish a donations management team and have an adequate facility that will serve as the donations coordination center. Representatives of voluntary agencies should be involved in the donations management team because they often play vital roles in response functions. Local restaurants and vendors often supply food and other material to responders and open their doors to feed victims for no charge. The donations management team should record and track these services so the affected community can meet state and federal requirements for grants and other types of assistance.

Mass care and sheltering. A major terrorist attack could create large numbers of victims and leave many people without food, water, housing, and other basic necessities of life. Organizations such as the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army usually have staff and equipment to feed many people and are able to open shelters on the basis of their prearranged agreements with churches, hotels, schools, and other public buildings. Jurisdictions must not assume that this is always the case, however. If joint emergency opera-

Site security. Unlike natural or technological disasters (earthquakes and industrial explosions, for example) terrorist attacks may require safeguarding responders from more than the fire, chemical compounds, and debris to which they initially respond. This is because terrorists frequently use secondary devices to target emergency workers. In Atlanta in 1997, for example, the bombers of an abortion clinic followed up with a secondary device that exploded near those responding. One terrorist incident in Northern Ireland consisted of at least four bombs.

As in New York City after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, law enforcement personnel should search emergency vehicles and heavy equipment entering the disaster site to avert the possible delivery of explosives or other weapons.

Terrorists could also attack staging areas where additional response personnel are gathering to be mobilized. And local authorities might also want to tighten security at the EOC and other critical government facilities in the wake of terrorist disasters because politicians and other key leaders could be targeted by terrorists to add to ongoing disasters.

Crime scene protection. Unlike natural disasters, terrorist incidents always lead to criminal investigations that can continue for quite some time. Thus a major priority at a terrorism site should be acquisition and protection of evidence.

The criminal aspect of terrorism should prompt responders to make mental notes of the crime scene and, if possible, even write down their thoughts about the incident and the circumstances. Volunteers and responders must not be allowed to move in and out of the affected area as freely as they would in a noncriminal environment. Authorities should establish a list of individuals and groups that are to be granted access and should set up check-in and check-out points to limit access to the crime scene. Letters, faxes, identification tags, and sign-in and sign-out sheets may prove useful for this purpose.

Law enforcement should control access and ensure that evidence is not introduced into or taken from the scene and should maintain a thorough record of the possession (chain of custody) of evidence.

Evidence must also be carefully preserved to avoid contamination. In New York after September 11, this meant that even the debris removed from the ruins of the World Trade Center would be evaluated under strict conditions of security. Other situations might require different measures. For instance, if a jurisdiction is investigating a terrorist incident that involves arson, emergency responders should understand the risks of using gasoline- or diesel-powered generators; exhaust fumes may contaminate debris and preclude the use of evidence that shows that accelerants were used by arsonists. When arson investigators collect samples for evidence, they should likewise use new tools on each investigation to eliminate the potential for contaminated evidence. The important lesson, then, is that first responders and criminal

investigators must acquire and protect evidence through well-devised strategies and techniques.

What every manager needs to know

Small and medium-sized towns and cities, once thought to be at less risk for terrorism, could be increasingly exposed to terrorist acts. City and county administrators need to:

- **Protect human infrastructure.** First responders and medical personnel must be protected in the event of terrorism. Secondary devices must not be forgotten because they can further injure the already wounded and also kill first responders and medical personnel.
- **Identify potential targets.** The U.S. Department of State declares that government buildings (both at home and abroad) are becoming increasingly protected against acts of terrorism; therefore terrorists could shift focus to business and public facilities.
- **Prepare for terrorism.**
 - First, systematically evaluate current capabilities and deficiencies in responding to an incident involving weapons of mass destruction. Then make sound administrative adjustments to address deficiencies.
 - Second, perform a risk assessment and vulnerability analysis of the community. The information gained will be helpful in reducing the risk of a terrorist event.
 - Finally, ensure that local hospitals are prepared to treat victims of a terrorist attack. This begins with each hospital having the capacity to treat at least one patient exposed to an explosive, chemical, or radioactive substance. Nuclear and chemical weapons have complex hazardous materials that need to be washed off contaminated victims before they enter the hospital.
- **Undertake other measures.**
 - Perform capability assessments of the fire department's response to hazardous materials incidents
 - Determine the need for additional training
 - Obtain protective equipment and antidotes
 - Transport contaminated persons and bodies in consultation with emergency medical service personnel
 - Train health care personnel to assist in diagnosing trends in biological attacks
 - Establish mutual aid agreements among communities to make better use of resources
 - Incorporate the private sector because industry can assist in raising overall community preparedness and may be able to provide financial assistance.

Source: Adapted from Howard Levitin, "Preparing for Terrorism: What Every Manager Needs to Know," *Public Management* 80, no. 12 (December 1998): 4, www.icma.org/documents/index.cfm?code=%2A%2B%40%5C%23WUDM74%5C%3AE%3D48%0A&hdr=ll.

RECOVERY

After a terrorist incident, cleanup, restoration, and rebuilding are essential for the community's well-being. Crisis counseling for citizens' well-being is also crucial.

Debris Removal

Debris removal from an incident of terrorism is almost always impeded by a criminal investigation. Every piece of debris is a potential clue and must be carefully examined before final disposal; this certainly has been the case in the World Trade Center area of New York. Exacting inspections take a great deal of time and can delay other parts of the recovery. Local jurisdictions should therefore make appropriate debris removal a top priority after a terrorist attack.

Environmental Restoration

Local officials also need to consider environmental issues in the aftermath of a terrorist attack because the debris generated by a terrorist event may contain hazardous materials. Great care is necessary when dealing with these materials, and contractors or state and federal agencies (for example, health and environmental

departments) that have expertise with these types of wastes must be called in. Many local employees—for example, the fire department of the jurisdiction that oversees runoff from fire suppression water—must understand legal issues involving hazardous materials and environmental contamination. Local jurisdictions also need to anticipate much followup paperwork and many inspections to certify a proper cleanup.

Mass Casualties

Because terrorists try to maximize casualties, large numbers of deaths can be expected to follow a terrorist incident. Jurisdictions must therefore plan for the establishment of a temporary or permanent morgue. Because many vehicles, official and unofficial, may bring bodies, any temporary morgue needs ample parking space. Private trucks with refrigeration units may be used to provide extra storage for bodies. If nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons have been used, bodies must be handled with extreme caution to avoid further contamination. FEMA's DMAT and DMORT teams can provide advice and assistance. Body remains should be identified and families notified as quickly and as sensitively as possible.

Rebuilding

Local jurisdictions play a major role in the rebuilding process. Public officials should understand the process of acquiring state and federal disaster funds. In addition, public officials should also ensure that construction companies do not take advantage of disaster victims through fraudulent business practices. If critical infrastructure—telephone, electricity, water, transportation—is destroyed, local governments should work closely with utility providers to restore services as quickly as possible.

Daily meetings that include the mayor, the city manager, public works director, police chief, transportation director, and other department leaders should be held to create shift schedules and coordinate the acquisition and use of heavy equipment. These meetings can be held at city hall, in the EOC, the disaster field office, or other convenient and secure places.

Problems identified during the threat assessment or during the terrorist incident itself could be corrected during this phase; for example, the size, exposure, and vulnerability of buildings should be reconsidered. The recovery period is a prime opportunity to see that setbacks and other design criteria are included in new construction.

Disaster Assistance

After a terrorist incident, many individuals, businesses, and public entities may well be in need of disaster assistance. Local and state governments should therefore consider budgeting funds for disaster relief. If funds cannot be set aside, the jurisdiction can still

U.S. law and policy

- **Title XIV of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-201, September 23, 1996).** This law, also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, required the U.S. Department of Defense to, among other things, examine federal, state, and local agencies' ability to respond to terrorist incidents. This act spawned training efforts in 120 U.S. cities and the development of tools to mitigate terrorist incidents.
- **Federal response plan (FRP) and the terrorism incident annex.** Created in 1992, the FRP is the policy under which the U.S. government deals with presidentially declared disasters. The FRP carries the signature of 26 federal agencies and the American Red Cross. Included in the 1997 FRP is an annex for terrorist incidents.
- **PDD 39.** In June 1995 the White House issued presidential decision directive (PDD) 39 to direct a number of measures to reduce U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, to deter and respond to terrorist acts, and to strengthen capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. PDD 39 discusses crisis management and consequence management.
- **PDD 62.** As a follow-up to PDD 39, PDD 62 was signed in 1998 to provide training and resources to the 120 largest cities in the United States. This directive also noted the successes and current challenges of domestic preparedness initiatives.

prepare to help citizens and business owners get in touch with people and groups that can help them. For example, the jurisdiction must ensure that citizens know the location of the disaster recovery center. Giving individuals the information they need to seek assistance may enable them to speed up their own

recovery. The American Red Cross and FEMA's National Disaster Tele-registration Center can serve as primary contacts for those seeking assistance. Other federal agencies, including the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Small Business Administration, have programs to assist disaster victims.

Lessons from the attack on the Pentagon

Although the events of September 11, 2001, had a significant impact on the entire nation, responders from Arlington County, Virginia, arrived first after the attack on the Pentagon. County Manager Ron Carlee asserts that the county gained numerous lessons as it reflected on its response and considered feedback from outsiders:

- **Prepare for disaster.** The threat of Y2K encouraged the community to create and test emergency operations plans that proved to be extremely useful in the response to the Pentagon terrorism. An EOC was also established in advance of Y2K and was used extensively for several days after the attack on the Pentagon. The EOC facilitated communication with field personnel and permitted the exchange of important information during periodic briefings among various departments. This was valuable in that it ensured "that the right hand knows what the left hand is doing," and it encouraged people to plan ahead.
- **Create an emergency declaration.** Arlington County had an emergency declaration in place and was able to implement it quickly after the September 11 terrorism at the Pentagon. The county was familiar with the process of relaying the necessary information to state and federal officials. Such familiarity was key to the quick request and fast activation of FEMA's urban search-and-rescue teams.
- **Train for response.** Practice the implementation of mutual aid agreements to ensure the interoperability of language, command structures, and radio systems. Combined training with the neighboring counties of Alexandria and Fairfax was credited as another reason for Arlington's successful response.
- **Control the scene.** Help will come from everywhere, regardless of whether you request it or not. Do not assume that everyone at the site has a legitimate reason to be there. A security system must be implemented to control access. At the Pentagon, it took at least 48 hours to achieve the appropriate level of security.
- **Safety is a top priority.** Arlington County undertook several measures to protect emergency workers. Rules were established on the required safety gear for emergency personnel. An environmental health specialist and communicable disease specialist were present to ensure the protection of workers and conduct medical surveillance. A physician with EMS oversight was on scene and highly visible. Shift limits were strictly enforced. Homemade food from well-meaning citizens was not given to emergency workers in order to ensure their health and well-being.
- **Meet the needs of emergency workers.** Responding personnel cannot do their jobs without adequate resources such as fencing, lumber, lighting, and generators. At the Pentagon, preestablished relationships with Home Depot, Grainger, and the Maryland Fire Equipment Company sped up Arlington's ability to respond.
- **Keep people informed.** After the Pentagon attack, Arlington had to deal with a host of national and international media. The county's Web site was used as an electronic newspaper. The public was given numbers for a 24-hour information line and a 24-hour counseling line. E-mail was used by the Arlington's department of economic development to provide the business community with information. Broadcast voice mail was also sent to county and school employees.
- **Maintain involvement of public officials.** Local leaders play vital roles in disasters by providing direction, maintaining public confidence in the services provided by the government, and communicating with state and federal officials. Although after the Pentagon attack Arlington County recognized that briefings to the local legislative body would have been helpful, many public officials conveyed to the public the unacceptability of hate crimes.
- **Participation is vital.** Mutual aid partners, corporations, nonprofit organizations, federal urban search-and-rescue teams, numerous state and federal agencies, and a supportive public cooperated and were essential to the success of the response operations. Individuals, departments, and various levels of government cooperated and collaborated.
- **Recognize success.** Celebrate bravery and success, especially among the family and friends of victims and emergency workers. The county held a community event to remember those who died at the Pentagon and to recognize those who served with distinction. A public event can be meaningful and moving without being excessive or extravagant.

Source: Adapted from Ron Carlee, "The Local Response to a National Tragedy," *Public Management* 83, no. 11 (December 2001): 6-9, www.icma.org/docs/500354.htm.

18 Managing the Threat of Terrorism

Crisis Counseling

Natural and technological disasters often evoke disturbing mental images and memories. Knowing that the damage and destruction is intentional can make emotional recovery even more difficult. Terrorism, especially if it causes great numbers of deaths, can cause sorrow and depression in an entire community. Local governments should work with crisis counselors to help console victims and their families. Responders might also need these services; it has become apparent that emergency services providers also need help from time to time in dealing with the emotional impact of their work.

Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) teams—composed of colleagues of fire, police, and EMS personnel—might also help people recover emotionally from disaster. Many jurisdictions have developed their own CISD teams to speak as peers with those in need of assistance. All those involved in a response have an obligation to keep a watchful eye on their coworkers to determine whether there is a need to call on a CISD team.

If a jurisdiction does not have its own team, it should look to nearby communities; emergency management offices in every jurisdiction should have a list of CISD personnel or teams in the area. Additional

information on organized CISD teams as well as training courses, seminars, and conference schedules is available from the International Critical Incident Stress Foundation, Inc. Prevention of post-traumatic stress among citizens and emergency services professionals is an important goal for all managers during and following a terrorist event.

CONCLUSION

The events on and following September 11, 2001, have awakened the United States to the serious threat of terrorism toward all Americans and their institutions. Local jurisdictions need to reaffirm their capabilities of emergency management (including warning, evacuation, search and rescue, public information, debris management, and disaster assistance) as well as take other steps that are specific to the threat of terrorism (protect emergency workers, be prepared to deal with weapons of mass destruction, maintain site control, and protect the crime scene). Although terrorist activity may be difficult to prevent, our communities should not be caught unprepared. Local jurisdictions must support the emergency manager's efforts to anticipate the threat of terrorism.

Western Massachusetts CISD Team

Serving

- Emergency medical services
- Fire departments
- Police departments
- Dispatchers
- Emergency departments
- Hospital staff
- Disaster responders
- Ambulance services.

Definition of a critical incident

A critical incident is any situation faced by emergency personnel that causes them to experience unusually strong emotional reactions that have the potential to interfere with their ability to function either at the scene or later.

Examples of a critical incident

- Death of a peer in the line of duty
- Death of a child
- Mass casualties
- Prolonged situations
- Events with intense media coverage.

Purpose of CISD

The purpose of Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) is to accelerate normal recovery, for normal people, having normal and necessary reactions to abnormal events.

Source: www.wmems.org/cisd.htm.

What we do

The Western Massachusetts CISD Team provides a simple yet effective method to help those emergency workers trying to cope with stressful experiences. CISD promotes the continuation of productive careers while building healthy stress management behaviors.

We offer

- Stress education geared toward emergency service professionals
- Support teams at the scene and after an incident
- Debriefing and defusing services
- Family support programs including special programs for spouses and significant others
- A resource and referral network.

Who we are

The Western Massachusetts CISD team is composed of specially trained emergency service and mental health professionals who volunteer their time, energy, and resources. Team members receive comprehensive training and participate in regular continuing education sessions. The Western Mass CISD Team is one of over 100 teams serving emergency service personnel nationally and internationally.

APPENDIX A

INTERNET RESOURCES

American Institute of Architects
www.aia.org/

American Red Cross
www.redcross.org/services/
disaster/keepsafe/unexpected.
html

**American Society of Civil
Engineers**
www.asce.org/

**ANSER Institute for Homeland
Security**
www.homelandsecurity.org/

Anti-Defamation League
www.adl.org/main_terrorism.asp

**Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention**
www.cdc.gov/

Department of Justice
www.usdoj.gov

Department of Defense
www.defenselink.mil/

Department of Energy
www.energy.gov/

**Department of Health and
Human Services**
www.hhs.gov/

Environmental Protection Agency
www.epa.gov/

Federal Bureau of Investigation
www.fbi.gov

**Federal Emergency Management
Agency**
www.fema.gov/

FirstGov
www.firstgov.gov/

**International City/County
Management Association**
Emergency readiness site: www.
icma.org/issueintersections/er.cfm

**International Critical Incident
Stress Foundation, Inc.**
www.icisf.org

National Association of Counties
www.naco.org/

**National Disaster Medical
System**
www.oep-ndms.dhhs.gov/NDMS/
ndms.html

**National Domestic Preparedness
Office**
www.ndppo.gov/

**National Guard and Reserve Fact
Sheet**
www.esgr.org/tipsemployers.html

Office of Homeland Security
www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/

Public Entity Risk Institute
www.riskinstitute.org/

U.S. Conference of Mayors
www.usmayors.org/

United States Postal Service
www.usps.com

APPENDIX B

RECOMMENDED READING

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